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Abstract
This research was conducted on two marketing companies, the Icelandic
Freezing Plant Corporation (IFPC, established 1942) and the Union of
Icelandic Fish Producers (UIFP, established 1932) in the Icelandic Fish
Industry, established by producers to export and market their products. The
main research question is "What is the role of the "central firm'" in
strategic alliances involving large numbers of small and medium size
enterprises"? The main emphasis is on studying the governance of vertical
alliances with a high number of participants' companies. These two
alliances have changed from being joint ventures owned by producers to
market their products to becoming independent Limited Liability
Companies on the public stock markets. The research is based on case
study methods where each marketing company is taken as a separate case.
Data was collected through various first and secondary data, such as
interviews and archival sources. Conclusions where drawn from each case
separately and then a mutual conclusion drawn from both cases.
It is argued in the research findings that the role of the central firm in
governing alliances with a high number of participants' companies should
be threefold; a coordinator, a strategic leader and a creative environment for
the participants' companies. Two types of administrative mechanisms were
identified, that is, a formal mechanism based on centralisation and an
informal mechanism based on direct communication. It is suggested that
the informal mechanism is much more likely to shape a value creative
environment for the participants' companies, while the formal mechanism
was more economical in an environment where value creation was not
required. In both cases, some mixture of these two mechanisms was used
and in accordance with the demands of value creation.
' In this thesis the term "central firms" is used to refer to the company that has an intermediary role in
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I Introduction
In business, the formation of alliances between companies in one form or
another is inescapable. The most common form of alliance usually occurs
where relationships between companies and their suppliers and customers
are close. Other forms of alliances, such as joint ventures, licensing and
networks of firms, are apparently becoming important in both domestic and
international business1. Cooperation and competition have often been put
forward as a contrast. It is equally important, in companies' strategies, to be
able to cooperate with other companies as well as compete with them2.
Examples of cooperation between companies include networks, inter-firm
cooperation, cooperative strategy, joint venture, strategic networks,
franchising, and licensing. Any arrangements in which companies agree
formally to cooperate are increasingly called "strategic alliances". A
strategic alliance is defined here as "where two or more companies
cooperate together to attain shared strategic objectives3". This definition
includes cooperative arrangements such as a joint venture, collaborative
venture, licensing, franchising, subcontracting and suppliers' and
customers' relationships that build on close cooperation in matters such as
research and development (abbreviated R&D) and quality control.
The increasing speed of change in the business strategic environment of the
past two decades makes it even more difficult for companies to focus
entirely on a "going it alone" strategy4. Companies face hard and often
unfamiliar competition from unexpected directions such as rival alliances.
This makes the business environment even more unpredictable5. Today's
business strategic environment involves rapid changes caused by increased
global competition, faster technological changes and variations in
customers' demands. These include:
1 Alter, C. & Hage, J.
2 Contractor, J. F. & Lorange, P.
3 This definition supports to definition that has been put forward by, Lorange P. & Roos J., page vi,
1993.
4 Contractor, J. F. & Lorange, P.; Harrigan, R. K. 1985.
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• Social: For example changes in fashion, family size, as well as increased interest in
health food and environmental issues which in turn lead to new consumption patterns
and customer demands.
• Political: The opening up of new markets, for example China and even the temporary
slowing down of others, as happened when the East-European bloc collapsed or during
the 1998 economic problems in Asia.
• Increased global competition from companies in countries like Taiwan, South Korea
and China.
• Demands from customers. Some aspects such as quality are now taken for granted so
it is no longer a major competitive advantage as was true 10-15 years ago6.
• Technological: Where the technology is becoming more complicated causing some
firms to emphasise their R&D investment.
It would be easy to carry on with this enumeration. Clearly, these changes
in the business environment have caused senior managers and owners of
companies to realise that they face difficulties coping with both old as well
as new forms of competition. These problems push firms to examine close
cooperation with other companies. The main motives for most alliances
appear to be to gain access to knowledge and skills, and/or to lower costs,
and/or to achieve the ability to overcome and/or heighten barriers for new
entrants and/or sharing risk7. By forming alliances, companies can
strengthen their own competitive stances by sticking to their core business
and expertise while letting their partner companies with other appropriate
resources take care ofwhat they in turn do best.
Although turbulence in the business environment seems to have increased
the importance of strategic alliances in some form or another, there is
evidence to suggest that strategic alliances are not a straightforward strategic
choice8. Cooperative arrangements between companies put great pressure
on management to share information and values and possibly to integrate
part of their activities. This is likely to be hard for companies that do not
have the organisational ability to cope with such arrangements. This is
especially true if the organisational structure of the participating companies
is hierarchical and bureaucratic, causing them to be incapable of coping with
the demands of co-operating closely with other companies9. Cross frontier
6 Hamel, G & Prahalad, K.C.
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partnerships between companies may face additional problems due to
differences in value systems, labour practice, law, language and culture.
Problems can also occur in collaboration between domestic companies. The
reported high percentage of failures of strategic alliances demonstrates
possible operating problems10. It has been pointed out that special abilities
are required ofmanagers in strategic alliances as opposed to those necessary
for hierarchically structured firms pursuing a "go it alone strategy"11.
Much of the literature on strategic alliances relates to either international
joint ventures between two large companies of different nationalities12 or,
increasingly, to studies of close relationships between large companies and
their suppliers13. Most of the published examples are of firms in the
automobile industry in the US and Japan, or of firms in the aerospace
industry. There is little discussion in the literature of alliances between
domestic companies, although these are increasingly common in mature
economies such as in the US and, of course, in Japan14. In addition there is
little published research on strategic alliances between small and medium
size companies particularly if the alliances involve ten or more participants15
(as in so called marketing cooperative). Small and medium size enterprises
(abbreviated SMEs16) could be said to require alliances at least as much if
not more than large companies. This is due to their resource constraint,
which hinder the SMEs abilities to market internationally (as in this study),
take on major projects and/or invest heavily in R&D. Hence, it can be
argued that the competitive position of SMEs can be improved by their





12 See for example Harrigan, R. K., 1985.
13 See for example Helper, S.; Human, E. S. & Provan, K.
14
Harrigan, R. K., 1985.
15 Human, E. S. & Provan, K.
16 In this thesis SMEs is defined as companies with 1 - 500 employees.
17 Alter, C. & Hage, J.
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Due to differences in the nature of SMEs and large companies, the strategic
alliances between SMEs could differ from what is known about strategic
alliances between large companies. Differences in alliances between SMEs
and between large companies may be due to limited resources resulting in a
higher dependency by SMEs on the alliances than in the case for larger
companies, the greater number of companies in each alliance may well
require a different administration mechanism to that in alliance between a
limited number of large companies, differences in the power structure due to
a high level of dependency on the alliance, lower levels of resources and
finally differences in aims and strategy of such cooperative alliances. These
issues have not received much attention from academics, and there is
therefore causing little understanding of the suggested difference in strategic
alliances between SMEs and large companies.
The organisational form (structure) and the administrative mechanism of
strategic alliances as a whole are said to be unstable. Such alliances can be
seen as lying between two extremes. On the one hand there is the firm
operating in a totally open "market" - an economic "free for all" in which
the firm competes with all others to gain an advantage not only against
direct competition but also in terms of other resources and market position.
On the other hand there is the firm which attempts to gain market control
over the input-output situation through vertical integration ("hierarchy")1 .
Researchers have increasingly emphasised that strategic alliances should not
be viewed as some kind of intermediate position on a single dimensional
scale between "market" and "hierarchy" but as a unique type1 . This leads
to a discussion on the mechanism needed to govern strategic alliances where
there is neither the hierarchy-controlled process of a vertically integrated
firm nor the "invisible hand" of the market ruled by price and other
• • ... 90 • •
competitive activities . Academics in the organisational field are not
unanimous about the mechanism and methods to govern the alliances. On
the one hand are those that look at this process almost as a "grassroots
18






mechanism" that uses very informal methods from coordination . On the
other hand are the advocates of using a more formal mechanism to co¬
ordinate activities and resource in the alliances22. Clearly, internal
organisational relationships as in strategic alliances, demand the existence of
some kind of administrative mechanism23 to permit the sharing of
information and knowledge as well as to co-ordinate activities24. This is
crucial if the strategic alliance is to be efficient and competitive. Academics
have pointed out that more research is required focusing on the long-term
development of such alliances and methods of management to support a
better understanding of the way they operate25. This debate about the
administrative mechanism is very relevant for alliances between SMEs due
to the often high number of participants and limited resources, suggesting
different patterns to those in alliances or networks between large companies.
As has been described, strategic alliances of all types between SMEs have
not received much attention from academic researchers despite their
apparent strategic value to SMEs. This indicates a gap in the study of
strategic alliances. The intention of this research is to contribute to filling
this gap by studying three marketing companies in the Icelandic fish
industry established by groups of small processing companies to take charge
of the export of their products. The three marketing companies established
by producers (who process fish caught by their own fishing vessels or by
other individual fishing vessels) that was originally planed to studied here
are; the Solusamband Islenskra FiskframleiQenda (Union of Icelandic Fish
producers) abbreviated UIFP, established 1932, SolumiSstod
Hradfrystihusanna (Icelandic Freezing Plants), abbreviated IFPC,
established 1942 and Islenskar SjavarafurQir (IS/SIS) (Icelandic
Seafood/Federation of Icelandic Co-operatives) abbreviated IS. These three
companies have had the dominant share of the export of fish products from
Iceland; in 1982 these three companies exported 71.5% of the total fish
21
Thompson, P. & McHugh, D.
22
Thompson, P. & McHugh, D.
23 Axelsson, B.




products26. Due to increased freedom permitted by the government of
Iceland in the export of fish, which led to increased competition, this
proportion has fallen to 57.0% in 199127.
At around the same time as this research began (1995/96), Icelandic Seafood
faced increased operational difficulties, leading to finical problems of
Icelandic Seafood. This can be traced to high investment at the same time
that the company was facing poor profitability and the collapse of a big
project in Russia. These problems led to Icelandic Seafood denying the
author access to its companies concerning this research, thereby reducing
the number ofmarketing companies in the study to two. Icelandic Seafood
and Icelandic Freezing Plant were very similar companies and both
specialised in selling frozen fish. Historically, Icelandic Freezing Plant have
had a 50% higher portion of the export of frozen fish from Iceland than
Icelandic Seafood. The development and structure of Icelandic Freezing
Plants and Icelandic Seafood have in many cases been similar, so it can be
argued that no important or different information about alliances between
the marketing companies and their producers will be left out by omitting
Icelandic Seafood.
Over 95% of all fish products from Iceland are exported so the processing
companies have depended, for their financial viability, on the export of their
products and therefore on the success of their alliances. IFPC was originally
established by privately owned processing companies but UIFP was
established by processing companies that were both privately owned as well
as in cooperative ownership. Both IFPC and UIFP operated on co-operative
bases until 1992 when UIFP was changed into a limited liability company
and later, in 1996, IFPC went through the same changes. Until the
ownership changes of these two companies, they both operated as marketing
co-operative organisations, which returned their profits to their members
through taking a lower commission on sales of fish. Since the formation of
the two marketing co-operatives the nature of the alliances has changed due






independent. The study of these two marketing companies provides an
excellent opportunity to study the development and nature of such
(marketing cooperative) strategic alliances between SMEs. The objectives
of the proposed study include:
• Analysing the governance of strategic alliances between high numbers of
small and medium size enterprises and the role of "central firm" in the
governance and structure of such alliances.
• Analysing alliances with a "large" number of participants and the impact
the number of actors has on the strategy of the alliances.
• Analysing the development of the two alliances over a 50 years period
and the changes in the aims and forms of these alliances during that
period.
• Analysing two exporting companies operating in a rather homogenous
strategic environment, which appear to have developed distinctive
strategies.
1.1 Purpose andAims ofthe Study
The main purpose of this research is to study the historic development of the
"central firm"28 in strategic alliances between large groups of SMEs, in
order to provide a better understanding of such alliances. The nature of this
research is explanatory and descriptive, with the emphasis on analysing
what are the key factors in the development of the "central firm" and its
transition into an independent company in the Icelandic fish industry. The
goal is to increase understanding about this development and generate some
knowledge emerging from the empirical part of the study in order to
contribute to the identified gap in the literature (see chapter V).
The main research question therefore is:
"What is the role of the "central firm " in strategic alliances involving large
numbers ofsmall and medium size enterprises?
a) What is the role of the central firm in the governance
(administrative mechanism/coordination/management) of the
alliances?
b) What methods have been used to co-ordinate activities and actors
in the alliances as a whole?
c) How has the structure ofthe alliances changed over the operation
time and what has influenced these changes? "
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The research will cover the history of the two strategic alliances in the
Icelandic fish industry from their beginning until today (1998). In these
alliances the "central firm" is the intermediary between the producers and
the international process and/or retail distribution end of the supply chain
and is therefore responsible for all marketing activities outside Iceland. The
main emphasis in this research will be on the development of the "central
firm" but it is considered necessary to study the complete chain of processes
from the producers to the market, in order to develop a more holistic picture
of these alliances, their developments and the inter-connection of the key
factors found in the study.
Specific topics, which emerged from the general purpose and the main research
objectives, are:
I. The role of the two marketing companies as "central firm" in the
alliances, stressing over several levels in the value adding chain.
II. The role of the central firm in the "governance" of the alliances as a
whole and what impact changes have on the administrative
mechanism of the alliances.
III. The structure of the strategic alliances and how these have evolved
and developed.
IV. Finally, the academic literature in strategic alliances will be
compared with the findings of this research.
From the research questions as well as the nature of the research it should be
clear that this study is aimed at the managerial aspect of strategic alliances
between small and medium size companies. As has been pointed out this
aspect of strategic alliances between SMEs has received little attention from
academics, leaving a gap in the literature. Research on strategic alliances
has in many cases focused on the economical aspect of companies working
together with the main focus on explaining the reasons for their existence
and different forms of such arrangements. Rather than taking this
economical view of the strategic alliances, this research will focus on the
managerial aspect of operating such an inter-relationship between
companies. Academics have increasingly pointed out that a better
28 In this thesis the phrase "central firm" is used to refer to the company that has an intermediary role
in strategic alliances and takes care of some joint activities for participant companies.
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understanding is needed of the methods of management of strategic
alliances and other forms of inter-organisational relationship29.
1.2 Implications of the study
Implications of this research are threefold. Firstly it will contribute to the
theories about strategic alliances, secondly it will contribute to business
policy of small and medium size companies, and thirdly it will benefit
companies in the Icelandic fish industry.
First of all, this research is meant to contribute to the increased body of
knowledge and theories of companies' relationships and, more specifically,
of strategic alliances between small and medium size companies. Due to
little research and even lack of knowledge of the managerial aspect of
strategic alliances, and even more so in alliances between small and medium
size enterprise, an attempt will be made to help fill that gap with this
research. In that way it will contribute to theories of networking and
strategic alliances by adding to them a research on long term alliances in the
Icelandic fish industry providing an excellent opportunity to study long term
changes on such alliances. This research will also draw out the difference
between alliances of large companies and SMEs by comparing the academic
literature of strategic alliances with the findings of the empirical research
that will be undertaken in this study. Hence, the research will more clearly
establish what this difference includes, which will be of great relevance for
further research in this field.
Secondly, this research is aimed at contributing to the business policy of
small and medium size companies by studying the long-term alliances
between such companies in the Icelandic fish industry. Lessons will be
drawn from the two alliances that could contribute to other SMEs by adding
knowledge to the management of strategic alliances, which involve a high
number of participants. This is important for the strategy of small and
medium size companies, which often have to look for extension of their
business through alliances with other companies due to lack of resources
(for example, capital and human resources).
29
Obsborn, N. R. & Hagedoorn, J.; Axelsson, B.; Alter, C & Hage, J..
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Thirdly, it is inevitable that this research will also contribute to the Icelandic
fish industry due to the fact that the two companies that are studied are all
operating in that business. Better understanding of the managerial aspect of
the alliances that the majority of companies in the Icelandic fish industry are
participating in, will inevitably contribute to the industry and therefore the
Icelandic economy as a whole.
The fact that only two companies are studied and both in the same business
and country limits the generalisation of the study, however it makes
comparison more reliable than if the companies would have been from
different industries or countries.
1.3 Structure and summary ofchapters
This thesis is divided into 7 chapters. Chapter II is the research
methodology chapter providing an overview of the research methods used in
this research. In this research, multiple sources of data are used such as
archival data, articles, annual reports, companies' newsletters and histories
of the two companies. In addition to this, interviews were used as a main
source of data in studying the last period of the development of the
companies. The main research method is case studies where the two cases
are taken as separate cases and then mutual conclusions are drawn. Chapter
III provides basic information for the background of the study, that is,
geographical and economical information about Iceland. This chapter
shows the importance of the Icelandic fish industry for the Icelandic
economy and for the local communities that the industry is operating in.
Chapter IV describes the Icelandic Fish Industry, its development and
characteristics. This chapter shows that great changes have occurred in the
fish industry since the quota system was implemented in 1983. The main
characteristics of these changes are concentration of the companies in the
industry. Four main factors are indicated as main factors in these changes.
These four factors are the quota system, increased freedom in export of fish
products in Iceland, increased freedom in the Icelandic economy and finally
increased entrance of companies in the fish industry into the public stock
market. Chapter V provides the critical Literature review concerning
10
cooperation between companies. The main emphasis is on strategic
alliances, as well as on the growing literature about networking of
companies. In chapter VI the cases of Union of Icelandic Fish Producers
and Icelandic Freezing Plants are presented. This chapter is divided into
two subchapters one for each case. Discussion about each case is split into
three parts: First, the analytical view over the history and development of
the company is presented. Secondly, more analytical analysis is presented
of the development of these networks. This analysis is built upon the
archival sources although the main emphasis is on data taken from the
interviews. The third and last part includes conclusions for each case. The
last chapter in this thesis presents the conclusions and implications of this
work, where the main findings from the empirical study are drawn together,
and comparisons are made between the two cases as well as with existing
literature. Finally the implications of this study for the Icelandic fish
industry and the Icelandic economy are presented along with a discussion of
theoretical implications and suggestion for further research.
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II Research Methodology
As stated in the introduction, the original idea of this research was to study
three of the big marketing companies in the Icelandic fish industry. The
accessibility to the companies limited this down to two companies, IFPC
and UIFP. The third company that was originally to be included in this
research, Icelandic Seafood, was going through great difficulties during the
time the research was undertaken. These difficulties were reflected by great
changes inside Icelandic Seafood such as changes on the management team,
which could have made research on them difficult. Due to these difficulties,
Icelandic Seafood denied the author access to the company for this research.
Later, in autumn 1999, Icelandic Seafood merged with UIFP. The
development of Icelandic Seafood and IFPC through the history of the two
companies has been almost identical. Both companies have been selling
their products on the same markets with a similar strategy of operating sales
offices and secondary processing plants in the market area. The relationship
with the producers has more or less developed in the same way, where
producers were the owners and dominated the boards of the two companies.
The development of Icelandic Seafood is explained in chapter IV which
deals with the Icelandic fish industry. Some lessons were also drawn from
the development of Icelandic Seafood and these are included in chapter VI
in relation to research findings. It is therefore claimed that the absence of
Icelandic Seafood in the research will not leave out important data for this
project.
The fourth primary marketing company that would have been possible to
include in this research was the Icelandic Herring Board. The Icelandic
Herring board is in many ways different from the other primary marketing
companies in that it was not established by producers to sell their products,
but was much more a governmental institution where the parliament and the
Ministry of Fishery nominate members of board. The Icelandic Herring
board had a monopoly on the export of Herring from Iceland for a long
time. This direct governmental influence differs greatly from the other three
marketing companies that were established by producers for producers so
Icelandic Herring Board is therefore not included in this research. The
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Icelandic Herring Board was in 1998 changed into a Limited Liability
Company and renamed Islandssild hf., which in 1999 merged with UIFP.
Hence, during the period of this research, UIFP has merged with two of the
three remaining marketing companies, leaving only UIFP and IFPC of the
four that would have been a possible sample in the beginning of this
research.
II. 1 Research Perspective
The main aim of this research is to analyse the role of the central firm in the
governance of strategic alliances between high numbers of SMEs
companies. The focus is on the governance of the network, and on what has
influenced it and changed it over the operation time of the alliances. The
main research question is therefore:
"What is the role of the "central firm" in strategic alliances involving large
numbers ofsmall and medium size enterprises?
a) What is the role of the central firm in the governance
(administrative mechanism/coordination/management) of the
alliances?
b) What methods have been used to co-ordinate activities and actors
in the alliances as a whole?
c) How has the structure of the alliances changed over the operation
time and what has influenced these changes? "
The objective of the research is to provide an analysis on the development
of these two networks, in order to generate knowledge that will contribute to
the identified gap in the literature about networking between small and
medium size companies (see chapter V).
Human and Provan point out that there are very limited comparative
empirical studies on SMEs networks and that it is difficult to make
generalisations about them because most the research relates to large
companies1. Other academics have pointed out the need for a
multidimensional perspective in studying strategic alliances and networks.
Osborn and Hagedoorn for example "encourage researchers to abandon a
singular, clear-cut description of alliances and networks based on the
1
Human, E. S. & Provan, K.
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assumption of a host discipline in favour of a more robust, sophisticated,
multidimensional vision 2. In a similar way Easton points out that in such a
young paradigm as network research "there exists a remarkable number of
alternative views and perspective, sometimes espoused by the same author
at different times. In addition since these are views of the same phenomena
from different angles they are irreconcilable and cannot be integrated... "3.
According to these there is not much to build on to make comparable
research or to use a known methodology from other studies, especially in
connection to SMEs, as is the case here.
Another factor that influenced the choice of research methodology for this
study is the importance of the Icelandic fish industry for the Icelandic
economy in general, in particular, for those individual areas whose
prosperity is built upon the operation of the fish industry. In the past, this
has often been reflected in great social pressure on companies in the
industry leading to business decisions that are not the most efficient or
profitable. With increased competition and pressure from owners
(shareholders) of the companies, profit and efficiency plays a bigger role in
the decision making process today than in the past. This social pressure, as
well as the number of owners, conflict of interest and the mixed form of
relationships makes the decision of what research framework to use in
studying this development rather difficult. Nohria points this out when he
claims that in studying organisation it has been too common that the
environment is treated as a black box4. According to Nohria it is important
to recognise the environment and its impact on the companies5. Due to this
it is clear that it would be difficult to use the traditional "dominant
perspective", such as the competitive analysis of Porter where outside
companies are viewed as "extended rivals"6 and the transactional cost
theories that focus on the single relationship that a company has with its
2 Osborn, N. R. & Hagedoorn, J., page 274.
3
Easton, G., page 4.
4 Nohria, N.
5 Nohria, N.
6 Johnston. R. & Lawrence, R. P.
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suppliers or customers7. In addition to this there is only a very limited body
of research on the business environment in the Icelandic fish industry or the
operation of companies in the industry8. It is therefore the author's
conclusion that it is necessary in researching strategic alliances to view the
participating companies as a part of the network and embedded in the
environment that it is working in, and not as a single free standing unit.
This can be supported by Easton were he claims that "ifstrong relationships
exist among buyers and sellers then the facile switching among easily
available alternatives which is assumed in economic analysis no longer
applies"9. Furthermore he claims that history becomes important and "the
rules of optimum resource allocation fail as relational constraints start to
bite and motives other that short term profit maximisation begin to
dominate"10. Hence it seems clear that a mixture of frameworks is needed
where both efficiency and social factors are acknowledged as pressures or
reasons for decision-making. This is supported by the increased interest in
using mixed framework in organization research11. Perhaps this trend also
reflects a growing disappointment with theories that portray efficiency as
the driving force behind decision-making12.
As has been presented, the objective of this research is to study the role of
the central firm as well as the structure and governance of strategic alliances
in the Icelandic fish industry. Barley and Tolbert point out that
"researcher(s) who wish to study changes in institutions that govern the
action of collective activities may therefore need to resort to historical and
archival data. Studies of inter-organisational networks suggest that
researchers can reconstruct relationships among organisations over time by
drawing on a variety of archival sources"13. This supports the argument
that the research methods need to be connected to historical analysis of
7 Axelsson. B.; Alter, C. & Hage, J.; Osborn, N. R. & Hagedoorn, J.
8 See for example Bjarnason, A.
9
Easton, G., page 6.
10
Easton, G., page 6.
11
Clegg, R . S.
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Clegg, R. S.
13 Barley, R. S. & Tolbert, S. P., page 105.
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various data in this research. It is not enough to use a single method of data
collection, but rather various sources such as archival analyses and
interviews. This also emphasises the need for research to stretch over a
longer period to get better understanding and a more holistic picture of the
development in the organisation and the driving forces for the institutional
changes.
The network perspective offers an opportunity to adopt both the economical
as well as the social aspects in the research framework, and is therefore a
good starting point in network research. Although the network perspective
is a good starting point the actual research methods must also be suitable for
the use of variable sources, including both secondary and archival data as
well as primary data such as interviews. In the critical literature review
chapter (chapter V) it is pointed out that further research is needed on the
governance on the strategic alliances14. Due to the lack of a pre-existing
body of theory about governing of strategic alliances the nature of this
research is explanatory, aiming at increasing understanding and generating
some knowledge emerging from the empirical part of the study. This
research will be based on a broad range of data sources that are both historic
and contemporary, as well as data collection from interviews and
documentation. Hence, the research methods must be able to deal with
these various sources and methods. Hamel and Fortin claims that case
studies employ various research methods and data sources15. In a similar
way Bryman claims that "cave studies can and do exhibit the whole gamut
of methods of data collection"16. Bryman carries on by claiming that one
case can involve a number of different methods, both quantitative and
qualitative, within a single case17. Hence, having considered the theoretical
aspect of the research as well as the fact that the research is dealing with two
central firms and their strategic alliances, case study methods have been
chosen as the main approach to study this research topic.
14 See for example, Osborn, N. R. & Hagedoorn, J.; Axelsson, B.; Alter, C. & Hage, J.
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Yin claims, "that a case study arises from the desire to understand complex
social phenomena and is a flexible and widely used method'8". He also
defines case studies as an "empirical inquiry, within a real-life context
where the boundaries between phenomena and context are blurred and
using multiple source of evidence19." Robson gives a similar definition that
a "case study is a strategy for doing research that involves an empirical
investigation of a practically contemporary phenomenon within its real life
context using multiple sources of evidence20." One of the academics'
concerns is whether the case study is a method or an approach. Hamel,
Dufous and Fortin claim, "case studies employ various methods. These can
include interviews, participant observation, and field studies. Their goals
are to reconstruct and analyse a case from a sociological perspective. It
would thus be more appropriate to define the case study as an approach,
although the term case method suggest that it is indeed method"21. From
this it can be seen that the case studies approach can combine various
research methods, which is very helpful in studying the two marketing
companies and their relationship with producers with over fifty years'
history and the various data that the research will be based on. Hence, it is
the author's conclusion to use case studies in conducting this research.
In studying the relationship between the marketing companies and their
producers in the Icelandic fish industry it turned out that very limited
research has been done on that phenomena, or indeed on the Icelandic fish
industry at all. This means that the present study cannot build on a body on
research on the companies in the fish industry. Hence, this research needs
to build up an understanding of the marketing companies and their
relationship with their producers. It is the author's conclusion that use of
quantitative research methods on phenomena with limited previous
knowledge and research to build upon would not be trustworthy enough.
18 Yin, K. R., page 14.
19 Yin, K. R„ page 14.
20 Robson, C., page 5.
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Hence, by applying only quantitative methods such as survey, there is a
danger that the research would not reflect the most important aspect of the
relationship and therefore miss out vital information due to lack of pre-
understanding of the phenomena. It is the author's conclusion that to be
able to conduct analytical research on the network, a qualitative research
approach is needed where the emphasis is to give a holistic and an analytical
view on the network.
Each case will be analysed on its own, and conclusions will be drawn from
each one. In addition to that, mutual conclusions will be drawn from the
two cases, where they will be compared to each other as well as being
evaluated against the theoretical framework provided in the literature review
chapter. Using two sets of data or two cases makes demands on the data
collection to ensure that it is comparable data across the cases22. In this
research this is in many ways given by the fact that both of the marketing
companies are in the same business in the same country. It is clear though
that the nature of their operation is not quite the same due to different
numbers of producers inside each network and differences in the product
range of the two companies. To ensure that the data collection based on
interviews will be reasonably comparable, semi-structured interviews will
be used to guarantee that the same topics are covered. Other options would
have been to use more standardised closed questions but it was the author's
conclusion that due to the lack of existing research about the networks that
would not provide the same depth to the data collection as having the
interlocutors expressing their thoughts in their own language.
11.1.2 Grounded Theory
Data collection in this research is based on multiple sources, as has been
discussed, although interviews play a big part. The case studies do not
provide a method for analysing data; rather they provide a framework to
host other methods of data collection and analysis. It is the author's
conclusion that it is necessary to bring in a more structured way of




grounded theory were used as a "guideline" in the data collection for this
research. Grounded theory is a method of analysing various sources of data
such as non-standardised text, transcripts or other kinds of qualitative data23.
Grounded theory was developed initially in the 1960s by two sociologists,
Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss. Although both sociologists, they came
from different backgrounds. Glaser was trained in quantitative research
methods whereas Strauss was strongly influenced by what has come to be
known as the Chicago School of thought - the University of Chicago has a
long history of pioneering and innovating qualitative research approaches24.
The methodology of grounded theory was conceived in an attempt to
develop scientific respectability for qualitative research.
In grounded theory data are collected through observations in the field,
interviews with participants, diaries and other documents like letters or even
newspapers. Data are initially coded with substantive codes that reflect the
substance of what people said or the observed events, actions, or other
dimensions of the phenomena. Codes are then compared; similar codes are
clustered and given an initial label and a category is formed. Further data
collection and analysis will produce other categories. The last step in the
grounded theory is exploration and elaboration of the links between the
categories and the possible development of grounded theoretical patterns25.
In this research the methods of grounded theories will be used to support the
data collection and analysis. However, the final part in grounded theory-
that is, the development of theory- is not taken in this research.
One of the methods developed in grounded theory, and which was applied
to the data collection of this research, was theoretical sampling. Theoretical
sampling is the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the
researcher concurrently collects, codes and analyses his/her data and decides
what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his/her
theory as it emerges. Beyond the decisions concerning the initial collection
of data, further collection cannot be planned in advance of the emerging
23
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theory. The emerging theory points to the next steps - the researcher does
not know them until he/she is guided by emerging gaps in his/her theory and
by research questions suggested by previous answers26. In other words,
sampling and analysis must occur in tandem, with analysis guiding the data
collection27. The criterion for judging when to stop sampling the different
groups pertinent to a category is the category's theoretical saturation-28 that
is when no new information is added to the category from the participants.
Grounded theory has been criticised for its treatment of previous theory. In
grounded theory an attempt is made to condense previous theory, so in that
sense it is taken as one of the data, but it is not used to build on or
acknowledged as vital knowledge29. In this research the previous theory-
that is, the literature- was studied before the empirical work, to build on the
previous knowledge rather than to treat it as just one of the sources as in
grounded theory. Grounded theory has also been criticised for the danger
that the research will be lost in coding and category schemes, which in some
cases is unattached to the research30. This danger is always present in
analysing data where the knowledge on the phenomena that is being
researched is limited. By studying the previous literature, and a pre-
understanding of the phenomena by the author makes this danger less likely
to influence this work. On the other hand the previous experience and pre-
understanding can introduce the danger of prejudices on the phenomena.
Gummesson pointed out that lack of pre-understanding could lead to serious
shortcomings and be misleading. He also pointed out that lack of pre-
understanding could affect the choice of the right research methods, the
priority of relevant importance and the danger of believing people who are
misleading for the research31. Although limited research has been done on
the Icelandic fish industry the author claims that his previous knowledge
and experience in the industry as a foreman and product manager for over
26 Glaser, B. G. & Strauss, A. L.
27
Strauss, A. & Corbin, J.
28
Glaser, B.,G. & Strauss, A. L.
29 Denzin, K. N.




10 years is an advantage rather than a disadvantage, and limits the danger of
being lost in coding and category schemes.
II.2 Scope of the Research
Although the focus in this research is on the two marketing companies the
scope of the research involves a greater number of companies, including
producers, the population of which has varied over time, and also
subsidiaries ofmarketing companies. To get a better picture of the research
site and the business of the two marketing companies the scope of the
research is drawn up in figure II. 1.
Production Companies











_ Market subsid 9
(Sec.proc.plants 2)
— Market subsd. 3
(Sec.proc.plants 2)
Subsidiaries 12
Figure ILlThe scope of the research and number of companies
Some of the producers are both in the business of IFPC and UIFP and in
many cases the managers of the production companies have an experience
of business relationships with both companies. The number of companies
has varied a lot over the last decade and even during this research but the
number in the figure is a close estimate, as it looked half way through the
research. These changes in the number of companies in the industry are
mainly due to concentration in the industry where companies have merged.
In addition to the companies, information can be drawn from people who
are not working directly in the business but have either been in the business
or have good knowledge of what has happened in the field. In its simplest
form the scope of the research therefore consists of four main groups; the
marketing companies, the subsidiaries of the marketing companies, the
production companies and finally the people outside these companies. The
last group, that is people outside these companies, consists for example of
former employees, board members of the participants' companies,
consultants, mangers of competing companies and finally academics that
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have knowledge of the development in the industry. In addition to these
four groups are different levels inside the participants' companies. One way
ofanalysing the different groups is to split the network into two levels:
• Strategic level, where the strategy, structure and overall governance is, or
should be decided. This level includes the senior managers in the
companies.
• Operational level, where the main day-to-day operation is managed. This
level includes production managers and foremen on the processing site
and sales persons on the marketing site.
Due to the small size of most of the production companies the boundaries
between these levels are not necessarily clear; for example general managers
of the production companies are in many cases also responsible for the
marketing connection of the production companies and therefore in more
contact with the market than the foreman or production manager. In this
research the interviews are mainly aimed at the strategic level ofactivity.
Although the main emphasis in this research was placed on the senior
managers in the participants' companies, interviews were also taken with
other employees in those companies to get more depth in the analyses.
Some of the interviews were more in the form of conversation where field
notes were taken after the conversation took place. The total number of
interviews was 33, with 31 people, as can be seen in table II.l.
Nr. of Nr. of
interlocutors interviews
Managers and staff of the marketing companies 11 13
Managers and employees of the marketing subsidiaries 4 4
Managers and employees ofproduction companies 9 9
Other as former managers ofmarketing, and production 8 8
companies
Total 31 33
Table II. 1 Numbers of interlocutors and interviews
In addition to the formal interviews are a number of conversations with
managers and employees of the participants' companies and others that gave
both vital information and clarified certain matters. Memos were also taken
from some of the conversations and used as a source of data for the analysis
of the two cases.
The key to the selections of the interlocutors was the importance of the
interlocutors, accessibility and knowledge of the phenomena that were
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studied in this research. The importance is based on the position of the
interlocutors in the companies as well as how well they represent different
views on the relationship between producers and the marketing companies.
In selection of the interlocutors, the different approach of the companies to
the relationship was also taken in account. The sample taken in this
research was not selected beforehand but rather, according to the analysis of
the interviews and documentation, as is the case in theoretical sampling32.
The fact that interlocutors were not chosen by random sampling brings up
the risk that the interlocutors may not represent the sample well enough.
Due to the limitations of this study in terms of time, size and single
research, it was considered more dangerous to take a random sample, which
would be difficult to access and would not guarantee in any way different
views that would be represented. Selecting interlocutors in accordance with
their views, impact and knowledge was considered to serve the aim of this
research much better.
II.3 Data collection and analysis
The empirical research was split into two main parts. Part one is a
descriptive analysis of the history of the two companies, providing the
background and context for the second part, which is the analytical
component of the two case studies. In the second part the main emphasis is
on the last 15 years when the Icelandic economy started to become more
open and market oriented (see Chapter III). During this period the first sign
of major changes in the operation of the marketing companies started to
emerge. The main focus in this part is on the period from 1985 until 1998,
during which the marketing companies have gone through major changes in
their operation, making them much more international in their marketing
orientations. Significantly, it was during this period that their ownership
form changed from being co-operative to becoming limited liability
companies.
Data collection in the first stage of the research was more focused on
secondary sources materials/data such as the companies' annual report,
32
Strauss, A. & Corbin, J., 1990.
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newspapers, articles, official reports, companies' newsletters and history of
the companies. Although the main emphasis was on the historical
secondary data, primary data was also gathered, especially where
interpretation of the history is important for the research. Small scale
interviews were also used to clarify some aspects of the history where it is
believed to be important for the research and interviewers were available.
The first part of the research, the historical development and writing up the
case as well as the literature review build up a firm base of knowledge for
the next step that is the interviews.
The emphasis in part two of this research was on the collection of data
through interviews. Here, the research effort was based on in-depth semi
structured interviews, whereby as Bryman claims "the investigator uses a
schedule but recognises that departures will occur if interesting themes
emerge from what respondents say and in order to get their version of
things.33" Hence the emphasis was on having the respondents using then-
own words in answering the questions34. The aim of these interviews was to
get a more independent view ofparticipants' perceptions on the topics of the
three research questions (i.e. the structure and governance on the alliances
as well as the role of the central firm). The interviews lasted from half an
hour to three hours. One interview was conducted by phone and lasted half
an hour but others were conducted face to face. One of the problems in
conducting the interviews was that the interlocutors were very concentrated
in using their own language or wording of the topics of the research. Most
of the interlocutors were either former or present senior managers that had a
very strong opinion/view of the development of the network. Due to this
the interviews turned out to be more unstructured than initially planned.
The weakness of these rather unstructured interviews was that they would
not be as comparable as structured interviews35. To avoid this weakness the
topics for the interviews were clear and covered in the interview although
the interlocutors were not asked exactly the same questions. The questions
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that were prepared for the interviews where therefore more or less used as a
direction for the discussion and a checklist to guarantee that all the topics
listed were covered. The historical analysis undertaken in part one of this
research as well as the author's previous knowledge of the companies'
operation turned out to be very helpful, allowing the author to pursue
interesting matters that came up in the interview and to take actual examples
to ask the interlocutors to explain. The mixture of unstructured interviews
and pre-understanding was therefore an advantage and made the interview
and data collection better focused and deeper than it otherwise would have
been.
The interviews were conducted in three phases. The first phase commenced
in the summer of 1997 when six interviews were taken with selected people
from all levels in the study. The interlocutors were selected to give as broad
picture of the research site as possible. These interviews were then coded
and analysed. The analyses were then used to reconsider the topics for the
next phase of the data collection, which took place in the summer, and
autumn of 1998. In this phase eighteen formal interviews were taken.
These interviews were coded and analysed in the winter 1998/99. The last
phase in the interviews took place during early 1999 with 8 people. The aim
then was to fill in gaps that had been identified in the analyses and to cover
the spectrum of the sample group. As a example of this gap, it became clear
that no interlocutors talked about marketing fish products but only about
selling the products. This topic was taken further and asked about in the
interviews, which lead to more emphasis being put on questions about the
role of the central firm in the value creation in the network. During this
time other data was collected as documentation that was used in the analyses
of the two cases. This sequence of collecting data and analysing them is in
accordance with the theoretical sampling described by Strauss and Corbm
earlier in this research methods chapter.
Most of the interviews were taped. If the interview was not taped notes
were taken immediately after the interview. Not all interviews were
transcribed in whole. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990) the rule of
36
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thumb is to transcribe only as much as is needed. In accordance to that the
first interviews were transcribed in whole but after that, only the parts of the
interviews that were important for the analysis were transcribed. The QSR
Nud*ist Revision 4.0 software was used to code and group the transcripts of
the interviews.
II.4 Ethical Considerations
When planning research it is important to realise from the beginning how
the study might impact upon the participants and thus it is important to
ensure safety, anonymity and confidentiality of the individual. Bryman
claims, that in researching organisations the "investigator must be sensitive
to the ethical and political dimension of the study"37. In a similar way
Bulmer, claims that ethical considerations for organisation studies need to
take into account "invasion ofprivacy, [whether] there is a lack of informed
consent on the part of those studies, [whether] people are deceived and
[whether] there is the possibility that harm could come to those studied'38.
In accordance to this the participants have the right to get information, so an
information, sheet was given to participants to ensure that they know about
the nature and the purpose of the study, and the methods for collecting and
analysing data. It was also highlighted at the beginning of each interview
that the process of the research might change due to the fact that this was a
mixture of quantitative and qualitative research and because the project
develops and changes with ongoing data analysis. It was emphasised in the
information sheet that participants had the right to terminate participation in
the study and resist questioning at any time without any penalty. They were
also asked to sign an informed consent declaration before the beginning of
the study to show their explicit agreement of participation. Due to
circumstances, three interlocutors neither received the information sheet nor
signed the confidential statement. They were provided with verbal
explanation of the research where they were promised lull confidence as all
other participants.
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The participants also had the right to anonymity, confidence and privacy.
Their actual names were never used and nothing is reported which might be
traced to a particular participant. Each interlocutor was given a coding,
which is used when he or she is quoted in the thesis. Only the author has
access to this coding. However, full confidentiality could not be promised
because words and ideas are used in the final report. The participants were
informed that selected excerpts would be used in this final report, with
minor changes to details, if needed, so that they could not be recognised.
Numbers rather than names were written on the tapes, and a matching list of
names stored separately, in my office, to ensure anonymity. All data remain
confidential and tapes will be destroyed when the study has been examined.
II.5 Limitation to the study
Limitations of the study refer to those issues which diminish the validity of
the study. First of all, the number of cases (that is, only two) is small and
limits the ability of generalising the findings of this study.
Bresnen M points out that the reactive, unstructured type of research
approach is a double-edge sword or as he claims "on the one hand, it yields
valuable information and insight in a way in which a more pre-planned and
structured approach does not; on the other hand, you lose the benefits ofa
more exactly comparable database that you would otherwise have obtained
using the latter approach,"39 In a similar way Bryman claims that in multi-
site studies the data needs to be comparable and it is therefore necessary to
use more structured methods of data collection than for just one case40. The
research methods used in this research limited the generalisation ability, but
it is however claimed that using the semi-structured interviews brings more
rigour to the research than fully unstructured data collection.
During the research time both the networks were going through major
changes in their operation that could have affected the openness of the
interlocutors in the interviews. This can affect the research but in the same
way it meant that some of the interlocutors were even more open to express
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their thoughts about the network and philosophised a lot about different
possibilities of the development of the network, both in the past and in the
future. On the other hand this also meant that some interlocutors were very
careful about expressing their thoughts about the development, being afraid
of their position and status inside the companies and network. This was
especially true for IFPC, which was going through difficult times in 1998
and 1999 leading to changes of president of the companies and reductions of
other staff. On the other hand UIFP was on the way up, diversifying its
operation quite a lot and with many new managers inside, making the
atmosphere in the companies different.
All the interviews were taken in Icelandic and coded in Icelandic. The
quotations were then translated into English, which is not the first language
of the author. Hence, the danger is that in the translation some of the
nuances of the language will not be made as explicit in the English
translation as in the original Icelandic.
Despite the justification of the research methods, as described earlier, it has
to be recognised that generalising from two cases limits the use of the
findings of this research. The research is analytical and explanatory with
the aim of contributing to the identified gap in the literature about the
strategic alliances and networks for SMEs companies. The research should
be viewed in that light and no other.
II.6 Human Perceptions
One of the problems conducting research like this is human perception that
is, how different people view and understand the phenomena being
investigated. This became clear in this research where the interlocutors had
a very strong need to tell the story about the development of the network in
their own terms. As a researcher it was often difficult to judge whether they
were explaining the situation as they saw it or as they wanted it to be. It has
to be considered that in many cases the interlocutors were salesmen with
lots of experience and talent in selling products by explaining the quality of
the products. As a researcher I often felt like a prospective buyer who
needed to be convinced about the product quality without seeing it. Hence,
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it became clear that the interlocutors were explaining the situation as they
wanted it to be rather than the real situation. As the interviews went on and
it was possible to go deeper into the subject, the interlocutors started to
describe the situation and the network more realistic. Understanding of the
phenomena and the background information gathered from the historical
analysis of the companies played a big role in breaking this "salesman"
perception of the interview. In the same way the rather unstructured
interviews that were conducted opened the possibility of taking the topics
further, asking for real examples to highlight the reality rather than the
"salesman's" virtual reality. In most cases the interlocutors were very
honest and open about the topics and willing to explain how they have seen
the development and key issues of the network. In evaluating the effect of
human perception on the research it has to be considered that both the
networks were going through major changes during this time, which could
easily have affected the interlocutors and their views of the development of
the network. The conclusion is that the background information from
analysis of the history of the companies, as well as previous knowledge of
the companies and the fish industry, made the interviews much more
effective than they otherwise would have been. Hence, it was possible to
compare the interviews with the history during the interviews themselves,
thereby making the interviews deeper than they would have been if the
comparison had been done afterwards.
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Ill Background
The aim of this chapter is to give a short overview of Iceland and the
Icelandic economy and society, which form the background of this research.
The main emphasis will be on factors that are important to understanding
and getting a holistic picture of the environment and society which
surrounds the Icelandic fish industry, and how it has developed over this
century. The discussion starts with simple facts about Iceland, its
geography, history, demography and culture. The next section discusses the
basic facts and figures in the Icelandic economy and then the discussion
moves on to what has characterised the economic policy in Iceland from the
beginning of this century to the year 1997. In the conclusions the discussion
is drawn together by looking at the competitiveness of Iceland as well as its
strengths and weaknesses.
7/7.2 Geography and Climate
Iceland is an island in the north Atlantic and is a part of the European
continent. The nearest neighbours are Greenland (287 km away), Faroe
Island (429 km away), Scotland (798 km away) and Norway (970 km
away). The size of Iceland is about 103,000 km2 comprising waste land
50.5%, grazing 19.5%, glaciers 11.5%, lava 10.5%, sands 4%, lakes 3% and
cultivated land 1%'. Most of the coast of Iceland is characterised by fjords
with good natural harbours except the south coast, which is mainly sand
beaches with no fjords, and therefore no natural harbours. Despite the
location of Iceland the climate is not as cold as the name suggests, due to
the Gulf Stream that comes to Iceland along the south west coast where it
reduces the influence of its location so close to the Arctic Circle. In a
normal winter the Icelandic coast is ice free although occasionally drift ice
may sweep up to the coast. In the history of Iceland there have been winters
when the west and north coast were covered with ice for some time,




cold winter. In a normal year the average temperature in Reykjavik in
January is around -0.5 °C but in July around 10.6 "C.
III.2Natural resources
Iceland is not rich with natural resources; the most obvious one, and that
which has the most economic importance, are the fishing grounds that
surround Iceland. Other natural resources are the energy resources in the
form of hydroelectric- and geothermal power. In 1993, 4,950 Gwh of
electricity was exploited of the 45,000 Gwh that are estimated to be
economically exploitable in Iceland, or around 11% of exploitable energy.
In 1993 geothermal power was used to heat 86% of apartments in Iceland.
Almost 100% of electricity consumed in Iceland comes from water- and
geothermal power. Large scale industry such as Aluminium smelter and
Ferro-silicon smelter consumed 47% of the electricity in 1993, and plans for
expansion of that kind of high power consumption industry are now on the
way. The third important natural resource is the natural beauty of Iceland,
which attracts increased numbers of tourists to Iceland each year. In many
ways there are contrasts between the increased emphasis on building of
hydroelectric power stations and the tourist industry, which uses the
unspoiled nature of Iceland as an attraction. The building of hydroelectric
power station demands that a lot of land goes under lakes, power lines have
to be laid over unspoiled areas and waterfalls could be affected from
changes of the flow of rivers, all of which could affect areas that at present
have great tourist attraction.
1II.3 History
Norwegian Vikings who were escaping from the domination and taxation of
the Norwegian monarchy found Iceland in 874. The settlement of Iceland
came mainly from Norway, although a considerable proportion came from
the British Isles, especially Ireland and the Hebrides2. In 930 the Icelandic
parliament "Althing" was established at bingvellir. In 1262 Iceland became
part of the Norwegian monarchy and in 1380, when Norway became part of
2
Kristjansson. L., volume 4.
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the Danish monarchy, Iceland did as well. In 1874 the Danish monarchy
granted Iceland a constitution, which was followed up by granting Iceland a
home rule in 1904 and the first Icelandic government minister. Iceland got
full control of virtually all its domestic affairs in 1918 although still with the
Danish King as head of state. Full establishment of the Modern Republic of
Iceland was in 1944 when Iceland became an independent parliamentary
democracy with a President as head of state. Icelanders have maintained
their language with little change from the settlement of Iceland, despite
having been a part of other nations most of the time since the land was
found. Until this century the Icelandic nation was a farming society, that is,
people lived on the land, and it is only from the latter part of the 19th
century that villages began to develop. Although Iceland was a farming
society it would not have survived without the support from the sea and fish
has always been an important part of the Icelandic diet3.
III.4Demography and culture
At the end of 1996 there were 269,735 inhabitants in Iceland, which is a
0.72% increase from 1995. In 1801 the population of Iceland was around
50,000 and in 1901 the population was around 80,000, so the increase has
been very fast in this century. Iceland is one of the least densely populated
countries in Europe with around 2.6 inhabitants per square kilometre.
Approximately 86% of the population live in communities with population
in excess of 1000 inhabitants4. Of the total population about 60% live in the
area of the capital city Reykjavik. The largest town outside the capital area
is Akureyri in the north of the country with 14,920. In the West Fjord
(VestfjoOrum) IsafjorOur is biggest with 3,337 and in the east EgilstaSir is
biggest with 1,580.
The standard of living in Iceland is high and very similar to that in the
nearby countries, especially in the Scandinavian countries Norway,
Denmark and Sweden. These Scandinavian countries and their social
system have been the role model for Icelandic society. This is well reflected
3
Kristjansson, L., volume 1.
4 The economy of Iceland, Spring 1997 (Central Bank of Iceland).
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in the high standards of systems such as education and health, as well as in
other aspects of social services that are provided in the country. The vast
majority (91.5%) of the population in Iceland are members in the Church of
Iceland (state church), which is a Lutherans religion; the remainder are
spread over different, mainly Christian religions.
III. 5 Icelandic Economy
At first glance, the small size of the economy and how dependent it is on
one industry, that is the fish industry and export of its product, characterises
the Icelandic economy. In an other way the economy has a similar structure
as most of others OECD5 countries, but for most of the post-war period the
Icelandic economy has been characterised by extensive government
interference, direct or indirect6. Since the mid-eighties the Icelandic
economy has gone through an important transition to increase liberalisation
and freedom, with, for example the establishment in financial- and stock
markets in the way that is common in most western countries, and the
deregulation of the economy. The government still has much influence on
the economy and owns for example two of the four commercial banks in
Iceland, and most of the investment funds are government controlled.
However the investment funds have merged and been changed into Limited
Liability Company, and the government sold its share in the autumn of
1999. The government also changed the ownership form of the commercial
banks into limited liability, by 1st January 19987, although it still owns the
majority share in both the banks. The transition that started in the mid-
eighties means that companies in Iceland are now operating more or less in
the same financial environment as most companies in the western world.
111.5.1 Gross Domestic Product
In 1996, the gross domestic production (GDP) was approximately $7.3
thousand million, which is small in absolute terms (somewhere around
5 OECD stands for "Organisation for Economic CO-operatin and Development"
6
Arnason, R.
7 The Economy of Iceland, Spring 1997.
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0.67% of the UK economy), but in terms of per capita the GDP is
approximately $26,900, which is rather high by international standards8
Contribution of industrial sectors towards GDP 1973 - 1996
1973 1980 1990 1996
% % % %
Fishery 7.6 8.5 10.1 10.1
Fish processing 8.5 8.3 5.2 5.1
Fish Industry 16.1 16.8 15.3 15.2
Agriculture 5.5 5.2 2.9 2.2
Manufacturing 13.1 12.8 12.3 11.6
Construction 12.3 9.2 8.2 7.2
Trade, Restaurants, Hotels 10.5 10.9 11.5 13.2
Transportation 9.8 8.0 7.8 8.6
Public service 12.3 15.4 16.1 16.9
Other service 20.4 21.7 25.9 25.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table III. 1 Contribution of industrial sectors towards GDP9
The main trend over the last decade in contribution of various economic
sectors to GDP is that agriculture has gone down from 5.5% in 1973 to
2.2% in 1996. The largest increase has been in the service sector, as can be
seen in Table III-l, where the biggest increase is in areas like trade and
financial service. The fish industry counts only directly for around 15% of
the total GDP although it stands for around 72% of the commodities
exported from Iceland10. The private and public service sectors are in
relative size and structure very similar to other OECD countries11. On the
other hand the manufacturing sector is very small and simple where the
main emphasis lies on few big high power consumption companies like
Aluminium and Ferro silicon smelter.
111.5.2 The Labour Market
The labour market in Iceland in 1995 was approximately 130,254 people.
The participation rate in the labour market has dramatically increased over
the past decades mainly due to increased participation of females in the
labour market. In 1983 the labour market was estimated to be 78% of the
8 The Economy of Iceland, Spring 1997.
9
Magnusson. S. M.. Figures from before 1973 are not available in this form.




population among 15 and 74 years of age12. The corresponding figure for
the year 1997 is approximated to be 81% of those aged between 16-74
years old13.
Most Icelandic employees between 90-95% of the total work force are
members of trade unions, which is higher than in other western countries
where the figures are, for example, Denmark 86% Sweden 87.7%, UK
43.3%, and France with only 12.0%.14. Most of the trade unions in the
private sector are affiliated with the Federation of Labour, which in most
cases takes care of negotiation with the Federation of employers. In the
public sector individual trade unions are affiliated either with the Federation
of Public Employees or Federation of University Graduates, which then take
care of wage negotiation with the state. Most of the companies in the
private sector are members of the Employers Federation or Federation of
Cooperative Employers, which take care of wage negotiations on their
behalf. This arrangement, that is a high percentage of employers and
employees connected to a larger Federation, has brought with it large wage
negotiations and guidelines are set for other smaller unions. As part of this
negotiation the government usually announces its part in the negotiation in
the form of changes in taxes and benefits in the social welfare system. In
the past, there has been increased pressure to break down this large wage
negotiation and instead put more emphasis on negotiations within a rather
wider framework between the big federation of the trade unions and
between the employers and the individual company. The labour union
within companies then would negotiate the detailed matters concerning the
company and its employees. Increased freedom and changes in the business
environment as well as increased difference between companies will
probably create more pressure for wage negotiations in a form like this.
This will probably mean the establishment of trade unions in individual







From 1989 onwards, the labour market has been relatively stable and few
strikes disturbed it until 1997 when increased pressure from the employees
for their share in the improved economy caused a few strikes, but very few
spanned a long time period. Before 1989 the labour market was rather
unstable and strikes very common mainly due to an unstable economy and
high inflation. An example of this unstable labour market occurred during
the time period 1977-88. The working days lost in strikes was close to
0.2%, which is a much higher percentage than is known in most of the
Nordic countries15.
Employment by industries reflects very well the changes that have occurred
in Icelandic society in this century. The most obvious changes are the
decline of employment in agriculture where in 1940 it counted for 16.4% of
the total work force but in 1995 the rate was down to 4.9%16 (see table
III.2).
Development in Employment by industries 1970 - 1995
1970 1980 1988 1995
% % % %
Fishery 6.6 5.3 5.2 5.2
Fish processing 7.8 9.1 6.7 5.9
Fish Industry 14.4 14.4 11.9 11.1
Agriculture 12.4 7.9 4.9 4.5
Manufacturing 15.2 15.2 13.3 11.3
Construction 10.7 10.2 9.3 7.9
Power stations 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.1
Trade, Restaurants, Hotels 13.5 13.4 16.0 14.8
Finance, Real Estate, Insurance 10.9 12.6 15.3 16.4
Transportation 8.4 7.3 6.6 6.8
Government 12.4 15.7 17.4 19.8
Other 1.4 2.4 5.4 6.3
Total 100 100 100 100
Table III.2 Employment by industries
In Employment the fishing industry has also declined over the past decades,
from 15.3% of the total work force in 1965 to 11.1% in 1995. The largest






Sogulegt yfirlit hagtalna 1997.
36
Nordic countries the picture of employment is very similar but with more
employment in the primary processing sectors like agriculture and fishery18.
The labour market is characterised by a generally long working week, with
average weakly hours of the total work force around 46 hours. The normal
working weak is 40 hours so this means general overtime work which can
be traced to a rather low hourly wage19.
111.5.3 Foreign Trade
Foreign trade plays an important role in the Icelandic economy and in 1996
export of goods and non-factor service accounted for around 36% of the
total GDP. Around 70% of foreign trade consists of commodities, the
remainder are services20.












Fish 91.3 79.7 74.3 74.0 75.4 74.6
Agriculture 5.1 4.6 2.7 1.6 1.8 1.8
Manufactured 1.6 15.2 21.3 22.7 20.4 19.5







Table III.3 Composition of commodity exports21
As can been seen from Table III.3 fish products stand for around 74.6% of
total export of commodities in the years between 1993-96 but around 91.3%
in the years 1960-67; the percentage of the export before that time was
around 90%. The changes in export are mainly that in the years 1968-73
manufacturing products became much stronger, from 1.6% of the
commodity export to around 15%, and have been around 20% since then.
This is mainly due to the export of aluminium and ferro-silicon; export of
these stood at around 63.4% of the export of manufacturing products
between the years 1993-96.
Iceland's main export markets are the EEA (European Economic Area)
countries. In 1996 the UK was the most important with 19.2% and then




21 Arnason, R.; The Economy of Iceland, Spring 1997.
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Germany with 13.0%. After these two EEA countries US came next with
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Figure III.l Geographic Distribution of Foreign Trade in 199622
In the same way as in export around 70% of all imports come from EEA
countries where the UK is again the most important with 10.2% of the total
value of imported goods. USA is the next largest with 9.4% of the total
value of import but Japan has only 4.0% of the import against 10.4% of the
total value ofexport (see figure III.l).
In Table III.4 is the breakdown of imports of goods into groups for the years
1970-96. The biggest group is raw material and fuel, which accounts for
around 35.7% of the total import in the years 1993-96 and of that, raw
material (industrial supplies) counts for 27.8% ofthe total import.
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-88 1989-92 1993-96
% % % % % %
Consumption goods 33.5 32.3 34.6 37.2 28.6 31.3
Raw materials and fuel 30.3 35.9 35.9 30.7 35.5 35.7
Investment goods 36.2 31.8 29.5 32.1 35.9 33.0
Table III.4 Composition of commodity imports
Participating in international organisations is very important for small nation
like Iceland, both to get access to markets as well as to minimise the danger
of becoming isolated and uncompetitive in the international market. Table
III.5 gives an overview the participation of Iceland in international
organisations.
22 The Economy of Iceland, Spring 1997,
23 Arnason R.; The Economy of Iceland, Spring 1997.
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Iceland's Membership in International Organisations
International Monetary fund (IMF) 1945
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) 1945
United Nations (UN) 1946
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1949
Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD) 1949
Council ofEurope 1950
Nordic Council 1952
International Finance Corporation (IFC) 1956
International Development Association (IDA) 1961
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1964
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 1970
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 1975
Western European Union (WEU) 1992
European Economic Area (EEA) 1994
World Trade Organization (WTO) 1995
Table III.5 The year Iceland joined international organisations"
III.5.4 Investment and Interest Rate
Investment in Iceland has for the last decades been around 25% of GDP,
which is a little higher than OECD or EU countries (see Table III.6). The
investment reached its peak in 1974 when it was 32.1% of the total GDP
mainly due to huge investment in stern-trawlers, electric power generation
and distribution systems for power25. Government plays big a part in the
investment in Iceland, or around 30% of the total investment, mainly due to
the fact that the government owns most of the power plants and their
distribution and communication systems. Industry invests around 45% of
the total investment in Iceland, and residential construction is around 22.0%
of the investment (see Table III.6)




Investment by sectors and industries 1960 - 92
19960-67 1968-73 1973-79 1979-87 1987-92
% % % % %
Industry 49.3 44.4 41.6 45.6 44.6
Agricultural 9.4 6.7 5.8 5.3 3.5
Fishery 13.0 10.1 12.0 10.1 9.2
Manufacturing 7.4 13.0 8.9 10.4 9.2
Transport 10.8 7.1 6.4 6.0 9.0
Other 8.7 7.6 8.5 13.5 13.7
Residential 23.1 21.2 22.9 22.6 22.8
Construction
Government 27.5 34.4 35.5 31.8 32.7
Energy 7.7 13.6 17.8 12.5 8.6
Communication 12.4 12.8 11.0 12.1 12.3
Buildings 7.4 8.0 6.7 7.2 11.8
Table III.6 Investment by sectors and industries
Over the last decade a large part of the investment in Iceland has not been
paid for or supported by voluntary savings (less than 40% in 1990). Pension
funds, official investment funds and foreign borrowing have paid for the
rest. This little voluntary saving in Iceland over this time can be explained
by high inflation and negative real interest rates but the interest rate was
negative from 1960 to 1990 (see Table III.7).
Comparison of average real interest rate 1960 - 1990
1960-67 1968-73 1974-79 1980-87 1987-90 1960-90
% % % % % %
Iceland -1.8 -7.3 -14.5 -1.8 8.1 -4.1
UK 2.7 2.0 -2.0 3.5 3.4 1.9
USA 2.2 0.6 -0.6 5.4 5.0 2.5
;7
Table III.7 Average real interest rate
The stock market, more options on the financial market and high real
interest rates have supported voluntary saving and opened more interesting
options for saving than was known before 1990. Hence, because voluntary
saving is lower in Iceland than most other western countries it has been one
of the main aims ofpast governments to improve this situation.
26 Arnason, R.; Sogulegt Yfirlit Hagtalna 1993.
27 Arnason, R., page 23.
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111.5.5 Inflation
From the end of the Second World War (WW2) until 1990 Iceland has
suffered from economic fluctuation and high inflation28. During the years
1980-90 the average annual inflation in Iceland was 34.9% compared to an
average 6.9% in EU countries. Inflation reached its peak in 1983 when it
went over 80% on a one-year basis29. After 1990 the government has
managed to get the inflation down to a level which is known in other
western countries and it has since been even lower than in other neighbour's
countries. The inflation rates between the years 1956-96 are illustrated in
Figure III.2 where it can be seen that Iceland has for a long time until 1990
suffered from much higher inflation than in other OECD countries or in
important market countries such as the UK.
Inflation 1956 -1996
Figure III.2 Comparison of inflation 1956 - 1996 (rates averaged over 5 years) ".
Figure III.3 Inflation in Iceland 1955 - 1996 (year-on-year rate)31
28 Arnason, R.
29 The Economy of Iceland, Spring 1997.
30 Snaevarr, S.; Sogulegt Yfirlit Hagtalna 1995.
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In figure III.3, which illustrates the inflation in Iceland on a yearly basis
between the years 1955-96, it can be seen that inflation has been fluctuating
over the last decades. Most of the time inflation has been very high and it is
not until recent years that the government has gained control over it.
111.5.6 Economic Policy in Iceland
Economic policy in Iceland has changed over time; these changes can be
divided into periods with different aims and methods for managing the
economy. The economist Magnus S. Magnusson split the development over
the last century into three periods32:
1) 1876-1930, a period ofminor government interference
2) 1930-1960, a period of regulated economy and major credit transfer
between economics sectors
3) 1960-1990, a period of slow adjustment to a market economy.
In addition, it is logical to talk about the period from 1990 until now as a
period of market economy although with some exceptions, for example the
ownership by the government of the commercial banks and investment
funds. In the following discussion these four periods will be used as a
guideline to describe the Icelandic economy, its policy, aims and main
characteristics over the last century33.
III.5.6.1 Minor Government Interference 1876-1930
This period is highly influenced by the farming society that existed in
Iceland during this time, although mainly before the First World War
(WW1). The value of the society is reflected in economic policy by factors
such as not depending too much on loans but rather saving before buying.
Formally Iceland did not get independent registration of its own currency
the "krona" until 1922; until 1914 the Icelandic "krona" had the same value
as the Danish "krona". In 1924 the Icelandic government broke the tradition
31




33 In this discussion the author will supports Magnussons discussion about the economic policy during
that time
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of letting the bank system control the value of the currency and started to
interfere directly with how the value of the Icelandic "krona" was registered.
From this time onward, the currency was valued according to the need of
industry, mainly the fish and farming industries. The main aim of the
economic policy during the last decade of this period was to have a balance
between import and export, which was done with having fixed registration
of the "krona" for the longest run in the history, from the years 1925-35.
During the period 1901-30 the economic growth was on average 3.9% per
year though with very little growth over the WW1 period but rapid growth
(6.2%) between 1920-30. During the period 1900-45 the economic growth
was rather high in Iceland (3.5% average increase in GDP per year)
compared to 2.5% in the US, 2.2% in the UK and 2.0% in Denmark34. This
can be traced to the fact that Iceland was at this time transferring from a
farming and fishing society to an industrial society, like those which were
already well established in other western countries35. The main
characteristic of the economic system during the period between 1900-30
was freedom and little government interference36.
III.5.6.2 Government Interference 1930-1960
The time until 1960 was characterised by increased regulation and barriers
that the government implemented in the economy. The barriers were for
example high import taxes on goods that were described by the government
as being "unnecessary". As a indication of the way of thinking during the
period of 1934 - 38, the aim of the government was to implement "planned
economy37", not just out of necessity but rather because it was believed to
be a vital part of the scientific management of economy38. The aim for
"planned economy" did not work out and the economic policy was clearly a
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managed with direct interference of the politics with regulation, barriers and
government intervention39. The economic growth was slow during the
period 1930-37 (on average 1,4% per year), and export was difficult due to
general economic depression on foreign markets. This also affected
unemployment, which rose during this time mainly because of difficulties in
selling salted Cod to the Mediterranean countries.
Due to the military occupation of Iceland, first by the British army and then
later the US army, Iceland benefited greatly during the WW2 period unlike
most other countries. This military occupation brought with it increased
domestic activities like building roads and airports using the Icelandic work
force. Many talk about the period of the WW2 as a transformation period
for Iceland, going from a rather poor and simple conservative farming and
fishing society to become one of the richest nations in the world with living
standards which were unknown to most Icelandic people before that time.
During WW2 Iceland gained an increase in the GDP of around 38%, or on
average 5.5% increase in GDP per year and in its peak in 1940 a 9.5%
increase40. This boost to the Icelandic economy cannot all be traced to the
increase in domestic investment and activities due to the military
occupation. During WW2, the UK government made an agreement with
Iceland about importing fish from Iceland amongst other things to help with
the food supply for the UK, which was very difficult during this time. This
arrangement, and war activities in the world, meant that Icelandic fish
dominated the UK market for fresh iced fish and this domination was
reflected in high prices, which helped the Icelandic fish industry at a time
when other traditional markets were closed41. The years from 1938-45 were
therefore characterised by great expansion in the economy with decreased
unemployment. The period after WW2 started with three years of






rapid economic growth but after that, until 1960, the economy was rather
unstable with little economic growth42.
From 1939 the Icelandic government had to face managing the economy,
which was highly index-linked, which meant that devaluation of the
currency directly affected salaries and prices. Hence, controlling cost in the
main industries like fishing and agriculture was increasingly difficult, so the
government decided to use major transfer of credit between economic
sectors to try to even out the fluctuation that followed the increased cost. In
summary, one might say that the economy period from 1930-60 was
characterised by separate or holistic measures which could include
establishment of fund systems, transfer of credit, rationing processes and
barriers in forms of legislation and regulation, which all adds up to an
economy that was managed by political "hand power"43.
III.5.6.3 Adjustment to International Business Environment 1960-1990
In the 1960s the Icelandic government started to adjust the rather closed
economy towards a more open economy that took account of what was
happening in other western countries during this time. The first step in this
process was to obliterate the massive credit transfer systems and barriers.
This development to open the economy went much slower in Iceland than in
most other western countries and in many ways that real movement did not
emerge until Iceland joined the EFTA44 in 1970. Then external pressures
and international contracts made it necessary for the Icelandic government
to lower or remove some of the external barriers like very high import taxes
on goods to Iceland45. External barriers gradually declined as these
international trade contracts were introduced but right up until the present










One of the main aims of governments in Iceland during this time period was
to keep everyone in full employment46. The government succeeded in doing
this and from WW2 onward, unemployment was almost unknown, apart
from between 1967-71 when the economy suffered from a drop in catch of
important species like herring47. Between 1971-90 the average
unemployment rate in Iceland was 1,1% of the total labour force, compared
to around 6% on average in the OECD countries48.
One of the ways that the government used to defend the economy and keep
unemployment down was to devalue the currency "krona", and this
happened rapidly over this period. In 1984 the government changed its
policy in listing the currency when it implemented a fixed value for the
currency, which worked for a limited time mainly due to an increase in fish
catching and favourable conditions on major markets for fish 49. But when
the catch declined due to over-fishing and unfavourable market conditions,
the currency was devalued again. The policy of most governments during
this time was to list the value of the "krona" in accordance with the needs of
fish industry, which in many cases kept other industries in a poor
competitive state50. This was, in many ways, a barrier against more
diversity in the economy, development of new industries and the
strengthening of existing ones.
Other important characteristic of the economic policy during this time was
increased and high inflation (see Table III.8 and Chapter III.5.5).
1960-67 1968-73 1974-79 1980-90 1960-90
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Iceland 11.4 19.9 38.7 34.9 26.2
OECD 3.2 6.1 8.6 6.0
. . si
5.8
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Every government had its aims set on getting inflation down but the met
little success. However, there is doubt as to how serious this attempt was
when the top priority was to minimise unemployment. Inflation between
1960 and 1987 was almost five times higher than in other OECD countries52
and reached its climax in 1983 when the year-on-year figure went over
80%53.
It would be impossible to leave this period in Icelandic economy without
mentioning the interest rate. With high inflation present in Iceland during
this time, the real interest rate was negative most of this time and hugely
negative (-14.5%) during the period of 1974-7934. The government and the
Central Bank of Iceland decided the interest rate until 1st ofNovember 1983
when the commercial bank was given the freedom to decide55. While the
government controlled the interest rate, the real interest rate had no priority
in the management of the economy, which was characterised by high
inflation; high inflation meant a lower real interest rate56. For businesses
this meant subsidised loans, which worked almost like grants57 and during
this period it was the general view that getting a loan was like a bonus since
inflation would eat up the loan.
The period of 1961-66 was characterised by rapid economic growth or
around 8.8% increase in GDP per year, mainly due to a increase in the
catching of herring. From 1967-69 on the other hand, there was a
contraction of 3.5% of GDP due to the collapse of the herring stock in
Icelandic water. During 1969-82, the economic growth was around 5.8%
increase in GDP, mainly due to an increased catch as a result of expansions
of the economic zone around Iceland of 50 miles in 1972 and then 200 miles
in 197558. Other motives for economic growth during this time were the
building of high power consuming industries, like aluminium smelter and
52 Arnason, R.
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ferro-silicon smelter. These companies were built more or less with foreign
money and owned by foreigners, particularly the aluminium companies but
in the ferro-silicon company the Icelandic government had some share. As
a consequence of this and a decline in fishing, the fish product in 1960-67
stood for 91.3% of the total export and manufacturing product 1.6% but
between 1968-73 fish product stood for 79.7% and manufacturing products
15.2%59.
Between 1980-90 the economic growth in Iceland was far less than the
average in other OECD countries60. There was a short period between
1986-87 with rapid economic growth, which caused very optimistic views,
and huge investment, which the government pushed for with favourable
loans from government investment funds. These investments were mainly
in fish farming and fur bearing farming which turned out to be a bad
mistake due to bad timing and unfavourable market conditions. The years
between 1988-91 were characterised by great contraction and stagnation
where inflation was declining but unemployment increasing.
The period from 1960-90 was characterised by unnatural economic
conditions in the light of subsidised loans where the real interest was
negative. The stock market was rather immature and companies had to get
money in the form of loans rather than in the form of shares61. It can easily
be said that economic conditions were never normal where the governments
interfered with the economy in factors like devaluation of the currency,
interest rate and control of loans, and where they never made profit a
priority goal for companies, but rather the maintenance of employment
levels. Although the governments slowly moved towards an open economy,
their interference made businesses and the public suffer, because long term
thinking was very difficult, leading to short term thinking and unrealistic
activities and building. This environment also created political pressure to







like devaluation and increasing loans, rather than building up a healthy
environmental framework from which managers and people could work.
III.5.6.4 Open Economy 1990-1999
In many ways 1990 was a turning point in the Icelandic economy mainly
due to a wage contract, which was made in that year. A very broad
settlement was made between all major players in the labour market,
government, farmers and the banks, to lower inflation and to balance the
economy, which had been rather unstable62. This settlement was named the
"nation settlement" and held until the last wage contract took place in 1997,
when trade unions pressed for higher salaries. The first evaluation of the
wage contract, which took place in 1997, seemed not to threaten the goals of
the "nation settlement" which were low inflation and stability.
The economy was in stagnation and downturn until 1991 mainly due to the
restriction of fish catches and deterioration in terms of trade. In 1993 the
GDP contracted by 3.3% but in the period 1993-95 the economic growth
was more or less the same as in other OECD countries on average. In 1996
the economic growth was 5.7% which is well above the average OECD
(which was little more than 2.0%)63.
Inflation had been dramatically lowered and in 1993 and 1994 it was 1.5%,
the lowest rate since the 1950s. Between 1994 and 1996 the year-to-year
inflation was around 1.7%64. Unemployment had also declined in the year
1996 to around 4.3%, from the year 1995 when it reached its peak of around
5.0% of the total work force65.
The economic conditions have been rather favourable since 1993. There are
many reasons for this but without a doubt one of the most important is the
successful stabilisation the Icelandic economy, making it more stable than it
has been for decades. The economy has moved from government
62 Snaevarr, S.
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interference to a much more open and market-driven economy with a
financial and stock market as in most western countries. Recent
governments have also emphasised privatisation of the economy and sold
several state enterprises to the private sector 6. Included in this are
companies like an insurance company (Islensk endurtrygging), a fish
processing company (kormodur Rammi), a fish meal company (S.R.mjol), a
coastal shipping line (Rikisskip), a tourist bureau (Ferdaskrifstofa rlkisins)
and a heavy equipment plant (Landssmidjan).
In addition to a more stable economy there have been many important
structural changes implemented in the financial sector since the last decade.
Among these are "interest rate liberalisation, elimination of automatic
access to the Central Bank facility by commercial banks, liberation of
foreign exchange regulations and establishment of foreign exchange market,
establishment of securities exchange and leasing operations, and the
development of secondary markets for public and private bonds."67 The
Icelandic government has also adapted the Icelandic financial system to
foreign financial markets within the framework of a Nordic Economic
Programme 1989-92 and the implementation of the EEA agreement in
January 1994.
Although the economy is gradually becoming more open and market driven
and the direct interference of politicians is getting weaker, there is still a
tendency to build up barriers around the economy. These barriers are for
example to protect Icelandic agriculture with technical barriers against
importing of foreign agricultural goods. Another barrier is against foreign
investment in the Icelandic fish industry; foreigners are not allowed to
invest in the fishery or fish processing sectors in Iceland. However, at the
same time, Icelandic companies in the fish sector have invested in foreign
companies in countries like Germany, UK, Chile, Mexico and Namibia.
The business environment is much healthier today than it was 10-15 years
ago, and managers and owners of companies have to realise that they can
not any longer count on the politician to come up with special measures to
66 The Economy of Iceland, Spring 1997.
67 The Economy of Iceland, Spring 1997.
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change unfavourable conditions. The politicians, however, still have a
tendency to interfere and put money into special situations like when they
assisted fish industry in the West Fjord in 1994-95, by offering them
favourable loans if specific conditions about improvements concerning
effectiveness and profitability were fulfilled.
These changes of the economy towards an open and market-driven economy
have taken a long time and are far from finished. It will probably take
managers, politicians and private people some time to adjust their activities
to the business environment which seems to follow today's economy.
III.6 Government andPolitical Environment
Icelandic government is built on a parliament system, which consists of 63
members elected from eight constituencies on the basis of proportional
representation for a term of four years. Traditionally, between four and six
political parties have members in the parliament "Alj)ingi". After the
election in 1995, six parties had members in the parliament, where the two
biggest parties, the Independent Party (right wing party) with 37.21% of the
vote and the Progressive Party (central farmers party) with 23.3% of the
vote, formed a coalition government. The four remaining parties are all left
wing parties: the social Democratic Party with 11.4% of the vote, the
Peoples Alliance with 14.3%, the Peoples' Movement with 7.2% and the
Women's Alliance with 4.9% of the vote. Other parties that got a vote did
not get members elected to the parliament. The number of members of
parliament from each constituency is not proportional to the population,
which means, that the constituency with the highest population is
underrepresented and the constituency with the lowest population is over-
presented. For example, the constituency with fewest inhabitants; the
Western Fjord with 9,545 people have only 1,920 votes behind each
Member of Parliament, compared to the capital area with 156,513
inhabitants and 5,448 votes behind each member of the parliament.
Traditionally the governments have been formed by a majority coalition of
two or more political parties. The government must be supported by a
majority of the members of the Parliament to remain a power. The Prime
Minister and other Ministers exercise power and constitute the government.
President is the head of the state but with very little political power although
(s)he has to sign all new laws and has the authority to send them back to the
parliament, but historically the president has never exercised that power.
The other main power or political role that the president has is nominating a
leader of a political party to lead the formation of a government after
election.
In Iceland there are two levels of government, national and local. The
country splits into approximately 200 local communities at government
level where the majority are very small rural communities. Many of these
rural communities, or about third, consist of a fishing village and to a
varying degree have the rural population in its vicinity68. The national
government plays a very big role in the governance of the country and was
responsible for around 79% of the total government spending in 199569.
This reflects well the centralisation that exists in the Icelandic government
and the great tendency of the national government to intervene in all
possible matters. This centralisation as well as the lack of power of the
local governments has resulted in the accumulation of official institutions in
the capital area. In the past the government had tried to change this by
opening branches ofofficial institutions in bigger towns around the country.
Icelandic politics has for a long time been characterised by "personal
service"70 with voters, and of great influence of the interest groups in the
community71. The influence of this personal service, and the impact of
influencing groups, are in many cases obvious through the lack of long-term
strategy and vision of the Icelandic government and the number of ad-hoc
decisions and parliamentary exercises. This political environment has been
slowly changing over the last ten years or so but the old-style politics is still
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recruitment in official positions72. The political environment in Iceland has
been quite stable since in most cases the government has seen out their
elected four years' period, although there have been some exceptions.
III. 7Conclusions
The Icelandic society has moved fast in this century, from a very simple
farming and fishing society with a rather low living standard to a more
complicated society with very high living standards. To draw together the
major influencing factors, on the economic development in Iceland it is
possible to talk about three major factors that is 1) outside conditions, 2)
payoff of the fishing grounds, and 3) the economic policy (government
influence)73. It can be argued that outside conditions have caused the main
turnaround in the Icelandic economic development and put Iceland on the
level it has been since. These outside conditions are, for example, WW2
and the Marshal help that followed the war, which boosted the Icelandic
economy. This was followed up with an increase in fish catch that
continued economic growth in Iceland until around 1970 when other
industries started to play a bigger role in the economy.
The management of the Icelandic economy has gone through different
phases over the century and to give a fuller picture of the status of Iceland
today, a few thoughts about the competitiveness of Iceland will be added.
The competitiveness of nations has been defined in many different ways;
two common and general definitions are:74
1. Competitiveness of a nation is the ability of the nation to produce goods and
services which fulfil the demands of the international market with freedom and
normal competition.
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In the appraisal of the World Economic Forum which is published in the
book "The Global Competitive Report 1996" uses eight main factors to
evaluate competitiveness of a nation. These factors are75.
1. How open the economy is for international trade
2. The part that the government plays in the economy
3. Efficiency of the financial market
4. Internal strength of the economy
5. The level of technology
6. Qualification of the managers in the companies
7. Flexibility of the labour market
8. Reliability of the judiciary and political systems
Each factor then splits up into more sub-factors but about 2/3 of the
weighting is put on factor 1-4 and 1/3 on factors 5- 8. In this appraisal of
the World Economic Forum, Iceland is in 27th place in competitiveness and
31st place in economic freedom of 49 nations. It is interesting that Iceland
is evaluated much lower according to this method of evaluation than if
traditional indices such as GDP and wealth are used76. What is most
obvious in this evaluation is that the opening of the economy is much more
recent in Iceland than in most other countries and the government influences
are still too much in areas like banking, communication and power supply77.
Other factors that influence the Icelandic economy are due to its size and the
lack of competition that can arise in such a small economy where few
companies compete on the market78. An example of this can be taken from
transportation to and from Iceland, where one company (Icelandair)
dominates charter flights and another company (Eimskip) dominates sea
transportation. These two companies are then linked together by over 30%
ownership of Eimskip in Icelandair.
Clearly the Icelandic economy has never been closer to an open market
driven economy although it still has far to go to be competitive, at least
according to the evaluation of the National Forum of Competitiveness. It is
also clear that participation in international organisations will keep up










groups in Iceland fight for their interests often against the holistic interest of
Iceland and call for protection and support in the form of barriers in the
economy. Iceland has build its main strength on the utilisation of the two
most important natural resources, that is, the fishing grounds around Iceland
and hydroelectric energy. The main weaknesses are that the economy has in
many ways been stuck in this utilisation of the natural resources to produce
raw materials and to build economic growth through increases of the fish
catch. With these factors comes the danger that not enough attention has
been given to building up an business environment that would make use of
the human resources to increase innovation, both in new disciplines and
better utilising the resources that we already have.
The people that live in Iceland seem to have a very positive attitude towards
innovation and in many ways have the entrepreneur attitude that is needed to
push things forward79. This is reflected very well, for example, in how
quickly people in Iceland implement, or at least buy new techniques. For
example only one country (Finland) has a higher percentage of Internet
hosts per thousand inhabitants than Iceland in 199680. On the other hand the
weakness is that on the organisational side Iceland seems in many ways to
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be behind other nations with a similar economical status . In many ways
Icelanders seem not to like working in big organisations and companies tend
to be small and often family-run. This small size of companies can often
work as a barrier towards the utilisation of modern technology or other
factors that are essential in gaining competitiveness today82.
To strengthen the competitive status of Iceland today it seems to be crucial
that the governments carry on opening up the economy and creating a
healthy economic framework for companies and people to work within. In
the same way it is necessary for companies to be able to use these changes
as well as their resources to strengthen their competitive status and
overcome weaknesses.
79 Olafsson, S.
80 Network Wizards at http://vvww.nvv.com/ In July 1996 Iceland had 40.34 Internet hosts per
thousand inhabitants while Finland had 54.25 and UK 9.9.
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IV The Icelandic Fish Industry
The aim of this chapter is to give a short but comprehensive overview of the
Icelandic fish industry, its development and its structure. The definitions of
"fish" and "fishing industry" vary and can range from activities that are
directly related to catching and processing fish to technical- or machinery-
related activities. In this thesis, the definition of fish industry will focus on
catching, farming, processing, exporting and administration connected to the
industry.
IV. 1 BriefHistory
From the earliest settlements, the fish and the sea have been important
issues for Iceland. It would have been difficult for people to live in Iceland
if not for the food supplies that came from the sea83. Up until the 19th
century, fishing was mainly a supplement to farming and was done on
rowing boats that were owned by farmers and which were mainly operated
seasonally according to the farming conditions. This form of fishing started
out as "home fishing" which was operated from the farms. Later this form
moved towards the establishment of fishing stations that were closer to the
best fishing grounds. In the fishing season, people (mainly workers on the
farms) then moved from their farm to the fishing station and stayed there
over the operation season which lasted from the end of January to the
beginning of May. This continued until the latter part of the 19th century.
Other fishing seasons were the spring season from the middle ofMay to the
end of June and the autumn season from the end of September to the end of
December84. During the 17th and 18th centuries Icelanders had to watch
other nations fish in Icelandic waters on large deck sail boats while they
were fishing in open small rowing boats just a short distance from the coast.
They went out in the morning and came onshore the same day.
82 Arnbjornsson, G.
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It is surprising how late the Icelandic fishing industry started to develop and
that the development started because of pressure and influence from
foreigners85. The development of the Icelandic fishing industry started in
1783 when the Danish King supported experiments in the operation of deck
boats in Iceland. However, these experiments met with resistance from
conservative Icelanders, mainly farmers, leading to cessation in 1787. It
was at the beginning of the 19th century that Icelanders started to operate
their own deck boats and in the middle of that century there were 31 deck
boats in Iceland. From that point on it is possible to talk about an
independent fishing industry, operating on a full year basis in Iceland.
IV.2 Structure andDevelopment
Sigfus Jonson put forward a model of the Icelandic fish industry which
presents the main influencing factors and what impact they have on the
economy and community (see figure IV. I)86.
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Figure IV. 1 shows that Jonson split the fishing industry into three main
factors: catching (fishing sector), processing and exporting. These three
factors are influenced by official administration and research. Official
administration can both be from the government, in the form of law and
regulation, as well as formal administration bodies that the industry itself
has established to take care of their own matters. The three main
influencing factors are then split into three parts; first the natural factors like
fish stocks and weather, secondly the economic factors and thirdly the
community factors. To understand these influencing factors it is necessary
to look at these factors in Iceland, as well as in countries that are the main
competitors for the Icelandic fish industry. Lastly there are the influences of
the fish industry on the economy and inhabitation patterns in Iceland. It was
made clear in chapter III about the Icelandic economy that the fish industry
has great influence on the economic development in Iceland and fluctuations
in the Icelandic economy. It is also evident that the fish industry has great
influence on the inhabitation patterns in the country, especially in the parts
of the country where the fish industry is the main industry and the principal
reason for habitation, such as in places like the West Fjord (Vestfjordum)
and the eastern part of Iceland. To understand the Icelandic fish industry
and the demands that are made of it, it is necessary to look at all these
factors and to understand their impact on the industry. In many cases these
factors are not what could be called economical factors; they are more often
ad hoc emotional and political, often invisible, factors that follow some tacit
principles.
Periods of fast development rather than steady growth have characterised
the fish industry. Innovation and development have usually started in the
fishing industry and then moved on towards the land processing sector and
other related industries and services88. In the next section, development in
each sector of the fish industry will be looked at briefly to give a more
holistic picture of the factors that may influence the industry today.
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In the book "Islenskur Sjavarutvegur" {Icelandic Fishing Industry) Sigfus
Jonsson split the development of the fishing industry into five periods: 1)
rowing-boats, 2) sail boats, 3) motorboats and trawlers, 4) innovation-
trawlers and Swedish boats, and finally 5) the stern-trawlers. In this section
these periods will by used to describe briefly the development in the fishing
sector. The author adds one extra period, processing trawlers, which have
been developing over the last decade or so. It is interesting to see that until
the beginning of the 20th century the majority of improvements and
progress in the Icelandic fishing sector were through activities of foreign
companies or individuals. It was not until the third decade of the 20th
century that Icelanders took the fish industry into their own hands89.
IV.2.1.1 Rowing boats 1750-1850
The first period started around the middle of the 18th century when fishing
was mainly operated in open rowing boats and on a seasonal basis. Up until
the year 1800, fishing was almost only operated in rowing boats.90 Rowing
boats were widely used until the beginning of the 20th century when
engines were first put into such boats. Following this, the use of rowing
boas went into a rapid decline.
IV.2.1.2 Sail boats 1850-1905
The second period lasted from the middle of the 19th century until 1905,
when deck sailboats became increasingly important in the fishing sector. At
the turn of the 20th century the number of deck boats was 150.
IV.2.1.3 Motor boats and trawlers 1905 - 1945
The third period started in 1902 when the first engine was put into a boat
and in 1905 when the first trawler came to Iceland. From this point on,
development in the fishing sector was fast, and the catching of demersal






to the beginning of WW1, or from 40,000 tons to 100,000 tons. In the
1920s, the catch went to 340,000 tons when Icelanders started to catch
saithe, which up to that point had not been utilised. Employment in the
fishing and processing sector reached its peak in 1930 when 23% of the total
work force were working in both these sectors and over 15% of the total
work force in the fishing sector. In the 1930s, a problem period appeared
due to sales problems on foreign markets and the decreased catching of
demersal species, especially cod and haddock, relative to a simultaneous
increase in the catching of herring. During WW2, the circumstances of the
fish industry changed because the traditional market for products closed or
was difficult to supply. As a result of this, the export of fresh fish to Britain
increased and prices went up. During WW2 the fishery sector was very
profitable and able to put money in saving funds to prepare replacements of
fishing vessels that were getting old and out of date91.
IV.2.1.4 Innovation-trawlers and Swedish boats 1945 - 1970
At the beginning of this period, the Icelandic government made a contract to
build new trawlers to renew the ageing fleet. These trawlers got the name
innovation-trawlers to refer to the impact they were supposed to have on the
industry. In the same way the government made a contract to build boats in
Sweden to renew the boat fleet. Between 1945 and 1952 the fleet increased
but during the latter part of the period, i.e. post-1955, the catching of
demersal species stock decreased. Between 1960-1966 operation of
trawlers became difficult and their numbers declined from 47 to 2292. An
increase catch of herring made up part of the loss of the catch of demersal
species, but mainly for the boats rather than the trawlers. The catch of
herring was great in the years from 1960-67, which meant that herring





IV.2.1.5 Stern-trawlers 1970 - 1985
From around 1970 onwards, the trawler fleet was renewed and stern-
trawlers were bought. Their introduction was so well received that their
numbers increased very rapidly and the government supported this
development by offering good funding. The government used this as a
regional development policy, to enable companies in small villages to buy
stern-trawlers, which would increase the stability of these operations,
increase employment and reduce the drain of people from the rural areas.
This meant that, as well as an increase in the catch, the number of trawlers
increased from 22 in 1970 to 54 in 1974 and to 103 in 1983. After the
collapse of the herring catch in 1967 the boat fleet started to concentrate
more on other species such as capelin and shrimp, as well as catching
demersal species like cod. In 1982 and 1991 the catch of capelin collapsed;
although it had been very important for the boat fleet, the catching of
capelin has always fluctuated. After 1970 the fishing fleet increased the
range of fish caught, including species that had not been as important
previously, for example greenland halibut, capelin, and ocean redfish. After
1982 the total catch fell because of over-fishing and declining fish stocks.
This decline has continued in all major species until 1997, when some
evidence showed increase in fish stocks and quotas.
IV.2.1.6 Processing-trawlers 1983 - 1997
In 1983 processing at sea started in some real quantities when mainly
trawlers and bigger boats began to be adapted. This processing includes
mainly freezing the fish either whole, headed or filleted, trimming the fish
and freezing it in blocks. The output of the sea processing vessels was 24
thousand tons in 1983 and went up to 155 thousand tons in 1994 but has
declined a little since then, mainly because of declined fish stocks. In the
last five years or so, new trawlers and big boats with processing facilities
have been bought and have made it possible for the fleet to fish on
international fishing grounds which in some cases are without quotas and
control. In 1995, the demersal species made up 81% of sea frozen products,
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and shrimp 19%. During the period from 1983 onwards these percentages
have fluctuated from 80-90% for demersal and 10-20% for shrimp.
1V.2.2 Fish Farming
Fish farming started to some extent in Iceland in the 1970s, mainly with
salmon. Export of fresh-farmed salmon started around 1980. The
production of farmed fish has gone from 3 tons in 1983 to around 3,000 tons
in 1993 and was still around that in 199793. Around 1980 the Icelandic
government offered support and favourable loans to encourage fish farming
which they thought would be very positive for the Icelandic economy and
would support more economic diversity. When farmed salmon from Iceland
was put on the market the price was falling due to increased production in
countries like Norway and Scotland. In addition to this, countries that had
been farming much longer had lower price, as they had managed to lower
the production costs. Conditions for fish farming are in many cases more
difficult in Iceland than in other countries due to the cold sea. The optimism
concerning fish farming thus ended with disappointment and difficulties for
companies that had started in farming. This bad experience has in many
ways been a barrier for further development of fish farming in Iceland,
where favourable conditions, such as the geothermal water, could be utilised
to a greater extent. However, this is slowly changing and fish farming, such
as river trout farming, has increased. In addition, three companies now
operate as experimental companies, one in farming halibut, another in
European sea bass and the third in abalone.
Table IV. 1 presents the production of slaughtered fish from the year 1992 to
1995.
Production of fish farming 1992 - 1995
1992 1993 1994 1995
ton94 ton ton ton
Salmon (From all farming methods) 2.585 2.844 2.896 2.880
Trout (all species) 399 566 574 860
Total 2.984 3.410 3.470 3.740
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Table IV. 1 shows that there has been over 100% increase in trout farming
from 1992 to 1995 and a slow growth in salmon farming at the same time.
Although fish farming does not play a major part in the Icelandic fish
industry, it represents around 22% of global fisheries production in the
world in 1996 and increases its share every year (was 8% in 1984)96.
Hence, Icelandic fish is in increased competition with farmed fish from
other nations.
IV.2.3 Fisheries control and management
Fishing management and control can be split up into three important
periods: (1) when the Icelandic government increased the Icelandic
fisheries' limits during the period 1952-75, (2) in 1983 when quotas were
placed on catching of the most important species and (3) in 1990, when
quotas were put on all species and boats and individual transferable quotas
were introduced on all species.
IV.2.3.1 Icelandic economic exclusive zone
An extension of the fisheries' jurisdiction started in 1952 when it limits was
extended from 3 to 4 miles and from 4-12 miles in 1958. In 1972 the
Icelandic government decided, unilaterally to other nations, to extend the
jurisdiction from 12 to 50 miles and again in 1975 from 50 - 200 miles.
These extensions were made because of fast declines in the fish stocks and
over-fishing in the fishing grounds around Iceland. Between 1950 and 1974
foreign fishing vessels caught on average of 360.000 thousand tons of
demersal species in the sea around Iceland, which is a similar catch to that
of the Icelandic fleet for of demersal species97. This foreign fleet was
mainly from Britain (about 60%) and West Germany (30%)98. After each of
the four extensions Britain imposed a landing ban on Icelandic ships; West
Germany imposed this after the last two extensions. The third conflict in










agreement meant that, without reaching a satisfactory agreement with EEC
countries, Iceland would not enjoy specific reductions on import duties on
fish to EEC countries. This sanction lasted from 1972 to 1976 when Iceland
reached an agreement over the 200 miles limit. Since 1976 fishing of
foreign ships in Icelandic waters has been very limited and plays no
important role in the total catch.
IV.2.3.2 The Quota system
The next aspect of fishing control that is worth mentioning is the quota
system. It was introduced in 1983, with quotas on important species, either
in the form of quantities or limitations regarding the number of days that
ships could fish each year. Before 1983 a quota system had been introduced
in the herring fisheries in 1975 and in 1980 this was extended to the fishing
of capelin. The main pressure for introducing the quota system was
declining fish stocks first the collapse of the herring stock and, later on the
foreseeable collapse of the capelin stock without preventive measures. The
same can be said about the demersal species before 1983 where the stock
had been declining due to overfishing. Hannesson has pointed out that the
ownership of quotas involves the right to catch the fish but not ownership of
the fish stock". Due to this it is claimed that the quota does not mean the
ownership of the fish but rather the right to catch the fish.
From the beginning of the quota system the quota has been bound to the
fishing vessels. In the first years of the quota system, two main systems
were active. First, the quantities quota where the fishing vessels were
assigned certain quantities that they could catch. Then there was the fishing
effort system that allowed the vessels to fish for certain number of days over
the year. Later the fishing effort system was abolished for all vessels except
for boats under 10 tons that could choose between systems. In 1995 the
fishing law was modified slightly so it would also cover boats under 10
tons, which before had been exempt from the quantity quota100. Still, boats






them to fish for a limited number of days per year (around 23 days per year
in the year 2000).
IV.2.3.3 Individual transferable quota (ITQ)
The law in relation to fishing was amended in 1990 in order to make the
quota system more effective rather than responding to declining fish stocks
or overfishing as almost all law concerning the quota had previously
attempted. According to law 1, no. 38, May 15, 1990 no one can catch fish
inside the Icelandic economic zone without permission from the Ministry of
Fisheries, and licences are given for one year at a time1 . Due to this law,
all major fisheries inside the Icelandic economic zone operate according to a
uniform system with transferable quotas in all species and fisheries. Hence,
nearly all fishing vessels have individual transferable quotas (abbreviated
ITQ), allowing ship owners to buy or sell quotas between ships. As has
been pointed out earlier, the ITQ grants the right to catch the fish but not the
ownership of the fish stock102. In that way, the ITQ permits the owners of
the fishing vessel to sell the right to catch the fish. However, there are
limitations to the transferability of the ITQ that could affect the structure of
the fisheries sectors. Firstly it is exclusively owners of fishing vessels with
a valid fishing licence that can hold quotas. Secondly, the holders of quotas
much catch at least 50 percent of their quotas every second year to maintain
the quota share. The third restriction is the geographical restriction to the
ITQ system where the local authorities and respective fisheries unions in
local geographical regions can block the transfer of annual quotas between
regions. On the other hand, annual vessel quotas are freely transferable
between fishing vessels within the same region. Runolfsson and Arnason
point out that it is rare in practice, that transfers of quotas between
geographical regions are blocked10 .
Runolfsson and Arnason claim that "The fishing industry is a major
determinant ofpersonal incomes and income distribution and, in manyparts
101 Fisheries Management Act No. 38/1990.
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of Iceland, the fishing industry is virtually the only basis for economic
activity. Anything that affects the fishing industry, therefore, has a regional
impact that often has very potent political repercussions. As a result, the
fisheries management is a major topic ofpublic discussion and has great
influence on the formulation of Icelandic economic and regional policy"104.
Consequently it is no surprise that the transferability of the quotas has been
criticised as a weakness where it would lead to concentration of quota
holdings within a few big companies. This will leave the smaller
companies, many located in the rural areas, without quotas and employment.
Runolfsson and Arnason point out that it is in the nature of any fisheries
management system to increase the efficiency and profitability of the
fisheries which will at least partly be done through a smaller fishing fleet105.
Decreasing the total allocation of quotas causes pressure in the fishing
sector to increase concentration by merger or acquisition. This can be seen
when in 1992 the twenty biggest quota holders had a 36% share of the total
quota but in March 2001 the share had increased to 59% of the total
quota106. This demonstrates that there has been concentration in the fishery
sector with companies getting bigger. This concentration needs to be
looked at in the light of the high proportion of vertical integration between
the processing and fisheries sectors where vertical integration is almost a
norm in the industry. Hence, this concentration in the fisheries sector also
applies in the processing sector.
It is clear that the ITQ system and the concentration that has occurred in the
industry cause a tension between the economic and political views aimed at
regional development. The concentration and the ITQ system in some way
support a healthy industry where the industry can adjust to changes in the
business enviroment by moving or selling quotas between companies. On
the other hand, it is the regional development that suffers when companies
that have been big employersin the region are bought and the fishing vessels
104 Runolfsson, B. & Arnason, R., page 1, 1996.




and quotas are moved away, leaving the small villages almost without
employment.
Another aspect of the critique of the ITQ system is the value bound in the
quotas and the fact that owners of companies or fishing vessels can sell their
share in companies where biggest part of the price is paid for the quota. It is
evident that this has made it possible for some owners of companies in the
fisheries sector to leave the industry with a good profit. On the other hand it
can be argued that without this price for the quota it would be very difficult
to leave the industry without losing a considerable amount or even going
bankrupt. Despite this, the holders of the quotas have only paid a very small
price to the community for the right to fish and, therefore critics have
claimed that the owners of the fishing companies have been "given" the
quotas which they then can sell at high prices. In the beginning, the annual
quota was issued by the Minestry of Fisheries free of charge. In 1990 this
changed in such a way that now the Minestry collects fees for the annual
quota to cover the cost ofmonitoring and enforcing the ITQ system107. The
fee only covers a very small amount compared to the price of the quotas on
the market. All this has caused disagreement over the ITQ system and over
the effect it has had on developments in the fishing industry as well as
regional development.
In evaluating the quota system it is necessary to look at the previously
described high degree of vertical integration that has taken place between
the processing and the fishing sectors. Without this vertical integration
between these two sectors it can be suggested that the quota system, and
especially the fact that the quota is bound to the fishing vessels, could
seriously affect the power balance in the industry. Quotas that are bound to
the fishing vessels put the owner of the vessels in a very powerful position
in bargaining against the processing sector about prices and other matters
concerning business dealings between the sectors. Hence, it is claimed here
that the high degree of vertical integration has minimised this proposed
negative effect of the quota system and is one of the prime reasons for the
success of the quota sytem in Iceland.
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The current situation is that all boats have quantity quotas (except for boats
under 10 tons that remain within the fishing effort quota system) for all
species, and permission to fish for one year, the so called "fishing year"
which starts on the 1st ofSeptember and ends on the 31st ofAugust.
IV.2.4 Fishing fleet and catch
To get a better overview of the fishery sector today, it is helpful to look at
three factors; (1) size and structure of the fleet, (2) the catch, and (3) the
disposal of the catch.
Fishing fleet in 1997
Type of fishing Size in Number GRT % of % of total % of total
vessels GRT108 of ships total GRT catch value
Seasonal boats 0-12 313 2,420 1.9 1.8 4.9
Multipurpose 13-50 123 3,052 2.5 2.7 7.8
vessels
"
51-110 83 6,487 5.2 2.3 6.5
"
110-200 77 12,165 9.7 4.1 11.5
Multip and 201-500 62 19,165 15.3 37.6 14.6
specialised
purse-seiner vessels 501-800 12 8,054 6.5 22.7 6.4
"
>800 5 5,474 4.4 13.8 3.6
Trawlers 0-500 63 24,625 19.7 7.5 17.2
>500 52 43,454 34.8 7.5 27.5
Total 790 124,896 100.0 100 100,0
Table IV.2 The fleet, size and catch 19971U9.
Table IV.2 shows that the trawlers bring ashore the most valuable catch, or
almost 47% of the total value, while the multipurpose boats bring the most
volume, mainly due to the capelin catch, the majority of which is reduced
into fish meal. From 1975 the GRT (Gross registered tonnage) of the boats
from 0 to 500 GRT has declined by about 28%. The boats over 500 GRT
have increased in GRT by about 7% and the trawler have increased in GRT
by about 21% and the trawler over 500 GRT have increased in GRT by
about 18%. This means that the number of ships in the fleet is declining and
the ships are getting bigger. This development has been rapid since 1985,
especially with these big trawlers and boats with processing facilities. This
development has mainly affected the trawler group and bigger boats. Table
107 Runolfsson, B. & Arnason, R., 1996.
i°8 stands for Gross registered tonnage.
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IV.3 presents the main species and fishing gear of each of the groups of the
fishing fleet.
Main spices and fishing gears
Type of fishing Size in Main Main
vessels GRT species fishing gear





51-110 Demersal., Herring. Longline, Gillnet
"
110-200 Shell fish purse-seine, trawl
Multip and specialised 201-500 Demersal., Herring./ Trawl
Purse-seiner vessels 501-800 Shell fish, Capelin purse-seine
"
>800 "
Trawlers 0-500 Demersal., Shrimp Trawl both
>500 " bottom and flow
Table IV.3 The fleet, main species and fishing gear11".
Demersal species are the most important fish species in the fishery sector
with over 54% of the total value of landed fish (see Table IV.4). On the
other hand pelagic species, mainly capelin, stand for over 74% of the
quantity of landed fish. However capelin fishing is built on quantity where
a large part of it goes into fishmeal production, although an increasing
proportion is frozen.
Total catch 1997
Value in Percent of Quantity in Percent of
thousand, fsl.kr. total value thousands ton total quantity
Demersal species 30,353,103 53.8 430,399 19.6
Flatfish 5,866,007 10.4 46,905 2.1
Pelagic fish 10,176,032 18.0 1,620,787 73.7
Molluscs and Crustaceans 10,025,228 17.7 99,824 4.5
Other 46,683 0.1 1,096 0.1
Total 56,467,053 100.0 2,199,011 100.0
Table IV.4 Total catches 1997111.
To get a better picture of individual species inside each group, the ten most
important species in value are presented in Table IV.5. In 1997 Cod was
less than half of the quantity in 1981 when it was in its maximum. Cod still
is the most important species in the Icelandic fishery industry and stands for
28% of the total value of landed fish. In later years shrimp has become the
second most important species and sea frozen product. As an example of
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quantity in 1995 but dropped to around 17% in 1997. In these two years the
catch of shrimps has declined by 24% of the total catch, meanwhile the
catch of cod has increased by 6%, from 22% in 1995 to 28% in 1997.
Most important species in 1997
Species Value % Ton %
Cod 15,579,987 27.59% 208,622 9.49%
Shrimp 9,341,083 16.54% 82,627 3.76%
Capelin 7,669,095 13.58% 1,313,624 59.74%
Redfish 7,644,557 13.54% 109,583 4.98%
Haddock 3,539,598 6.27% 43,248 1.97%
Greenland Halibut 3,376,939 5.98% 18,630 0.85%
Herring 2,219,987 3.93% 291,117 13.24%
Saithe 1,728,654 3.06% 36,546 1.66%
Plaice 1,143,309 2.02% 10,544 0.48%
Catfish 792,785 1.40% 11,666 0.53%
Total 53,035,994 93.92% 2,126,207 96.69%
Table IV.5 Ten most important species in fish catch 1997 .
Most of the volume goes to meal production, where capelin is the main
species, as well as herring. Although most of the volume (48%) goes to
meal production, meals stood for only about 16.4% of the total export value
of fish products in 1997113. The most valuable method is freezing; but in
1997 land freezing took 15% of the catch and sea freezing 8.6%, but
(together 23.6% of the total catch) they stood for around 55% of the export
value of fish from Iceland1 .
IV.2.5 Processing Sector
In the past the main aim of most processing methods was to expand the
lifetime of the fish so it could be kept under the primitive conditions of the
time. Developments in fish processing have principally followed the
development of the fishing sector. Fish processing was connected with the
boat owners, usually farmers who processed their own catch. With the
emergence of bigger boats and individual boat owners (who were not
farmers), operation on a whole year basis started around the middle of the
19th century. From this time it is possible to talk about a significant fish
industry, both in terms of fishing and production. However, it was not until
112






around 1930 that individual processing companies emerged that were not
bound to the operation of fishing vessels"5. After this it is possible to talk
about an independent fish processing industry, although the link between
fishing and processing is obvious. Today most of the processing companies
operate their own fishing vessels to take care of supplies for their
production.
The oldest processing method for fish in Iceland was to dry the fish to make
the so-called stockfish, which is the oldest exported fish product from
Iceland. In the middle of the 19th century salted fish took over as the main
processing method, until the closing of the main market in Spain during the
Civil War in the middle of the 1930s. After that, selling of fresh
unprocessed fish increased considerably, and between 1930 and 1950
freezing took over as the main processing method in the industry, and has
kept its position ever since.
IV.2.5.1 Production methods
Production methods for fish in Iceland can in the simplest way be split into
six main groups: 1) freezing, 2) salting, 3) drying, 4) fresh, 5) meal and oil
and 6) canned. In export reports unprocessed fish exported on ice is counted
as fresh although it gets no treatment or processing in Iceland. As can been
seen from Figure IV-2 which shows the percentage of value each year that is
produced, there is a fluctuation in and between each production method.
Many factors influence the choice of production methods, for example
market condition, exchange rate, quantity and quality of the catch and the
production capability. Another factor influencing the choice is flexibility of
the production companies; the majority of the bigger companies are capable
of switching between processing methods when, for example, market





Frozen Salted Iced Dried Meal/oil Canned Other
Figure IV.2 Production the fish processing 1975-1997116
The next sub-section provides a short description of each of these
processing methods and their development in Iceland, starting with drying
of fish, the oldest method.
IV.2.5.1.1Drying (Stockfish)
The history of stockfish production can be traced back to the year 1200 and
the first written source about export to the year 1340117. Stockfish
production was the most common processing method for fish in Iceland
until the middle of the 19th century. Stockfish production was almost zero
at the beginning of this century but around 1950 it became important again
as the catch of demersal species increased and a market for it opened in
Africa. In this century stockfish production reached its peak in 1981 when
it stood for around 16% of the total value of fish production from Iceland,
which was mainly exported to Nigeria. However, the market there
collapsed the year after due to one ofmany revolutions in the country. After
that the market in Nigeria has mainly been for cheap by-products like dried
cod heads and fish bone. Over the last decade stockfish production has
fluctuated from 0.71% to 2.68% of the total value of the fish production,
with the main market for quality stockfish being Italy, and for cheaper
production, Nigeria. Traditional stockfish production is usually a by¬
product for companies and demands neither a lot of technology, equipment
nor capital. Very few companies have stockfish production as their main
116
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activity, although a few companies located near geothermal heat sources
have used this natural resource for drying cod heads, bones and fish cuttings
as their main activities.
IV2.5.1.2Salting
Salting of fish was not common until the beginning of the 19th century
although sources report that fish was salted in Iceland from around 1624-30.
Between 1820-40 salting become increasingly important in the southern part
of Iceland but until 1870 most of the fish in the north and east of the country
was processed into stockfish118. After this, at the end of the 19th century,
almost all the catch was salted due to increased knowledge of the processing
method, good access to salt and favourable market conditions. The main
markets for salted fish (called Bacallo) have traditionally been in southern
Mediterranean countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. During the
Civil War in Spain and WW2, an increase in freezing meant that salting lost
its place as one of the main production methods for fish in Iceland between
1930-40, but salted fish has always been an important fish product. From
1975 to 1997 it has fluctuated between 14.34% - 28.86% of the total value
of exported fish compared to 16.0% in 1997. Salt fish production from
demersal species demands neither great equipment nor technology so, even
today, boat owners often process their own catch with their families. Thus
companies using salting are characterised mainly by small ones with 1-5
employees, although there are bigger companies that have implemented
much more technology to the production in the last decade. Salt fish
production is also often a by-product or second product for companies. The
main species for salting are demersal, mainly cod and herring, which are
salted into casks into which other species are often added.
IV.2.5.1.3Freezing
Freezing can be split into two parts, traditional land freezing and freezing at
sea, which has been increasing over the last two decades. Freezing of fish
started in Iceland in the 1930s and increased dramatically over the period




Icelandic fishing vessels due to a fishing dispute which but pressure on
companies to increase their processing capacity. Freezing demands much
more technology and capital than both drying and salting, so companies
tend to be bigger and have freezing as their core processing method,
although many companies also have the opportunity to use some other
processing methods like salting. Freezing has accounted for about 50% of
the total value of fish production for the last two decades, or from 38.9% in
1981, when a large proportion of fish caught went into stockfish production,
up to 63.6 % in 1994. Freezing on land has, for the last decade or so, faced
increased difficulties in operation and competition from processing trawlers
which process the fish on board. In sea freezing the fish is frozen very fresh
or usually within 24 hours of catching and the processing trawlers operate
24 hours per day in 20- to 30- day cruises. This means that their output on
capital is much higher than for land freezing and the fish is fresher. If the
Pelagic species are excluded, around 32% of the total catch was frozen at
sea in 1997, including where 29.6% of demersal species, 36.0% of flatfish
species and 50.3% of the total catch of shrimp"9. Rarely do the processing
trawlers have the facilities to utilise the cuttings and bones from the fish, nor
do they have the facilities to cut or trim the fish as is possible in land
processing. This means that processing at sea is much simpler than land
processing and does not offer as much opportunity for value adding through
more work. This leads to the product frozen at sea being much closer to a
raw material for further processing, which is usually is done abroad.
IV.2.5.1.4Meal and oil
The production of fishmeal and oil depends heavily on the catch of capelin
and herring, which are the most important species both for fishmeal as well
as oil. About 92.3% of the capelin catch and around 81.3% of the herring
catch in 1997 went into fishmeal and oil production120. Due to an increased
catch of herring in the summer time (fslandsfld/Iceland's herring) the






from nearly 56% in 1991 to around 81.3% in 1997121. Another aspect of the
fishmeal and oil production industry is the utilisation of fish bones and
cuttings from the processing companies, but with an increase in sea
processing this production has declined over the last years. Another sector
in this industry is the utilisation of fish products such as fish liver for liver
oil for human consumption, both for domestic consumption as well as for
export.
Companies in the fishmeal and oil sector are in most cases separated from
other processing companies or the fishing sector. It is common though that
other fish companies own a share in fishmeal companies near their
processing plants or have small melting facilities attached to their
production.
Production in this sector is fluctuates greatly, mainly due to fluctuations in
the catch of capelin and herring both in Iceland as well as in competing
countries like Canada and Norway. Fishmeal and oil production has
fluctuated from around 3% of the total export value of fish product from
Iceland to 25%122.
IV.2.5.1.5Canning andpreserving
Canning has a long history in Iceland but preserving is much newer and
began around 1955. Herring and shrimp are the most important species but
this sector also utilises lumpfish, cod-roe and cod-fiver. Most of the
production in this sector is exported in packaging that is ready for sale and
consumption. At a glance the canning and preserving sector is much closer
to the consumption market than most of the rest of the fish production
industry in Iceland. In 1997, production from this sector stood at around
1.9% of the export value of fish product in Iceland123.
IV.2.5.1.6Fresh (Iced)
The export or sailing with fresh iced fish did not start until WW1, although








home with their catch for a much longer time124. Sailing with fresh fish has
fluctuated greatly over its history, depending on catch and market
conditions. With improvements in transportation, export of fresh fish in
containers became increasingly common in the 1980s. Export of fresh fish
in containers opened a new option for smaller boats that could not sail
themselves with the fish to foreign auction markets; they could share
containers and send it to the market that way. In 1997 around 5.9% of the
catch of demersal species was exported in containers and around 5.9% of
the catch of demersal species was exported by the fishing vessels
themselves to foreign auction markets125.
IV.2.6 Export Sector
After the monopoly of the Danish merchants ended in 1787 the licences for
export from Iceland was bound to Danish citizen all until 1855 when it was
given free. The export of fish from Iceland was therefore rather free with
minimum government interference, with the exception of the WW1 period
up until 1930126. From 1900 to 1930 the most important export of fish from
Iceland was cod, either salted or whole on ice, and fish liver oil127. Most of
the export of salted fish during this period went through individual fish
merchants who bought the fish from small producers and sold to markets in
Mediterranean countries, mainly Spain and Italy128. After 1930 a period of
government interference in export matters and oligopoly took over, until
around 1980 when exports increased, along with competition in exporting.
This led to liberation of exports in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This
discussion about the export sector will be divided into these two periods;
that is, firstly the government interference and oligopoly during the period
1930 - 1980, and secondly post- 1980, which was characterised by increased












the general economic development in Iceland as previously discussed in
Chapter III.
IV.2.6.1 Government interference and oligopoly 1930 - 1987
In the 1930s the export of salted fish became increasingly difficult mainly
due to the "Great Depression" and huge overproduction of salted fish in the
world129. These difficulties induced lower prices and chaotic situations in
the main markets where commission agents controlled almost everything
and the producers or fish merchants underbid each other in the hope of
selling their products. During this period, five companies took care ofmost
of the export of salted cod from Iceland. Due to the bad conditions on the
markets, rapid underbidding and badly organised selling the commercial
banks of the Icelandic fish and fishery companies pressed for more
cooperation in the export of fish130. This ended in July 1932 when the three
biggest export companies, banks and companies in the fish industry
established Solusamtok Islenskra FiskframleiQenda (Union of Icelandic Fish
Producers), abbreviated UIFP. In December 1932 the Icelandic government
granted UIFP an almost entire monopoly on exporting salted cod from
Iceland with temporary law. This law strengthened the organisation in place
where it would otherwise have been difficult to get all the companies in the
production and selling of salted fish to work together in one sales
organisation. Since the expiration of this temporary law the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs granted permission to export fish on a year-to-year basis.
UIFP was the first export organisation established in Iceland in the
ownership of companies in the fishing industry. It can be said that with its
establishment and by granting the organisation a monopoly, the Icelandic
government had started its massive involvement in the organisation of the
export of fish from Iceland.
The next organisation in the Icelandic fish industry was the establishment of
Sildarutvegsnefiid (Icelandic Herring Board), abbreviated IHB, in 1934.
IHB's initial role was to supervise and exercise an overall control on the
129 Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
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catching, processing and exporting of herring in Iceland. However, it was
not until 1945 that IHB was granted a monopoly in exporting salted herring
from Iceland131. IHB is a private foundation with some of its board
members elected by Aljfrngi (parliament) and others appointed by the
Ministry ofFishery.
Another involvement of the government in the 1930s was the establishment
of Fiskimalanefnd, which was an official authority, which aimed to support
innovation in the fish industry as well as supporting the establishment of
freezing plants around the country. A few years later the Fiskimalanefhd
(Fish affairs committee) got the unofficial authority as an overall
government body in all matters concerning the fish industry in Iceland.
After the establishment of UIFP and the controversy over how the fish
export should be organised in Iceland, the Fiskimalanefnd was granted a
monopoly of exporting frozen fish from Iceland. Fiskimalanefhd put
pressure on the freezing plants, which they had supported, to sell their
products through them, and exercised its authority by denying granting
companies an export licence.132.
In the New Year 1940/41 companies in the freezing industry, which were
inside the Samband Islenskra Samvinnufelaga (Federation of Icelandic Co¬
operatives), abbreviated SIS, handed their sale activities over to the
Federation from Fiskimalanefiid. Then, in 1942, the privately owned
companies in the freezing sector established their own sales organization
SolumiSstod Hradfrysithusannna (Icelandic Freezing Plants Corporation),
abbreviated IFPC. IFPC gradually took over sales on behalf of their
companies from the Fiskimalanefhd, which had taken care of sales for the
IFPC in their first months, and much of the staff followed to IFPC from the
Fiskimalanefiid133.
Partly due to the conditions that the government put on the establishment of
sales organisations in the fish industry and granting export licences, the two
organisations (IFPC and UIFP) that were established by private companies
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operated on a Co-operative basis. SIS was run before on a Co-operative
basis but all three companies, that is SIS, UIFP and IFPC, were operated as
non-profit organisations, which returned their profits to their members
through lower commission on sales. As outlined earlier IHB was operated
as a private foundation, getting its revenue through commission on sales and
imported supplies needed for the herring production134.
After 1940 the Icelandic government controlled exports from Iceland
through the granting of export licensing by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The main aim of the government during this time was to minimize internal
competition and the underbidding of companies exporting fish from Iceland.
To ensure this the government granted very few companies export licences
to the most important markets, blocking internal competition between
companies in the fish industry and guaranteeing oligopoly. In general terms
this meant that the organisation of the export of salted and frozen demersal
species to these markets was as follows:
• UIFP had an almost monopoly of the export of salted demersal fish to the
Mediterranean countries until 1st of January 1993.
• IFPC and SIS (and later IS its successor) had an almost duopoly for frozen fish
on the US market until 1987.
• In the former Soviet Union, IFPC and SIS (and later IS) had also duopoly until
the market closed after the collapse of the Union in 1991.
• Export to Western Europe was much more liberated for frozen fish than in the
US and the Soviet Union, and in the 1960s companies other than IFPC and SIS
135started exporting to these countries
In the fish meal and oil sector the government was heavily involved in its
export by its ownership of the biggest company in that sector, Sildarvinnsla
Rikisins (The Icelandic State Factory), abbreviated SR, until 1994. Export
in the fishmeal and oil sector has always been much more decentralized than
in the other sectors of the fish industry and not under as much control from
1 ^6
the government .
In canning and preserving the government was also involved; it formed a








Lagmetisins (Icelandic Waters), abbreviated SL, in early 1970 to take care
of producers' sale activities. The canning sector is dominated by 3-4
producers that account for around 90% of the total export137. Therefore in
1991, when some of these big companies decided to take care of their own
sales activities, SL lost its share of export and in 1993 it merged with one
producer under the name Icelandic Waters.
This period 1930 - 1980 is characterised by oligopoly of the big sale
organisations, IFPC, SIS, UIFP, IHB and later SL, which dominated exports
from Iceland. In 1982 IFPC, SIS and UIFP exported 71.5% of the total
export of fish product from Iceland, and if IHB and SL are added to that the
share of the total export is 77.0%138. From here these four companies IFPC,
SIS/IS, UIFP and IHB will be called Principal Marketing Companies,
abbreviated PMCs. Although the government limited export licensing, a
number of new firms entered the export sector during this period, but
relatively few managed to stay in the export business for more than a few
139
years .
IV.2.6,2 Competition and increased freedom 1980 -1999
With increased fish catch and more diversity of the markets for fish, export
of fish increased heavily during the period after 1980. As a result an
increased number of small companies entered the export sector, especially
between 1983 - 88, leading to increased competition especially in the export
of frozen fish. This can be traced to the increased importance of the EEC
market for frozen fish, on account of a decline in the US market. As can
been seen from Figure IV.3, the percentage of the total export of fish
product from Iceland to the US market declined from around 48% in 1975
to around 12 - 18% in the 90s. At the same time, the EES market increased
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Figure IV.3 Markets for export of fish product from Iceland 1975 - 1995140
These changes, that is an increase in export, changes in the markets and
increased competition in export also meant that the IFPC and SIS lost their
share of the export of frozen fish to other companies. Dr. Arnar Bjarnason
found out in his Ph.D. study that IFPC had a 25% lower relative share of
export of frozen fish product from Iceland in 1990/91 than in 1982/83, and
the corresponding figure for SIS/IS was around 16%.
Another significant change during this period was a increased freedom in
exporting. First, the duopoly in export to the US was abolished in 1987.
These changes came at a time when the US market had lost it place as the
most important market for frozen fish to EEC markets. Therefore the
changes did not affect the IFPC and IS as could have happened one or two
decades earlier. In salted demersal species UIFP had had protection until
1st of January 1993 when the export of salted fish was de-monopolised.
Since then UIFP has lost considerable share of the export of salted demersal
species, going from almost 100% share to 51% share of the total volume of
exported salted demersal species in 1996141. The rest of the export has gone
to smaller companies, but around 5-6 companies export salted demersal fish
in some considerable volume. Freedom has also been increased in the
export of salted herring, where companies other than IHB have started to
export it.
Although freedom has been increased, the government still puts pressure on
companies in the industry to avoid internal competition and avoid too much
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supply of fish on foreign markets. To do this, government and interest
groups in the fish industry have formed a committee to control exports,
where companies have to apply for permission to put their fish to auction
markets. A successful recent judgement in a case where a company sued the
government for putting barriers on its export of lfesh fish to auction markets
could change this control in the future142.
All the marketing companies that were Co-operatives changed their
ownership form to limited liability, first with the establishment of Islenskum
Sjavarafurdum (Icelandic Seafood), abbreviated IS, that took over the
business of the fish function of SIS in 1987. The next one to change was
UIFP in 1992, then IFPC in 1996, and finally IHB changed its ownership
into a limited liability company in the ownership of producers of salted
herring in 1998143. Following increased competition in exporting fish from
Iceland and a declining catch in the late 1980s and 1990s, the marketing
companies, mainly IFPC, IS and UIFP, have all changed their strategy and
are increasingly starting to sell products for companies outside Iceland, both
to utilise their marketing network and to maintain growth and profitability.
This is in some part in coherent with the increased investment of Icelandic
companies in the fish industry of foreign countries. The PMCs have also
increasingly made contracts with other foreign companies not owned by
Icelandic companies to take care of their marketing activities.
The export sector has changed quite a lot in the last decade, with increased
freedom and entry ofmany small companies into the exporting sector. The
main changes are associated with the change of the PMCs' strategy, that is,
changes from selling only Icelandic fish to more international fish
marketing companies. Another significant change is an increased emphasis
of the PMCs on guaranteeing access to raw materials by buying shares in
Primary processing companies (abbreviated PPCs). This applies mainly to
IS which had shares in 12 - 15 PPCs in Iceland as well in foreign
companies. Due to problems within IS and lack ofprofit, IS sold its share in
the producers in 1999. UIFP has increasingly been investing in producers
142




and sale companies of salted fish, both in Norway and Canada, but has not
invested in PPCs in Iceland. IFPC has also invested in foreign production
companies but in a very few cases bought shares in PPCs in Iceland. As
well as IS, IFPC sold its share in the production companies in 1999.
The years 1997 -1999 have been big changes in the export sector in the
Icelandic fish industry. The Icelandic Herring board was changed into
Islandssild hf., in July 1998 and merged with UIFP on 1st of January 1999.
IS faced troubles in their operation due to huge investment in secondary
processing plants in US, France and in their new headquarters in Reykjavik.
They also face operational problems with a project they where operating in
Russia, where they lost a contract which they had invested quite a lot in.
The problem of IS ended in 1999 when they merged with UIFP, making
UIFP the biggest marketing company for fish in Iceland. In a similar way
IFPC made less profit in 1998 and 1999, forcing them into changes in their
operation, mainly by focusing more on their core activity, that is the sale of
frozen fish. Hence, IFPC as gone out of related businesses such as
transportation, and sold its share in other companies. In the end of 1999
only two of the four Primary Marketing Companies are in operation. UIFP
has increased its operation quite a lot in size and diversified its operation
from only being a marketing company for salted fish into being an
international marketing company focussing on chilled and frozen fish. On
the other hand IFPC has focused its operation as being an international
marketing company for frozen fish.
IV.2.6.3 Market developments
As can be seen from previous chapter the markets for the Icelandic fish
products have changed quite a lot over the past two decades. The European
market has become the most important market and the Japanese market has
increased its share considerably. The long term traditional markets like the
US and former Soviet Union have declined for the past decade. It is not just
the changes in markets areas that affect the fish industry but also changes
within the markets. The main developments in Europe and the US are the
increased market share of supermarkets. An example of this growing role is
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the high share of the big four supermarkets in the UK where Tesco,
Sainsbury's, Asda and Safeway account for about 45 percent of the total UK
grocery sales144. Thereof Tesco has around 16 percent of the total grocery
sales. In addition, there is a growing interest on the UK markets in own-
label products that account for around 45 percent of the total supermarket
sales in the UK145. This emphasis on own-label goods is however, not as
high in other European markets, for example in France146. This
consolidation that can be seen in the UK has also been noted in the US
where consolidation has increased significantly since 1995147. In the US,
the consolidation has been highest within the four biggest supermarkets,
their share having risen in 1998 from 9 percent to 29 percent of total grocery
sales in the US148.
It has been pointed out that the increased power of the supermarkets and
increased competition between supply chains (value chains) creates more
pressure on supermarkets to improve the relationships within the supply
chain to make it more competitive and effective. Dedman and Fearne
phrase this as the "Paradox ofPower" where with the increased power of the
supermarkets, emphasising on own-label products, they are getting
increasingly dependent on fewer and larger suppliers149. Hence,
supermarkets must concentrate more on cooperation with suppliers for long-
term partnerships in mind150. In the same way it has been pointed out that it
is getting more difficult for go-it-alone strategy and small companies to be
competitive in the market151. It is clear that developments on the food
markets, e.g. increased concentration, will affect the structure of the
Icelandic fish industry. It depends on how deep into the markets producers
are selling, but this development indicates a stronger need to join a
144
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competitive supply chain rather than pursue a go-it-alone strategy (see
discussion in chapter V in relation to a Literature Review for more
discussion about the supply/value chain and go-it-alone strategy).
Consolidation in the retailer section can easily affect the Icelandic fish
industry. It varies from one market to another, however, how far into the
markets the companies are selling their fish products. In the UK markets for
example the products of the secondary processing plants of ICFP are aimed
at the supermarkets. This status of the supermarkets and their strategy of
own-label makes it difficult for other producers to pursue their own label
strategies. These changes also affect the producers in such a way, that it
could be difficult for small producers to gain direct access to the
supermarkets with their products. Rather, they would need to sell to some
intermediate that would then have access to the supermarkets. On the other
hand, in most cases, the Icelandic fish products are not marketed directly to
supermarkets, but rather into secondary processing, to restaurants or to other
companies that distribute or sell the products deeper into the markets. This,
for example, is the case on the Japanese market where the products from
Iceland are more or less industrial products for further processing or go on
to an auction market. The same can be said of the salted fish that is mainly
sold to the Mediterranean area which is very much a traditional market with
small shops and distribution companies selling into these small shops.
IV.2.7 Profitability and Development of Companies
As can be seen from table IV.6 the profitability of the fishing industry has
varied quite a lot since 1980. From 1980 to 1994 the fishing industry has
only returned profit in two years, 1986 and 1990. The processing sector has
been little better and returned profit in 8 years out of 15. Due to the vertical
integration of the processing into the fishing sector and vice versa it is rather
unrealistic to look just on the sectors separately. It is more realistic to look
at the results from the industry as a whole. As can be see from table IV.6
the over-all profitability has been rather bad; the industry has returned profit
for 6 of 14 years. The profit has varied from 0.7% as a percentage of








1980 4.0 -3.9 8.3 2.3 18.2 N/A N/A
1981 4.0 -1.0 6.6 1.3 13.7 N/A N/A
1982 -9.4 -39.9 5.8 4.4 7.2 N/A N/A
1983 -4.4 -13.0 0.5 0.5 4.1 N/A N/A
1984 -8.0 -18.9 -1.4 -1.4 -5.0 N/A N/A
1985 -2.4 -1.8 -2.8 -4.6 -1.8 0.93 1,4
1986 4.7 6.2 3.7 4.1 7.6 0.63 1,9
1987 0.7 0.0 1.3 0.0 5.5 -0.18 3,7
1988 -8.5 -7.7 -9.2 -14.1 -5.2 -1.65 2,4
1989 -3.6 -4.4 -3.0 -1.1 -4.9 0.4 2,1
1990 4.9 7.7 2.1 4.8 1.5 1.74 4,4
1991 -2.7 -2.2 -3.1 -1.7 -2,7 0,98 1,3
1992 -3,5 -6,6 -0,7 -o,i -0,9 1,9 -1,4
1993 -5,1 -11,9 1,1 1,2 -3,0 2,73 1,8
1994 1.9 -2.3 5.3 8.6 -0.6 2,66 3,6
1995 3,0 4,2 1,9 2,1 -0,9 1,23 1,8
1996 0.8 2.7 -0.9 -4.3 -4.0 2.73 1.1
Table IV.6 Profit from regular operation as a percentage of revenues 1980-1996
During the period 1985-1996 IFPC returned profit all the years except 1987
and 1988. UIFP returned profit for all the years except for 1992 the last
year before the ownership change. Hence, comparing the fishing and
processing sector to the marketing companies it is clear that the profitability
of the marketing companies has been far better than the processing sector. It
has to be considered that the marketing companies were operated as non
profit companies, UIFP until 1993 and IFPC in 1997. Due to this the
marketing companies returned the profit to their producers in the end of the
year after they had paid their costs and investment that year.
Another aspect of the profitability and financial status of the companies in
the fish industry is the equity that the companies have built up. The equity
ratio in 1988 was 5.3% for the whole industry. In 1990 this ratio was 15%
and in 1996 it was up to 26%155. This is of course a mean figure for the
whole industry, so there are companies with higher equity ratio and
152
Figures for the period before 1985 were not available by IFPC.
153 Before 1985 UIFP used different methods of presenting their financial statement making access to
these figures difficult.
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bjodhagsstofhun, Atvinnuvegaskyrsla 1994; Sogulegt Yfirlit Hagtalna 1945 -1995; UIFP Annual
reports; IFPC Annual Reports.
155 Runolfsson, t>.B.
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companies with lower ratio. This development of the equity of companies
in the fish industry demonstrates very well the changes over the last decade,
where increased freedom in the economical environment and more
established financial markets have brought in new demands on the
companies in the industry to return profit and return dividends to the
owners. This is a big change from what was known before, mainly due to
hand controlled economy, where the government controlled the rate of
exchange of the Icelandic krona in accordance to some zero profit policy
where the aim was to keep the profit of the fish industry at zero. In this
environment profit was almost a bad thing in the view of the politicians.
The main characteristic of this development over the last decade is
concentration where companies have merged and become bigger. This is
relevant for companies in all the sectors of the fish industry, that is, in
fishing, processing and exporting. To see this concentration it is helpful to
look at the share of the ten biggest companies in the assigned quota of each
year. In the fishing year 1995/96 the ten biggest companies had a 26.51%
share of the total quota, but in 1998/99 the same figure was 32.22%136 (see
table IV.7). It is interesting that all these ten companies are both in fishing
and processing, that is, vertically integrated companies. Also, just one of
the ten biggest is not in the business of the Principle marketing companies,
that is, Samherji hf., which more or less takes care of its own marketing
matters.
1998/99 1997/98 1996/97 1995/96
Samheiji hf 5.56% 5.04%(1) 4.51%(1) 3.78%(3)
Haraldur Bodvarsson hf 4.61% 4.28%(2) 3.42%(4) 2.62%(4)
Utgerdafelag Akureyrar hf 3.90% 3.41%(4) 3.72%(3) 3.91%(2)
hormodur Ramrni - Saeberg hf 3.87% 4.23%(3) 1.49%(12) 1.66%(11)
Grandi hf 3.17% 3.16%(5) 3.80%(2) 4.43%(1)
Slldarvinnslan hf 2.53% 2.24%(8) 2.56%(5) 2.36%(5)
Fiskidjan Skagftrdingur hf 2.27% 2.16%(9) 2.28%(6) 2.04%(7)
borbjorn hf 2.26% 2.31%(7) 0.97%( 18) 1.17%( 16)
Ihusfelag Vestmanneyja hf 2.14% 1.76%(14) 2.19%(7) 1.90%(8)
Hradffystihus EskifjarQar hf 1.91% 1.82%( 13) 1.74%(9) 1.38%(14)
Total share of the ten Companies 32.22% 30.41% 26.68% 25.25%
Ten biggest each year 32.22% 31.24% 27.82% 26.51%
TabIeIV.7 Quota of the ten biggest companies as a percentage of assigned quotas each
156 Runolfsson, b.B.
157 Runolfsson, f>. B., page 77. The order of the companies is in the parenthesis
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Most of the changes in the order of the companies seen in table IV.7 can be
traced to mergers between companies in the fish industry and therefore the
companies have added to their quota. There is no sign that this development
will not carry on, as evidenced, for example, in 1999 when Ishusfelag
Vestmanneyja hf planed to merge with three other companies in the fish
industry. More examples could be taken but they all point towards more
concentration in the fish industry over the coming years.
IV.3 Conclusions
The Icelandic fish industry has gone through great changes over the last 20
years. These changes reflect the economical and political environment in
Iceland during this time. The main characteristics of these changes are
concentration, where the companies are getting bigger and fewer. The
industry is getting more stable where the profitability is getting better,
especially over the last five years. Bigger companies mean that companies
have increased their ability to take on more complicated issues than just
producing raw material. This is reflected in increased emphasis on issues
such as the development of new products and marketing matters. From this
discussion about the Icelandic fish industry four factors can be pointed out
as main factors that have influenced the development of the industry for the
last 10-15 years. These issues are the implementation of the quota system,
increased freedom in the export of fish from Iceland, increased economical
freedom in Iceland and finally the increased entrance of companies in the
fish industry to the public stock market.
The first factor, the implementation of the quota system, was first
introduced in 1983 and later on all species in 1990. Due to the quota system
better control has been gained of the fishing stock, which has lead to higher
quotas on species such as cod. The quota system has also made planning
better for the companies- they know better what they have and how they can
do their planning in accordance with that. The quota system has also
created pressure for concentration in the fishing sector, where decreased
quotas in the beginning meant that boats and trawlers faced operational
difficulties due to low utility of the investment. In studying the
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concentration it is interesting to see that the decline in the fishing fleet has
been dramatic from 1992 after a rather slow decline since the quota system
was introduced in 1984158. It is suggested here that this can be traced to the
law that allowed the ITQ and the high quota price that followed. This has
made the option of leaving the industry with a profit attractive for the
owners of companies that have been facing operating difficulties and
therefore supported a more profitable industry. Hence, it is argued that the
ITQ is one of the preconditions for making this concentration possible by
allowing owners of fishing vessels to sell their quotas and leave the industry
without losing money on the investment in vessels. Due to high vertical
integration of fishing and processing this concentration is also the case in
the processing sector, where decreasing quantities of fish for production
have forced producers out of business, especially those who are not
operating their own boats or trawlers. In the same way, as the high degree
of vertical integration has enabled this concentration in the processing
sector, it is claimed that this vertical integration is one of the prime reasons
for the ITQs to be effective in the industry, avoiding the negative effect of
the quota system. These proposed negative effects are for example the lack
of power balance between the two sectors, leaving the power in the hands of
the quota holders. Hence, the vertical integration has maintained a certain
power balance in the industry preventing the fishing sector from becoming
too powerful.
An other factor supporting this concentration is the entrance of companies in
the fish industry to the stock markets has increased their accessibility to
capital, where companies have been able to get capital to buy out smaller
companies that often have been facing operational problems. The entrance
of the fish companies to the stock markets have also put pressure on the
management to return profit to increase the value of their shares. This
development is in accordance with increased freedom in the Icelandic
economy where the freedom has given companies access to capital both in
Iceland and abroad. This freedom enables companies to transfer capital
between countries and invest in other countries, which has been the case for
158
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the Icelandic fish industry. This freedom is in some cases not the same in
both directions, where foreign companies have limited access of investment
in the Icelandic fish industry. The last factor in influencing the development
of the industry is increased freedom in exporting fish from Iceland. This
freedom was not gained until 1993 when export of salted fish was de¬
monopolised. This has meant that the traditional primary marketing
companies have faced increased competition both from other marketing
companies and also from some producers who have been selling the
products on their own. The increased power of supermarkets discussed
earlier in this chapter can in many ways work against this development of
individual companies attempting to sell their own products unless they want
to sell to intermediaries in the value chain.
All this has meant that the Icelandic fish industry has had to rely much more
on its own ability and development to be able to return profit, rather than
putting pressure on the government for deflation or other governmental
interference to guarantee the operational basis of the companies. This has
created a much healthier business environment for the companies in the fish
industry. Despite the positive affects of this development there are negative
affects as well, especially for the small villages along the coast where bigger
companies have bought the quota. This transferability of quotas has been
criticised. The criticism is mainly that in some cases the quota is sold, or
whole companies are sold, away from the village leaving the inhabitants
without employment. In the same way the value attached to quotas has been
criticised where the owners of fishing vessels and boats are granted a quota
with paying minimal price for it, which they can then sell for a high price.
This has in some cases been a motivation for boat owners to sell their boats
and quotas where they get most of the price for the quota, not the boat.
Despite this criticism, it is clear that the fish industry is operating in a much
healthier business environment than it did 10 years ago, where increased
freedom is the key factor today. This has caused great changes which are in
many cases just the beginning, and all indications point to more
concentration, where the production companies will increase their value
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Strategic alliance is a very wide concept that is increasingly used to cover
almost all aspects of companies' cooperation. The literature on strategic
alliances is young and gets its basis from heterogeneous sources of
cooperation of companies. Literature and research on the phenomena of
companies' cooperation has taken many forms and names. One reason for
this is that the literature encompasses organisational marketing often called
"business to business marketing". Axelsson claims that literature on
business-to-business marketing and organisational buying behaviour has
developed into two quite different traditions1. The first, and original
approach is mainly connected with academic research and writers in the
United States and their writings about buyers or sellers, which are generally
led from consumer marketing. The second approach is traced to Europe
where the work has been much more influenced by organisational theories
and more focused on the "space" between organisations and the network of
relationships between companies that are involved2. In addition to these
two perspectives it is necessary to include the long Japanese tradition for
companies' networks and close cooperation between companies and their
suppliers.
This chapter starts with a general discussion about the definition of strategic
alliances, their types and characteristics. In the second part the discussion
moves on to study the rationalisation of strategic alliances from the
economic and organisational point of view where the main emphasis is on
vertical alliances and relationship in the value chain. The third part of this
literature review will then study the newly emerging network perspectives
that are increasingly quoted in discussion about companies' relationships.
The fourth part will study the governance of strategic alliances; the main
emphasis will be on governance of strategic alliances in the value chain and





V.l Definitions ofStrategic Alliances
The definition of a strategic alliance is often unclear but in a broad sense it
involves cooperation between two or more companies3. This definition can
be used to cover almost all relationships that companies are involved in. An
example can be taken from Badaracco where, in his book "Knowledge
Link", he uses the term strategic alliances to describe all types of
cooperating relationships between companies and competitors, customers,
suppliers, governments bodies, universities and labour organisations4. Other
explanations are more specific. For example, James Jr. and Weiderbaum, in
their book "Strategic Alliances", suggest that companies "share some risk in
the investment they have made, financially or otherwise, in the common
activity"5. There, the authors exclude such a long-term commitment as
suppliers'/customers' relationships. It can be argued that the increasingly
common form of suppliers'/customers' relationship (as will be discussed in
chapter V.2.1 of this thesis), called a "comaker," is a strategic alliance
because the suppliers in this case often take on a risk in development of
products6 with their customers. In a "comaker" alliance, the shared risk and
benefits are undoubtable and the cooperating arrangement is often so close
that, in some cases, the boundaries between companies are getting blurred7.
Contract and Lorange have forwarded a definition of strategic alliances,
which is based on the degree of interdependency of companies involved in
the strategic alliances8. This definition covers the field from the extreme of a
complete merger, on the one hand, to informal arrangements on the other
hand. Several types of strategic alliances lie along this continuum. Figure
V.l shows how independent the companies in the alliances are to each other,
in this respect.
3 I .orange, P. & Roos, J., 1993.
4 Badaracco, J. L. Jr.
5
James, Jr. & Weiderbaum, M., page 11.
6 Product is in this essay used over both hard product as well as service that companies provides.
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Figure V.l Strategic alliances' options between the parent firms9.
According to Contract and Lorange, strategic alliances could include any of
the categories along this continuum, from informal cooperating
arrangements to mergers and acquisitions. Harrigan (1988) put forward the
definition that "strategic alliances, joint ventures, cooperating agreements
and so forth are partnerships amongfirms that work together to attain some
strategic objective"10. Hence Harrigan is taking strategic alliances as one
form of the relationships between firms. In the literature today it is reported
that the term "strategic alliances" is increasingly used to cover all types of
cooperating activities between companies11. On the other hand, the Centre
for the Study of American Business, Washington University, has
categorised strategic alliances and their alternatives for global marketing,
where strategic alliances are split up into two groups with and without
equity share (see Table V.l).
9
Lorange, P. & Roos, J., page 4.
10
Harrigan, R. K., page 205, 1988.
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Contractor, J. F. & Lorange, P.; Lorange, P. & Roos, J.; Badaracco, J. L. Jr.
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Alternative Business Responses to the Global Marketplace
Alternatives Forms
Direct strategies for marketing abroad Exporting
Turnkey operations
Cooperating contractual agreements Licensing
Franchising
Subcontracting
Wholly owned affiliates Greenfield operations
Mergers and acquisitions
Strategic nonequity alliances R&D cooperatives
Technology swaps
Joint production/ marketing agreements




Table V.l Alternative Business Responses to the Global Marketplace
If the definition proposed by the Centre for the Study of American Business,
shown in Table V.l is compared to prescribed definitions of strategic
alliances in this chapter, it is obvious that it is much narrower. Some
authors exclude licensing, franchising and subcontracting as a form of
cooperating contractual agreement whereas other authors have included
them. It can be argued that cooperating contractual agreements are, in
almost all cases, very close business relationships between companies where
the partners are aiming at the same strategic objectives. Hence, in
conclusion, a broad definition of strategic alliances can be used to cover the
whole range of cooperative relationships between companies, which are
aiming at the same strategic objectives. The definition that will be used in
this dissertation is that strategic alliances are where two or more companies
cooperate together to attain shared strategic objectives. The definition
includes the idea that a company is in a close strategic alliance with its
suppliers and customers.
12
James, S. J. Jr. & Weidenbaum, M, page, 104 - 105.
95
V.1.1 Types of Strategic Alliances
The most common type of strategic alliance is presumably the form of
suppliers' and customers' relationships. As will be described in more detail
in Chapter IV.2, the new suppliers'/customers' relationships, that are built
on a "co-makers" principle, require long term business relationships and
close cooperating arrangements between companies. Other forms of
strategic alliances are becoming increasingly popular and used in business
today, both in cooperation between companies in two or more countries and
in the domestic market as well13.
Lorange and Roos split strategic alliances into four archetypes according to
the nature of the "parents'14" input of resources and their retrieval of output
from the strategic alliances15. As can be seen from Figure V.2 these
archetypes are ad hoc pool, consortium, project-based joint venture and full¬
blown joint venture.
Parents' input of resources
Sufficient for short-term Sufficient for long-term
operations adaptation





Project-based joint Full-blown joint
venture venture
Figure V.2 Archetypes of strategic alliances
The ad hoc pool attempts to meet the need for short-term alliances, which
do not demand many resources from the "parents". Examples of ad-hoc
alliances include joint R&D programmes where, for some short time,
13
James, S. J. Jr. & Weidenbaum, M.
14 In this dissertation the word "parent" covers the companies that form the strategic alliances and the
word "child" is used for the joint venture company that is formed.
15
Lorange, P. & Roos, J.
16
Lorange, P. & Roos. J., page 10.
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companies decide to join forces to develop new technology or products;
after their development, the resources will go back to the companies17. The
consortium type, on the other hand, demands more resources from the
"parents" but the value creation in the strategic alliances is given back to
their "parents". Consortium types of alliances can be found in "more
involved consortium research programmes among several parties, each
having too small a resource base to carry out all the research on its own"n.
The third archetype is the project-based joint venture where the "parents"
form a joint venture to cover some project-based activities and demand a
minimum strategic resource from the "parents". The last form of archetype
is the full-blown joint venture, which often makes the strategic alliances
themselves more independent from their "parents" and their resources than
the other archetypes.
These archetypes of strategic alliances are helpful in studying the nature of
the alliances and the motivation for going into such arrangements.
However, it is important to recognise that the nature and motivation for the
strategic alliances can change over the course of the alliances. For example,
strategic alliances that start out as project-based joint ventures to cover some
short-term activities can be developed over time into a full-blown joint
venture. Although this category is helpful there are many forms of strategic
alliances that can be categorised into one or more of the alliances'
archetypes. To get a better view of the forms of strategic alliances, it is
helpful to categorise them in a way similar to that in Table V.l and Figure
V.l. In Table V.2, strategic alliances are categorised into three main types:
joint venture; collaborative venture and other types of alliances. Two other
groups are also mentioned, i.e. informal business relationship and mergers
and acquisitions. Both these types border on being called strategic alliances
but are included here because it is necessary to recognise that these forms of
relationships can be the first and the last steps respectively, in alliance
formation.
17
Lorange, P. & Roos, J.
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which is often the first step in
formal alliances between
companies
Joint Venture Form a separate
company to take care of
the joint activity.




Shared projects. Common form in industry that
demands high R&D cost or
industry that is risky, for example










Do not need equity share, though in






each other or are
acquisitions from other
companies.
Possible the last phase in strategic
alliances between companies
Table V.2 Category of strategic alliances .
V.1.2 Characteristics of Strategic Alliances
To get a better view of strategic alliances it is helpful to look vertically and
horizontally at the companies that are in such alliances20. In vertical
alliances (often called x-type) the companies form strategic alliances with
companies in the value chain, for example, in producing raw material for
their own use or to market their products at home and/or in foreign markets.
Typical vertical alliances can be in the form of a close business relationship
between companies and their suppliers and customers, such as co-producers
subcontracting, or in a form of a joint venture that is either behind or ahead
in the value chain. In vertical alliances the main object, in most cases, is to
add more value in the process and to get better access to factors like raw
material, technology, distribution, services or markets. These vertical
alliances can also be established in order to gain access to knowledge, for
example, for manufacturing companies to go into alliances with marketing
companies.
19 This table is the authors presentation.
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Horizontal strategic alliances, on the other hand, may be between companies
in a similar field as in the cases of the Icelandic fish industry presented in
chapter IV. In many cases they are in joint research and development
(R&D) programmes or joint production agreements with other companies in
order to broaden their production scope. Joint R&D programmes are
common in highly technical industries and in aerospace where the R&D
costs and risks are high. Horizontal alliances such as joint R&D
programmes are likely, for that reason, to be more knowledge-based than
vertical alliances. The aim is to gain access to knowledge and technology
that one company would not possess using only its own resources.
Many types of strategic alliances can be in both the vertical and horizontal
form. These types can range from an informal relationship between
companies without equity share, to the establishment of equity-shared
companies.
Another way to look at strategic alliances is to examine them in terms of the
relationship or links between the companies. Badaracco splits these links
into two main types: product links and knowledge links21. He then splits
knowledge links into two fiirther categories: "migrating knowledge" and
"embedded knowledge". "Migrating knowledge" can move easily from one
company to another, for example in the form of blueprints or a set of
business systems, in alliances such as franchising and licensing.
"Embedded knowledge" is knowledge that lies in a "specialised relationship
among individuals and groups and in the particular norms, attitudes,
information flows, and ways ofmaking decisions that shape their dealings
with each other"22. Knowledge and the ability to learn are crucial factors
for companies' success in the long run in the modern environment. In this
regard "embedded knowledge" is especially important because it is not as
easy to buy as "migrating knowledge".
The purpose of product links is, in most cases, to fill gaps in product lines,
often with a product from companies in low-cost countries, which the
20
James, S. J. Jr. & Weidenbaum, M.
21
Badaracco, J. L. Jr.
22 Badaracco, J. L. Jr., page 79.
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companies are not able to produce themselves23. This form of alliance is
well known in the automobile industry where the US companies made
alliances with Japanese and other Asian companies in order to produce
small cars, which US firms had not produced previously. Product links
between companies are usually in the form of joint ventures, long-term
suppliers'/customers' relationships or subcontracting often with minority
equity share24. Companies can benefit from product links in many ways but
the most obvious are, cost and risk reductions, flexibility and broader
product scope. Companies, especially from the US and W. Europe have
been criticised for moving their manufacturing too quickly to low cost areas
or for making alliances with companies there. This has led to instances
where companies have not tried to increase their competitiveness within
their domestic market but have used the opportunity to move the production
to low cost areas as an escape from the problems they are facing at home25
26. Although the main purpose of product links is to fill product gaps, it is
possible that some knowledge will move with the product. Initially this
knowledge is more likely to be "migrating knowledge" but in the long run
will probably start to add to the "embedded knowledge" of the local partner
companies.
In knowledge links, the main objective in the alliances is to create and learn
new knowledge27. Typical knowledge links occur when a company forms
an alliance with other companies in R&D activities or with universities or
other research institutions. It is not unusual for one company to form a
multitude of knowledge links with other companies, universities, and other
organisations in order to add new knowledge to their own organisations.
Knowledge links can be formed to get both "migrating" or "embedded"
knowledge but it is more likely that companies are trying to increase their
"embedded" knowledge to look for ways to differentiate themselves from
their competitors, for example by innovation.
23 Badaracco, J. L. Jr.
24 Badaracco, J. L. Jr.
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Hayden Shaugnessy pointed out that the emphasis on collaboration between
companies has moved from formal and product links towards more informal
alliances where the emphasis is much more on knowledge, as for example
joint R&D as well as joint venture in penetrating new markets (see Table
V.3 showing Hayden Shaugnessy's summation of changes in companies'
collaboration)28.
Development of Collaboration
Traditional inter-firm collaboration New alliances
Merger Loose alliances based on new corporate
forms such as the European Economic
Interest Group
Acquisition in new sectors for
diversification
Corporate networks
Local partner acquisition to penetrate new
geographical markets
Joint product development
Joint ventures to create new production
capacity
Joint ventures to penetrate new markets
Patent and other forms of licensing Short-term partnerships for contract
acquisition
Franchises Partnerships under public sector contracts
Product sharing and reciprocal marketing
rights
Inter-company collaboration by objectives




Table V.3 Development of collaboration of companies
Furthermore Axelsson claims that "formal cooperation seems to be a minor
part of the totality of inter-corporate cooperation. The fundamental
possibilities for cooperation lie in everyday informal activities within
continuing business relationship'^0. This development seems to be
suggesting that alliances are becoming more informal, knowledge based,
objective and market driven than they were in the past31. Hence it is
important to recognise that strategic alliances can develop from ad-hoc
alliances or informal relationships to full-blown joint ventures and even to
merging of the partners. Therefore, it is important that managers and others
who are involved in the strategic alliances have a good understanding of
both the nature and characteristics of the alliances as well as the objectives
28
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29
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30 Axelsson, B., page 198.
31
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of all partners in the alliances. This understanding can help companies and
managers to identify alliances that are suitable for the company to join and
also what resources need to be put into the alliances, both from the
viewpoint of their own company and other participants. An understanding
of the alliances and objectives of the participants in these alliances is also
essential to *8 ensure that they are manageable in the future and have the
opportunity to develop.
V.2 Rationalisation ofStrategic Alliances
The aim of this section is to make an attempt to answer the basic question of
how strategic alliances can be rationalised. It has been pointed out that in
order to establish strategic alliances and to then maintain them, they need to
• • • "XO . .
be more effective and efficient than their alternatives . Jarillo claims that
the basic condition behind the effectiveness of alliances is that the external
cost of the transaction is higher than the cost would be if the transaction
were carried out inside the alliances (internal cost). Furthermore he claims
that another basic condition behind effectiveness is that in the long term the
profit of the alliance is seen to be superior to the profit that can be obtained
by going it alone or by establishing short-term relationships with other
companies3 .
When studying the rationalisation behind strategic alliances it is helpful to
start looking at economic theories about business-to-business marketing or
suppliers' and customers' relationships. These theories have been called
transaction theories and can be traced originally to R.H. Coases (1937) and
more recently Williamson (1975). They aim to explain that the economic
system is coordinated by factors other than pure price mechanisms of the
free market34. The essence of Williamson transaction cost theory is that on
the one end is the hierarchy, which is a fully vertical integrated firm, and on
the other end is the free market where the price of the transaction is the
ruling force. This means that if the transaction cost is lower in the free
32 Jarillo, C. J.




market, where companies can buy their subcomponents rather than making
themselves, then the market will be used; then in the same way, if and when
the company can make the subcomponents itself it will integrate the
production in its own company35. Hence, it is given that there are only two
stable forms of organising the relationship between suppliers and buyers,
that is the free market and the vertical integrated firm. Strategic alliances
have then been located between these two poles and categorised according




Mergers and Joint joint cooperative cooperative
acquisitions ownership venture ven(ure venture
M ►
Large Degree ofvertical integration None
Figure V.3 Strategic alliances' options in terms of degree of vertical integration
The idea that strategic alliances should be viewed as an intermediate
between the free market and hierarchy has been increasingly criticised 37. It
has been pointed out that viewing the strategic alliances this way dismisses
the third dimension of coordination, and cooperation that can lower the
transaction cost and make companies quicker to respond to changes and
more flexible than in the case of hierarchy or the market38. Ouchi
approached this problem of using the two dimension scale by splitting
hierarchy into two parts, the "bureaucracy" which reflects the traditional
hierarchy and the "clan" which describes long term relationships, carried out
through non-specific contracts within the formal environment of an
organisation39. In the same way the market is split into two parts the
"classic market" where the relationship is built on a spot basis, and another
part which Jarillo calls "strategic network"40. These could equally be called
35 Jarillo, C. J.
36
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strategic alliances where the relationship is built on much closer cooperation









Figure V.4 The four modes of organising economic activities42
In accordance with this, Ouchi has put in a new dimension into the
discussion about companies' relationships built on "fairness" or win-win
(cooperative) relationships instead of the "opportunism" of Williamson's
transaction cost theories, which build on win-lose (competitive)
relationships between suppliers and customers43. Hence, the economy of
the strategic alliances is not just built on lowering the transaction cost but
rather on increasing the value in the relationship by working together in the
value chain to improve the value adding process by synergising their
activities and resources. Larson maintains that the strategic trend has moved
from the "transactional perspective", where the transactional cost decides
the form of the relationship, towards an "interaction approach" with various
kinds of socio-economic alliances44. In order to study this closer and move
the focus of this literature review closer to the essence of the following
empirical research, it is helpful to study the value chain and its relationship
in order to be able to analyse the strategic alliances.
V.2.1 Value Chain and Strategic Positions of Companies
Porter defines the role of the value chain as a template, which allows
managers to examine in a systematic way all the activities a firm, performs
and how they interact, which is necessary for analysing the source of
41 Jarillo, C. J.
42 This picture is the authors presentation but build on Jarillo, J. C., page 34.




competitive advantage45. Porter put great emphasis on the strategic position
of companies in what he calls the value system, which is the embedded
value chain from suppliers to buyers. Furthermore he claims that strategy is
about coping with competition and that companies' competitive strength
depends on five major forces: threat of new entrants, threat of substitute
products or service, bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining power of
buyers and rivalry among existing competitors46. In many cases this
emphasis on companies' bargaining power over suppliers and buyers has led
to a too narrow view of the whole value adding chain and put companies in
win-lose competition with their suppliers and buyers. This view is reflected
in the transactional perspective where the traditional view is that companies
have a single value adding chain, whereby they build their relationship with
suppliers and customers on one specific transaction where companies buy in
products from suppliers, add value to it and sell it on to customers47.
Furthermore Pfeffer concludes in his review of strategic contribution that
strategic research has been characterised by a fundamentally internal focus,
with the single organisation as the unit of analysis48. This is especially true
in US companies where the suppliers have traditionally been made to
compete against each other on price and kept away from information about
customers' production to ensure that companies will not have to depend too
much on their suppliers49. The main emphasis in such a strategy is that the
competitive strength of each company depends on obtaining the right
position in the value chain whereby the company has to choose the right
products, market segments and value-adding activities and to possess
bargaining power over others in the chain. This view is increasingly
criticised as being too narrow and isolated50.
Normann and Ramirez argue that it is no longer enough just to add value to
the product or have the right position in the value chain, rather that
45
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companies have to reinvent the value creation in the value chain^1. They go
on to say that "the focus ofstrategy analysis is not the company or even the
industry but the value-creating system itself within which different
economic actors-suppliers, business partners, allies, customers - work
together to co-produce value"52. In this way the key strategy is to rethink
the relationship that the firm has with other companies in order to be able to
create value in new forms for customers. This approach is different from
the traditional view which demands that managers understand well the
whole process because much of the value creation occurs in the supplier and
customer's chain53. Larson takes a similar view of what he calls the
"interactive perspective" and claims that it is necessary to focus on the
"overlapping links in activities function between buyer and seller"54. He
continues by saying that the "common work arena thus becomes the object
of study instead of the individual company"55. Furthermore Porter pointed
out the connection between the value chain and organisational structure and
states that the organisational structure of companies is often incapable of
providing coordinating mechanisms to optimise the linkages in the value
chain56. Hence, an understanding of the whole process and the interaction
with other players therein is necessary to optimise the linkages within the
value adding chain with the aim of increasing value creation, which may
have the added benefit of lowering costs in longer run.
In order to explain this new view, Normann and Ramirez take an example
from IKEA's system, which offers its customers a part in the value chain by
giving them the option to assemble the furniture at home57. Part of IKEA's
programme is to create a long term relationship with its suppliers in which
IKEA offers them high volume orders, technical assistance, leased
equipment and advice on bringing production up to world quality standards.
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In addition to this, IKEA plays a major role in improving the business
structure and manufacturing standards of its suppliers. Another example is
Benetton; its operation builds almost entirely on external subcontracting
with local producers in Italy, which are in many cases SMEs. On the
market side Benetton sells and distributes its product through franchise
holders, which allow a "just-in-time" flow from producers to the market
with a very short production cycle. This leaves Benetton primarily as
coordinator in the value chain where the physical flow of products never
enters Benettons' doors58.
These new forms of relationships between buyers and suppliers demand
much more overlapping links between companies and should not just be
bound to the purchasing or marketing department of the companies; rather,
there should be direct contact between people in these companies at
whatever level is necessary, for example, staff in production, quality control
and R&D59. Close cooperation is in many cases the ground for
implementing changes in production, for example, the implementation of
the "just in time" system. Other changes involve a close working
relationship with the suppliers as part of the programme such as TQM60 in
which the relationship with suppliers may be one of the key factors for
success61. When companies are in the position where this new form of
relationship between suppliers is in place and companies' processes are
integrated with suppliers' processes, the competitive advantage can be
significant. This will reflect in lower inventories, faster overall response
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Benefits from new suppliers' and customers' approach
Benefits Reasons
Lower inventories Steady flow of supplies that you can trust
No need for back orders in the company
Faster overall respond Suppliers know the companies' needs and are willing to fulfil
them
Better information flow between companies
Joint research programs
Higher quality Less variance in the supplies
Supplies fits companies' needs better
Cooperation in quality control in the supplier's process
Lower purchase cost Fewer suppliers
Lower inspection cost
Lower total cost By adding all this together the total cost goes down even
though companies have to pay a higher price per volume than
before.
Table V.4 Benefits from new suppliers' and customers' approach
Helper has found out in her research in the US automakers' industry where
she studied changes in suppliers' relationships that "once these relationships
were built for the short term, suppliers were numerous, and competition was
almost solely price-based. Now contracts are increasingly long term, sole
sourcing is becoming more common, and competition is based on quality,
delivery, and engineering as well as price".64 In a similar way, research
findings relating to the UK grocery supermarkets indicate that the tendency
is for the supermarkets to try to cut down the number of suppliers and to
build up long term relationships with suppliers65. When a company
implements these new forms of relationship with its suppliers and buyers the
nature of the relationship moves from supply management to strategic
partnership where the company has a long-term learning relationship with
its suppliers and buyers66. It can be argued that this form of suppliers' and
buyers' relationship fits well in the definition of strategic alliances that was
put forward in Chapter V. 1.
V.2.2 Strategic Contribution of Strategic Alliances
The discussion above is more or less bound to vertical relationship in the
value adding chain although strategic alliances can easily be horizontal. It
63 This table is the authors' summation.
64
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can be argued that the same rationalisation can be used for the horizontal
alliances as for vertical alliances when the basic condition is a win-win
strategy based on cooperation and coordination. Contractor and Lorange
have put forward a very good recapitulation of how strategic alliances can
benefit companies. They maintain that, "in broad terms, the joint venture,
licensing, and other types of cooperating arrangements can achieve at least
seven, more or less, overlapping objectives"67 that are listed in Table Y.5.
Strategic Conltributions of Joint Ventures
Objectives Strategic contribution
Risk reduction. Product portfolio diversification.
Dispersion and/or reduction of fixed cost.
Lower total capital investment.
Faster entry and payback.
Economies of scale and/or
rationalisation.
Lower average cost from larger volume.





Exchange of patents and territories.
Co-opting or blocking
competitions.
Defensive joint ventures to reduce competition.
Offensive joint ventures to increase cost and/or
lower market share for third company.
Overcoming government-
mandated trade or investment
barriers.
Receiving permit to operate as a "local" entity
because of local partner.




Benefit from local partner's know-how.
Vertical quasi-integration
advantages of linking the
complementary contributions of
the partners in a "value chain".
Access to materials, technology, labour, capital and
distribution channels.
Regulatory permits.
Benefits from brand recognition.
Establishing links with major buyers.
Drawing on existing fixed marketing
establishment.
Economies ofscope. Possible to access to new markets
Broader scope ofproducts by using productfrom
partner.
Table V.5 Strategic Contributions of Joint Ventures
It is clear from Table V.5 that strategic alliances can benefit companies in
many ways from reducing cost to getting access to new markets. Today's
business environment calls for strategy that builds on factors like low cost,
high quality, innovation, spreading of risk, increased flexibility and quick
67 Contractor, J. F. & Lorange, P., page 10.
68 This table is direct from Contractor, J. F. & Lorange, P., page 10, except segment 8 that is the
author's input.
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response to customer needs69. The strategy of the 1970s and 1980s, where
the emphasis was more on vertical integration, may, in this environment, be
too costly and inflexible to respond to changes70. Hence, companies have to
think outside their own realm for resources and form strategic alliances with
other companies. This can be a very good way for companies to respond to
changes and strengthen their competitive status as well as reduce the risk of
isolation.
Contractor and Lorange have the author's support in their opinion that it is
equally important in companies' strategy to be able to collaborate with other
companies as well as compete71. The principal objective of most of the
strategic alliances between companies is almost always to obtain access to
resources like technology, manufacturing, market, distribution and to
service72. In addition to the direct benefits from these relationships between
companies, there can also be hidden benefits. Because of the relationship
with new partners, the companies have to look critically at their operations
as well as receiving valuable new ideas from their partners. Alternatively,
the new partner can make demands that stimulate improvements in the
company73.
V.3 Networkperspective
In the academic literature on strategic alliances and networks there is an
increasing emphasis on the need to shift the focus from viewing a company
as a solitary unit to using a network approach where the emphasis is on the
inter-organisational relationship of participants' companies74. This means
moving the focus towards a "network" perspective instead of "dominance"
perspectives, such as the competitive analysis of Porter where outside
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theories that focus on the single relationship that a company has with its
suppliers or customers76. Hence, in these theories the dominance
perspective is predominant, where the environment is viewed as totally
competitive in the way that companies look at it as a whole and relate
themselves to it as a whole77. On the other hand, Walker states that "an
adequate understanding of a particular cooperative relationship can be
achieved only by analysing the network of transaction in which the
cooperative relationship is embedded"7^. Axelsson claims that the
environment should not be viewed as "totally faceless and completely
competitive'''79 rather it should be viewed as a mixture of cooperative and
competitive. Furthermore, Axelsson maintains that the best way to describe
this is a "missing perspective" though it seems evident in newer academic
research that this perspective is gradually emerging.80.
Hakansson and Johansson provide a basic structure of a model of industrial
networks that could be said to be the basic for the "missing perspective" that
Axelsson describes (see Figure V.5.). This model is also a helpful starting
point in understanding the structure of the strategic alliances and the
connection between the main variables in companies' relationships.
Although this model and discussion about the external relationship that
companies have is framed in a network perspective, it will be argued here
that it is well transferable to use for strategic alliances. Hellegren and
Stjernberg define the concept "network" as a "group of organisations that
are related to each other, but have no common hierarchical structure of
responsibility and only vague criteria for judging who is part of the
network"81. Alter and Hage provide a similar definition where "Networks
constitute the basic social form that permits inter-organizational
interactions of exchange, concerted action, and joint production. Networks
are unbounded or bounded clusters oforganisations that, by definition, are
76 Axelsson, B.; Alter, C. & Hage, J. Osborn, N. R. & Hagedoorn, J.
77 Pfeffer, J., 1987; Axelsson, B.
78 Walker, G„ page 228, 1988.
79 Axelsson, B.. page 193.
80 Axelsson, B.
81
Hellegren, B. & Stjernberg, T., page 89.
Ill
non-hierarchical collectives of legally separate units"82. In the same way
strategic alliances cover a rather wide field of cooperative arrangement
between companies as is discussed in Chapter V. 1 and can be seen from the
author's definition of the strategic alliances where two or more companies
cooperate together to attain shared strategic objectives. From this
definition it is clear though that strategic alliances should not be as vague a
concept for the participant companies as is often the case with networks.
Benassi claims that it is clear that network and strategic alliances are not
interchangeable concepts83. However, as in networks, participating
companies in strategic alliances are separate units with no shared formal
hierarchy. Hence it can be argued that strategic alliance is a part of the
network that companies are involved in, or, as Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller
describe, that: strategic alliance is a strategy guided network84.
The basic features of Hakansson and Johanson's model are actors, activities





Figure V.5 Basic structural model of network
According to Hakansson and Johanson's model, actors are defined as "those
who perform activities and/or control resources"*1', where individuals,
82 Alter, C. & Hage, J., page 46.
83 Benassi, M.
84 Lorenzoni, G. & Baden-Fuller, C., page 146.
85 Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J., page 28. 1992.
86 Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J., 1992.
87 Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J., page 28, 1992.
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groups of individuals, parts of firms, firms, and groups of firms can be
actors. Furthermore Hakansson and Johanson claim that actors have five
main characteristics; first they perform and control activities, secondly
actors develop relationships with each other through exchange processes,
thirdly they base their activities on control over resources, fourthly actors
are goal oriented and finally actors have different knowledge about
activities, resources and other actors in the network8 . According to this
actors can be on different organisational levels inside the participant
companies.
According to Hakansson and Johanson activities "occwr when one or
several actors combine, develop, exchange, or create resources by utilising
other resources"*9. They split the activities into two groups; firstly, the
transformation activities that are always directly controlled by one actor,
and secondly, transfer activities that transfer direct control over a resource
from one actor to another90. Activities are linked together in various ways,
some tightly coupled while others are more loosely coupled. In addition,
activities are performed by actors, and resources are controlled by actors
either individually or jointly. The nature of resources in networks is
heterogeneous and Hakansson and Johanson categorise them in the same
way as the activities, which is that transformation resources are needed to
perform transformation activities and transform resources are required to
perform transformed activities91.
Axelsson claims that these three factors (actors, activities and resources) are
closely connected and can cause conflict and power struggle in companies'
relationships such as when "actors in different levels, controlling different
resources and being involved in different activities may differ in their
intentions and perceptions...."92. Benassi claims that the network
perspective, which requires a holistic approach and is more than just a sum
88
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of "dyadic relations"93, is very useful in studying strategic alliances and
offers a very useful insight into the alliances, which with the other
perspective would be difficult94. It is the author's conclusion that it is
essential to recognise these factors and their relationship to understand
strategic alliances and the relationship that companies have with each other
therein. In the same way it is necessary to understand the external demands
that strategic alliances and other forms of cooperative relationship make as
it is necessary to understand the demands that this external relationship
makes inwards on the structure and governance of participant companies.
This can be supported with Nohria where he claims that the main difference
between the Porter's framework of analysing industry and the network
perspective is "... that greater attention is paid in the network perspective
to the overall pattern of relationship among firms in the industry, an issue
that receives short shrift in Porter's framework?'95.
This view of the companies' environment where the company is embedded
in it, and the emphasis on the patterns of relationship, is perhaps one of the
weaknesses in the network perspective at the same time as being its main
strength. The network perspective can cover almost all relationships
between companies. In literature about the network perspective it is
common that all relationships between companies, both formal and
informal, as well as both personal and on business level, are covered. This
is a great difference from the economical view of the transactional cost
theories where the transactional cost is almost the only criteria used to study
the relationship between the companies. This wide view of the network
perspective makes the literature often unclear and baldy focused which is in
many cases understandable considering it is described as an "emerging
perspective" as Axelsson claims96. This is supported by Nohria were he
claims that in some cases the network perspective is applied so loosely that
it stops having any meaning in describing companies relationships97.
93
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Despite this it is the authors conclusion that the network perspective offers a
necessary view over the companies environment to understand the nature of
the networks and their development. To conclude this part about the
network perspective it is appropriate to quote Alter and Hage. They claim
that the "...it is these cooperative behaviours-the growing number of
partnerships, alliances, joint ventures, consortia, obligational and
systematic networks-that represent a stunning evolutionary change in
institutional forms of governance"9*. Furthermore they predict that the
inter-organisational network will be the future institution and this new
institutional form will increasingly replace both markets and hierarchies as a
governance mechanism". Whether that is the case will not be evaluated
here but clearly the network perspective gives new insight into the
institutional environment of companies where the emphasis is that firms are
embedded in the environment100. This gives a new dimension to the
traditional perspective of the transactional and competitive perspectives and
offers opportunities to better understand the strategic alliances and other
cooperative arrangements that companies participate in.
V.4 Governance ofStrategic Alliances
Current literature on strategic alliances has undervalued the importance of
the management aspect of strategic alliances and put much more emphasis
on the planning, partner selection and formal agreement of the alliances101.
The reported high percentage of failures of strategic alliances demonstrates
possible operating problems suggesting that the management aspects are not
fully understood102. Furthermore it has been pointed out that special
abilities are required of managers in strategic alliances as opposed to those
necessary for hierarchically structured firms which pursue a "go it alone
strategy"103. These abilities are based on the fact that the mangers often
98 Alter, C. & Hage, J., page 12.
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lack the formal authority in the strategic alliances that they have in they own
company, which leads to more emphasis on the social skills of the mangers
when they enter strategic alliances than in single company. In addition to
literature on the governance of strategic alliances, lessons will be drawn
from the literature on networks as well as the network perspective in this
section. The discussion starts by looking at the administrative mechanisms
of strategic alliances leading to the more internal organisational demands of
such relationships. The final discussion concerns power that more or less
overlaps other elements of the governance of strategic alliances.
V.4.1 Administration mechanism
Yves L. Doz pointed out that the "operating interfaces between the two
partners cannot be left to chance and to ad hoc adjustment.104 Instead, a
clear internal organisational relationship, as exists in strategic alliances,
demands some kind of administrative mechanism105 to be able to share
information and knowledge as well as to coordinate activities106 with the
overall aim of making the strategic alliances efficient and competitive. In
the formally described organisation form that is the "market" and
"hierarchy", the administrative control and coordination is achieved through
the "hierarchy" controlled process of vertically integrated firms or the
invisible hand of the "market" where the price and competition are the most
relevant factors107. In strategic alliances there is no formal authority or
hierarchy to manage or coordinate inter-organisational activities, instead the
• • • • • 10R
companies have to cooperate to be able to coordinate their activities .
The network perspective put forward by Hakansson and Johanson presents
the relationship between actors and activities and/or resources (as is seen in
Figure V.6)109.
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—► Activities/Resources —Activities/Resources—^ Activities/Resources
Interdependency
Figure V.6 Relations between actors and activities/resources
In this model actors connect to actors through an exchange relation that
Hakansson and Johansson claim is the basic element of the network, where
this relationship suggests some kind of mutuality through involvement of
actors in giving away and receiving from one another111. Actors then have
control over certain activities and resources that are connected to activities
and/or resources of other actors through interdependence. Hakansson and
Johansson claim that the exchange relationship between actors is some kind
of mutuality of exchange that is not just an economic dimension but also a
knowledge and value dimension112. In the same way dependency or
interdependency is clearly at the centre of this model. Interdependency in
both activities and resource indicates that actors have to depend on other
actors for some activities and resources. Smith and Helleman point out that
dependency is probably strongest between actors that are located close to
each other in the network, for example involving a common actor, activity
or resources113. This could be the case for companies connected to each
other in the value chain such as where they are not only dependent on the
next company on products, but rather on their resources and activities. It
will be argued here that actors depend on each other concerning control due
to the fact that individual activities and resources are partly dependent on
other actors and their control.
What is missing from this model as presented in Figure V.6 is how these
inter-activities of actors, activities and resources are managed. Academics
110 Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J., page 36, 1992.
111 Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J., 1993.
112 Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J., 1993.
113 Smith, P. C. & Laage-Helleman, J.
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seem to be unanimous that the key to the administrative mechanisms in
networks and strategic alliances is coordination114. What is often not as
clear is what is involved in coordination and how this coordination is
achieved. Lundgren claims that in the network perspective "coordination
refers to the organising of function and flows, that is, activities and
relationships, within a network, to increase the effectiveness of activity
cycle"115. It can then be argued that, in its simplest form, coordination is
meant to coordinate the flow of activities and resources between actors in
the network.
One of the influencing factors on the administrative mechanism used in the
alliances is the structure and scope of the alliances. According to Devanna
and Tichy "the great majority of inter-firm associations since the 1980s
have tended to be less formal in structure and more specific in scope and
purpose''116. This suggests that the alliances have to depend more on the
informal coordination structure than formal coordination. One aspect of the
formal structure is the establishment of formal contracts. It has been
increasingly pointed out that the establishment of formal contracts, and
especially of the external law-protected kind, is costly and possibly self-
defeating in integrative games117. Grandori claims that the "establishment
offormal contracts entails a variety of transaction costs, including set up
and administration costs; search, decision and negotiation costs; and
possibly costs of loss of cooperative atmosphere"1™. Much rather than
building the alliance on formal contract, Lorange and Roos say that in their
experience "the foundation of successful strategic alliances is laid during
the initial formation process. It is at that stage that the analytical and
political dimensions and issues have to be dealt with in such a way that
clear and realistic intents are established and that the foundation for trust
and behavioural consonance is laid"1™Killing found out in his research on
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companies' experience of strategic alliances that the "key to success in
alliance building is to create an alliance that is simple enough to be
manageable"120. Furthermore he claims that complexity leads to failure121.
V.4.1.1 Coordination
Coordination is one of the essences of the organisational structure of
companies, as can be seen from the definition of the formal organisational
structure of companies. This definition is that organisational structure is the
"rational coordination ofpeople, information and technology around some
common purpose to produce an output"122. Organisational structure can also
be split into two structures123. These are "basic structure which allocates
and co-ordinates people often through job descriptions, organisational
chart and resource; and the operating structure which specifies more
detailed activities and forms of behaviour, such as those embodied in
performance review, work plans and communication, financial or reward
systems"124. It can be argued that the inter-organisational relationship
between companies in strategic alliances goes mainly through the operating
structure due to the fact that the participating companies have no shared
hierarchy or structure, so the basic structure is separated.
Lundgren points out that in the network perspective the coordination is not
solely achieved through planning and control, rather that coordination in
network perspective is a process of mutual adaptation and learning125. This
is one of the essences of the network perspective, that is, this process of
mutual adaptation and learning that changes the structure of the networks as
well as affects the distribution of power in the network126. Furthermore
Lundgren claims that a perfectly coordinated and balanced network is a
120
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static network127. On the other hand a network that is unbalanced is
constantly adjusting and learning, and this is the driving force behind
development and changes in the network128.
What emerged from the literature about networks, strategic alliances and
traditional organisation is that coordination is achieved through a mixture of
formal and informal mechanisms. An example can be taken from Alter and
Hage who found that companies tend to use mainly three methods of
achieving administrative coordination in alliances129:
• Written rules and contract were used when outcomes were predictable.
• Personal coordination and communication were used when work
volume was heavy and work process brief.
• Group decision making by administrators occurred where the task scope
was broad.
In similar ways, Benassi, in his research on strategic alliances, found out
that coordination is often characterised by130:
• Information openness among partners so that different communication
channels can be used according to the needs of the strategic alliances.
• Mutual support by actors participating in the strategic alliances, which
often can outflank obstacles to which each partner may be subject
• Personal networks arising among actors involved in the alliance.
A final example can been taken from Lorenzoni and Ornati, who in their
research on growth of SMEs found out that companies tend to use
unconventional mechanisms of coordination while organisational design
matures131. What emerged from their research includes:
• Trust: among the partners: which is a priority and is confirmed by all
scholars analysing reticular forms of organisations
• Reciprocity: operationally reinforcing the trust effect as a lubricant of
interfirm relationships.
• Mutual adjustment: accepting problems and views of the partner and
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• Multiple lines relationship (horizontal, vertical and lateral): developing
intelligence, information and reciprocal influence circulating on multiple
tracts.
It is clear from these three examples that the emphasis is on the informal or
personal coordination with the exception of Alter and Hage who mention
written rules and contracts as one option. The choice of coordination
mechanisms in strategic alliances depends heavily on the nature of the
relationship, the interaction between participating companies and the
number of participating companies. In many cases in the literature on
network or strategic alliances, examples are taken from a dyadic relationship
involving only two companies. Benassi points out three types of
relationship as can be seen in Figure V.7. First are the dyadic relations of











A < + ► d Systematic relations
Figure V.7 Different form of relations between companies133
It could be suggested that in the real world more types of relationship will
occur, for example a mixture of convergent relations and systemic relations.
Other influencing factors on the coordination include the degree of
interaction and dependency. This can be reflected in that companies with
little interaction and dependency can get away with informal mechanisms
132 Benassi, M.
133 Benassi. M.. page 103.
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while companies with greater interaction and dependency would need more
formal mechanism and structure134.
V.4.1.2 Strategic centre
One way of coordination that is increasingly discussed in the academic
literature on strategic alliances is the central or focal firm that acts as a
strategic leader for the network. Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller say that one of
the essences of successful strategic alliances is the need to be strategically
guided and a network that is not guided strategically by a "centre" is
increasingly unable to meet the demanding challenges of today's markets135.
Lorenzoni and Baden -Fuller take examples from the Italian textile industry
mainly from Benetton, which has built up a vertical network in the value
adding chain through many small and medium size companies. They claim
that one of the conditions for success is to have one central firm that
strategically guides the network of participating companies. Jarillo
similarly emphasised the role of a "hub" firm "which is often the firm that
established the network and takes a pro-active attitude in taking care of
fr"136. Easton has pointed out the importance of a "focal" firm, which is the
firm that has connections with other firms in the network137. This idea of a
central firm has also been phrased as a "constellation" form of organisations
where the emphasis is on the leadership of a central firm controlling critical
competence and uncertainties as a coordination mechanism138. Lorange and
Roos on other hand put emphasis on the strategic planning and control as a
process to coordinate activities in the alliances and avoid information
139
asymmetry .
In this discussion about strategic centres, hub firms, constellations and focal
firms it is obvious that the emphasis is on the need for one company to take
care of leading the alliances. In many senses it moves the emphasis from
134
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the idea that coordination can be achieved through some grassroots
movement140 to more formal methods of coordination. By formal methods
one does not mean traditional methods of headquarters' governance and
their domination, rather that the centre has a strategic role to lead and be a
leader in forming strategy and framework that one participating companies
can work inside with the freedom of being individual companies. Lorenzoni
and Baden-Fuller frame this by claiming that the strategic centre has three
main roles: that is, first to be a creator of value for its partners, second to be
a leader, rule setter and capability builder, and third to simultaneously
structure and strategize the network141. In the cases that Lorenzoni and
Baden-Fuller examined, the strategic centre is most appropriate where the
network covers multiple stages in the value adding chain where many
companies are involved and are considered to be an alternative to large
integrated multi-market organisation142. Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller
emphasised that the strategic centre should not just coordinate and rule the
network, but also create an atmosphere where the participating companies
can be creative and the network flexible143.
In this discussion about the role of a centre, solid lessons can be learned
from multi-business firms that base their governance, often through a centre,
and usually in the form of headquarters. Campbell, Goold and Alexander
have in their research on corporate strategy found that parent companies in
many cases tend to destroy the value of their participating business units
rather than create value144. The main reason for the value destruction is that
the parent companies exercised too much centralisation of their business
units in matters such as business development, strategy, and control. The
value destruction occurred when the headquarters acted as if they knew how
to do individual things better than the business units, leading to ineffective
business decisions and strategy because of the great emphasis on
140
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centralisation and the controlling role of headquarters145. It is clear from the
example Campbell et al take that the basis for successful value creation
through parenting is a much more decentralised system where the
participating companies have freedom to develop their own business with
the help and support of the parent companies. Then the parents' companies
act much more as an overall strategic leader and supporter, rather than being
involved in detailed strategy and business decisions146, which is in many
ways similar to the role of the central firm in the case of Lorenzoni and
Baden-Fuller.
V.4.2 Organisational demands of Strategic alliances
Interactive relationships between companies challenge in many ways the
traditional view of the organisational structure of companies built on
hierarchy. The strategic alliances demand much more of the participant
companies in terms of sharing information, having good communication and
making faster decisions than single companies. This calls for changes of
emphasis, such as on speed, innovation, learning, flexibility and processes
for absorbing the new information. Ghoshal and Bartlett pointed out that
companies have to see themselves not as a hierarchy but rather as a portfolio
of dynamic processes. They found out in an examination of twenty
Japanese companies that when the managers looked at their companies they
saw processes not structure147. The processes they saw were:
1. Entrepreneurial process that provides creative and entrepreneurial
characteristics in front-line managers.
2. Competence building process that builds competence across the company's
internal organisational boundaries.
3. The renewal process of a company's core organisational processes that
promote continuous renewal of the strategies and ideas that drive the business.
Processes in companies reach out to both suppliers and customers and it is
important that this flow is as good as possible. Bartlett and Ghoshal also
place emphasis on the transitional organisation that is, in a way, similar to
strategic alliances in that the flow in the organisation is crucial14 . The flow
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they talk about is threefold: firstly there must be a flow of parts,
components, and finished goods; secondly there must be management of the
flow of funds, skills, and other scarce resources among units; thirdly there
must be a link between intelligence, ideas and knowledge that is central to
innovation and learning capabilities.
In a similar way David Ulrich, the editor of "Human Resource
Management", pointed out three levels of boundaries that can exist in
companies. He states that it is essential to lay emphasis on overcoming the
negative characteristics of the traditional hierarchy structure in
companies149. The first boundary he talks about is the vertical boundary
caused by the number of layers in the hierarchy. This means that in the
decision making process, communication and information sharing may
suffer from the number of layers in the organisational structure. The second
boundary is the internal horizontal boundary between the departments or
those that function within the organisational structure. These boundaries
often cause conflict between departments, for example between production
and marketing. This conflict is often due to the separation of departments
and because communication, information and decisions have to follow the
hierarchy. This can take a long time and often misses the point when it
finally reaches the person who needed the information or decision in the
first place. The third boundary is the external horizontal (or vertical)
boundary that can occur in the value chain. Ulrich claims that this is the
most difficult boundary to break because it needs a fundamental change in
the concept and definition of the organisation15 . He goes on to say that
these are also the most important boundaries to break in order to make
strategic alliances successful. Similar focusing on processes is found in the
theory of TQM and Reengineering where great emphasis is placed on
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This emphasis on process and flow without barriers between companies
reflects well the contradiction between the network perspective and the
dominating perspectives where the bargaining power over external
relationship is seen as crucial for the companies' competitive stance152. A
prime emphasis in the new literature on the organisational structure of
companies points in the same direction. If companies want to be
competitive they have to break down boundaries and barriers, both
internally and externally. Different terminology has been used to explain
the new emphases in organisational structure of companies such as
innovation153, flexibility, strategy and production154, lean organisation155,
learning organisation156 and trust157. These new emphases on organisational
structure have been described as organisational structure without
boundaries. What is crucial in the new organisational structure is the
operating part (often called the "softer" part) of the organisational structure.
These softer issues are, for example, the internal culture, value system,
information system, learning, teamwork, and communication between
people158. Also, the competitiveness of the organisational structure is built
on speed and learning rather than on specialisation and economy of scale159.
In order to highlight these two systems a comparison is made in Table V.6.
It has to be recognised that this is a comparison of two extremes, which
have lots ofdifferent combinations or forms in between.
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Control and bureaucracy Flexibility
Knowledge and refreshers course are just
for specialists
Refresher courses and knowledge are for
all employees
One-sided communication after the
hierarchy
Double-sided communication and direct
Decision lies high in the hierarchy Decentralisation and decision at the
workplace
Management build up on skill and
knowledge
Emphasis on leadership
Management from the top moving
downwards
Direct leadership
Specialisation Knowledge and education to every
employee
Small changes in the system Continual development of the system
Table V.6 Comparison of the old and new approach to management
Hierarchical structure is usually associated with large and vertical firms, and
must be recognised as probably the most effective structure when the
product is standardised, produced in high volume, and can remain
unchanged over a long time period161. Furthermore, Alter and Hage
maintain that the products' life cycle is increasingly getting shorter, leading
to an increased disadvantage of having a large organization with hierarchical
structure, due to difficulties in coping and adjusting to rapid changes in the
market conditions16 . Hasting points out as well that the old hierarchy
system has serious problems in slow and inefficient communication, and its
culture "generally teaches people to keep their heads down to limit their
expectations"163. Large vertically integrated companies tend to share as
little knowledge as possible, and in many cases, they view their external
relationship in accordance to the dominant competitive perspective and
concentrate on having bargaining power over them164. In addition the
bureaucratic structure results in managers that lack knowledge over
activities along the value adding chain165. An example to support this can
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be taken from an interview with a CEO of a small company, which was in a
strategic alliance with a larger company. He said "/ found myself
unwillingly in the position to arbitrate between units ofmy partner. I had
more information than any of their units had, they did not talk among
themselves, but each talked to meP,166.
This suggests that there are some internal organisational barriers in the
hierarchical structure indicating that companies with such structure could
have serious problems in participating in successful strategy alliances.
These barriers are both connected to the visible organisational structure of
the companies as well as to the more invisible "softer" part which includes
culture and communication. In the visible part these barriers could be built
in factors such as many levels in the structure, numbers of departments and
bureaucratic systems167. The "softer" part includes for issues such as
culture, trust, attitude, value system, information system, learning,
teamwork, and communication between people168. Hasting claims that it is
even more important to tackle the softer barriers such as communication and
culture to make companies capable of coping with inter-firm-
relationships169.
V.4.2.1 Culture
Thompson and McHugh define corporate culture as "the way that
management mobilises combinations of values, language, rituals and
myths"170. The corporate culture can, therefore, be seen as a key factor in
the commitment and enthusiasm of the work force that is working for the
company so that they feel that they are working for something worthwhile.
Robert D. Hass, CEO of Levi Strauss said in an interview "that in the future
the competitive advance of companies would not be their product or
technology but, who is going to do the work, how they will do it, why they
166
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will do it and how valuable will the work be to them"171. Corporate culture
is very different between companies and it is, therefore, difficult to
generalise. Corporate culture is likely affected by factors such as nationality
of the company, size, organisational structure, the company's management
style and last but not least the aims of the company. Examples of different
corporate culture are often taken from US and Japanese companies. In
Japan the management builds on attributed values like teamwork, trust,
consensus, shared responsibility, loyalties, long term employment, stability,
commitment and tactics such as just-in-time and quality improvement
throughout the value chain172. At the same time the culture of US
companies and many companies in the western world has been built around
individualism, specialisation and rapid change of the employees. Hence,
there have been signs that employees' loyalties and commitment to the
organisation are declining in US and other western countries173. These
differences in culture can easily lead to difficulties in managing strategic
alliances leading to irritation amongst managers, poor communication, slow
decision processes and misunderstanding between companies, which can
lead to a lack of trust between the companies. It is important to understand
and respect the national culture in the country where the alliance is taking
place in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and irritating
conflict, which can jeopardise the alliances174. Differences in culture can
also exist between companies of different size and even between companies
of similar size that are in similar businesses. Even in the same company
there can be some cultural difference, for example, the culture in the
marketing division and the product division. Thompson and McHugh
pointed out that it is important for all kinds of organisation to create a
corporate culture that is resonant with the overall goals of the company173.
They also emphasise that it is even more important to do this for consensual
groupings. Hence, it would be a mistake if managers of strategic alliances,
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paid no attention to the cultural differences between companies.
Furthermore the author concludes that it is even more important to build up
a culture that supports the behaviour, attitude and trust that the company
needs in order to build successful alliances.
V.4.2.2 Trust and Attitude
Trust has for a long time been considered to be one of the key elements in
successful strategic alliances176. In the transaction theory and competitive
analysis of Porter lack of trust is one of the key element in companies'
relationships leading to a fear of depending too heavily on single or few
suppliers because they could exercise their bargaining power to get a
dominant position and by that heighten the transactional cost177. On the
other hand, trust and positive attitude towards cooperation is one of the key
elements in developing successful strategic alliances178. Lundvall points out
that trust cannot be bought and building trust on formal contracts is
expensive and would heighten the transaction cost rather than lowering it,
which is often the objective in cooperating179. In order to build up trust, a
positive attitude, especially by top managers, towards strategic alliances is
crucial. In similar ways Alter and Hage claim that willingness to cooperate
• i*l80
is one of four basic conditions of building up successful alliances .
Willingness to cooperate, positive attitude and trust do not come without
effort, so top managers and leaders of participating companies must show in
their behaviour that they can be trusted and have a positive attitude towards
the alliances. Leavitt and Bahrami point out that in the long run, behaviour
tends to go in line with attitude so to change behaviour it is necessary to
attempt to change attitudes181. Public commitment is perhaps the most
important aspect of gaining a positive attitude towards changes in
organisations. In order to achieve this commitment, the public (staff in this
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instance) needs to have some visible role model to take a stand for the
changes and to act as a driving force for them182. It is, therefore, vital in
bringing about changes, such as cultural or organisational, that the top
managers' team has the right attitude towards them and acts a as role model.
This is because individuals on the team and as a whole can transfer the
company's administrative heritage by being role models to build a new
• • • • 18^ • •
management perspective and capability within the company . This is even
more important in strategic alliances than in changes inside one company, as
strategic alliances call for a new view of how the business is operated,
because in alliances people and companies often give up private resources to
gain access to collective ones184.
V.4.2.3 Power
Power is a central issue in almost all perspectives and theories in studying
organisations and cooperation between them, although different perspectives
have different approaches and views about power185. In a simple way,
power has been defined, as "the ability ofA to get B to do something that B
would not otherwise do, despite any resistance"186. Pfeflfer's definition of
power is similar where he states "power is the potential ability to influence
behaviour, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to
get people to do things that they would not otherwise c/o"187. Foucault, the
French philosopher, defines power in his early work "Madness and
Civilisation" with a negative perspective that "power is to force people to do
something that they would not do and would resist doing 188. In his later
works, as in "Discipline and Punish", he admits that his earlier view on
power was too narrow and negative. He admits that power does not only
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weigh on us as a force, but it has also a positive effect, which causes people
to be productive in modern societies189.
In order to make power more visible in the companies, it is helpful to study
how it can be located inside the company. The formal power structure is the
organisational structure in the companies that was designed with formal
authority in mind190. The traditional form of organisation, that is, the
hierarchy, makes it simple to plot out the formal authority in the company.
In many cases, this structure does not tell the observer about all power in the
company. There may be other forms of countervailing power that may
overwhelm the formal authority. This is because it takes more than rank
and role to influence people191. As Pfeffer says "politics and influences are
the processes, the actions, the behaviour through which this potential power
is utilised and realised^92. According to this, it is very possible that people
who have no formal rank in companies can have more power than those
who have the formal authority. These can be people who have knowledge,
skill, access to information and social respect from others inside or outside
the company. In addition to this, in the more modern organisational
structure based on teamwork, processes, and leaner structure, the power is
spread through the company and is less visible than before193. This leads to
the fact that people can use resources as a way to execute power over people
who do not have the same resources, and where people can use access to
i 194
resources to gam more power m the orgamsation .
Pfeffer claims that power in networks often arises from centralised control
or coordination over other participants in the network195. In the same way,
individuals inside a company can use control of resources to gain or
maintain power. Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller claim that "to maintain the
189
Foucault, M„ 1991.
190 Leavitt, J. H. & Bahrami, H.
191 Leavitt, J. H. & Bahrami, H.




Thompson, P. & McHugh, D.
195 Pfeffer, J.. 1987.
196 Lorenzoni, G. & Baden-Fuller, C., page 153 - 154.
132
balance ofpower in the network, all central firms retain certain activities.
The control of the brand names and development of the systems that
integrate the network are two activities that give the organisation a pivotal
role and allow it to exercise power over the system"196. Lorange and Roos
mention that companies, and mainly the central or focal company, in
strategic alliances tend to have some "black box" where they protect unique
proprietary skills and know-how from other companies in the case of break¬
up of the alliances197. Doz found out, in his research of technical alliances
between large and small companies, that the small firms almost always try
to retain control over the technology because it is their only bargaining
strength198. At the same time the small firms were afraid that the bigger
firms would take detrimental action that the small firms could not resist and
could put their future in jeopardy199. This detrimental action could be taking
over the small firms or by insisting that more capital was put into the
alliances than the small firm could afford. This would lead to a take-over by
the bigger firm. On the other hand, Fearne and Dedman found out in then-
research of supermarkets that with added concentration among them and
growing power in the supply chain they became increasingly dependent on
fewer and larger suppliers200. Fearne and Dedman phrase this as "power
paradox" due to the paradox of the powerful position of the supermarkets in
the value chain compared to the suppliers201. Lorange and Roos point out
that there is too often a tendency in strategic alliances to under-allocate
critical resources and/or to commit resources only on general terms leading
to the danger of unsuccessful alliances due to lack of trust and insufficient
dedication of participating companies202. Lorenzoni and Baden -Fuller
claim in a similar way that successful central firms tend to stick to very few
core skills and assets, and handout as much of the resources as possible,
197
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making the alliances much more value adding for the participating
• 203
companies .
Power can also be related to individual persons inside companies; for
example, the CEO can see alliances and collaboration as a loss of power
leading to a loss of direct authority (visible power). Lorange and Roos call
this power that can often hinder the alliances "kingdom mentality"204, others
have phrased it as "corporate ego" 205 reflected by the ego of the CEO of the
companies or even "powerful person" or "power hungry"206. It is however
clear that it is the actors in the alliances that are in the position to exercise
power over other actors in the network through coordination or control of
resources and activities.
In the network perspective power structure in some form is essential
because activities and resources are, to some extent, organised through the
bases of the power relation between actors in the network207. On the other
hand power on the free market is viewed very negatively and transaction
should be free from being influenced by power. Furthermore in the
hierarchy or vertical integrated firm, power is much more accepted and is
often used to centralise things such as decision making. Axelsson points out
that analysing power in a dyadic relationship between companies is
problematic and in an inter-organisational relationship, that includes more
participants and more complicated structure, it gets increasingly difficult to
make power explicit or understandable208. Despite some difficulties power
is clearly closely connected with the inter-organisational relationship and its
is necessary to include it in all analyses of such relationships.
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V.4.2.4 Uniqueness of SMEs
It can be argued that small and medium size companies do not have as many
internal organisational barriers as larger companies due to much fewer
layers in the hierarchy and departments. On the other hand the "softer" part,
such as culture and attitude could easily build barriers towards an interacting
relationship. Paradoxically, the issues that facilitate the motivation for
SMEs to take part in strategic alliances can also work as barriers to
successful participation of the company. These issues arise from a lack of
resources, such as money, knowledge and time. It is difficult to generalise
about the difference between the structure of small and large companies.
However the author attempted to do so in Table V.7 with the warning that
this difference varies between companies.
Difference between large and small companies
Factor Large companies Small Companies
Organisation Formal hierarchy and
bureaucracy
Lean and informal
Culture (company) Based on formality and
status inside the companies
Based on entrepreneurial
characteristics
Decisions Slow, have to go between
many levels and are finally
made in the top level






Changes Slow and use the scale of
size




Middle managers that often
do not have the authority to
make necessary decisions
Top managers that have all
the authority to make
necessary decisions fast.
Table V.7 Differences between large and small companies
Yves L. Doz found out, in his research on partnerships between large and
small companies in the technology industry, that the odds are against such
partnerships, and most fail to meet the objectives of the partners. What is
interesting in his conclusion is that the attitude of managers and owners of
the small companies is characterised by a fear of being taken over by then-
large partner209. This could suggest that managers in SMEs could build up a
negative attitude and culture due to the fear that another company will
overtake their core resource that is often knowledge.
209 Doz, L. Y.
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V.5 Conclusions
What emerged from the literature review is that there is a clear difference in
emphasis between the newly emerging network perspective and the more
traditional dominant perspectives, such as the transactional cost theory and
competitive analysis of Porter. It is the author's conclusion that it is
necessary in researching strategic alliances to view the participating
companies as a part of the network and embedded in the environment that it
is working in, but not as a single free standing unit. At the same time, it is
necessary to recognise that the environment of a company, whether it is
participating in strategic alliances or not, is a mixture of cooperation and
competition. In this environment a company needs to be able to cooperate
as well as compete and even be able to do so with the same company210.
The network perspective is also a very useful guide in studying strategic
alliances where strategic alliances can be seen as a part of the bigger
network in which the company is participating. It is clear though, in the
author's mind, that strategic alliance is a narrower concept than the network
concept. Hellegren and Stjernberg define the concept "network" as a "group
of organisations that are related to each other, but have no common
hierarchical structure of responsibility and only vague criteria for judging
who is part of the network211. On the other hand strategic alliance is
defined here as where two or more companies cooperate together to attain
shared strategic objectives. This definition should make it clear that
companies participating in strategic alliances need to have shared objectives
in terms of what they are going to achieve from their participation in the
alliance, which narrows the scope of the alliances from what is known in the
network perspective.
It is concluded here that the network perspective and increased emphasis on
cooperation has introduced new dimensions in the discussion about the
organisational form (hierarchy and market) of firms. Ouchi put forward an
interesting view where he splits the market and hierarchy into four parts and
brings in the option of having a win-win strategy instead of just a win-lose
210
Contractor, J. F. & Lorange, P.
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strategy that is dominant in the two other forms212. Hence, cooperation or
networking should be seen as the third option to the hierarchy and market.
It is necessary though to recognise that in the "real world" more mixtures of
forms exist and the boundaries between forms are not as clear-cut as many
academics would like them to be.
In many cases the discussion about the governance of the network and
strategic alliances moves between the extremes of network and hierarchy.
On the one hand there is an almost grassroots emphasis on the network
perspective, where the governance is based on mutual adjustment and
learning; on the other hand there is the very hierarchical style of
governance, which is known in many joint ventures where one parent
dominates and is responsible for the management aspects of the child213.
What becomes apparent from most of the literature on governance of
companies' relationships is the need for coordination. In most cases
coordination is achieved through a mixture of formal and informal
administration mechanisms, which in many cases can be problematic due to
interdependency of each company in the alliance. Due to this
interdependency some element of opportunism will always be included in
the transaction in the alliances. Each company has the option of comparing
the transaction inside the network to the free market or vertically integrated
firm. For SMEs this comparison may be different from what is known in
the literature of large companies. SMEs have often limited opportunities for
vertical integration due to limited resources; transactions on the free market
can limit their opportunities. Hence the SMEs often face co-operating in
one way or other, not through choice, but rather through the necessity of
having to operate in the international market today.
From the SMEs point of view, one of the most interesting elements that has
emerged from the literature review is the discussion about the need for some
leading companies to be responsible for the coordination to some extent
and, more importantly, to be the strategic leader in the alliances. The
strategic leader, or what Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller calls the "strategic
212 Jarillo, C. J.
213 Badaracco, J. L. Jr.
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centre", is in many ways in contradiction with the grassroots movement in
the network perspective. However, upon closer examination of the role of
the strategic centre it becomes clear that it is not meant to operate as a
centralised headquarters in a multi-business company. Rather it is meant to
be encouraging and to create an environment where other companies can
operate and exercise innovation and creativity. In this environment the
mutual adjustment and flexibility that is emphasised in the network
perspective can then flourish even better than if no single company has the
role of leading the alliances. Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller point out that lack
of strategically leadership is one of the key weaknesses in the management
of strategic alliances. In the same way it can be said that in the network
perspective, the lack of clarity and of a better understanding about the
governance of networks are some of the main weaknesses in that
perspective. It can be suggested that for SMEs working in an alliance the
need for strategic leadership is even more important, due to lack of
resources and limited size often making them unable to put much effort into
forming a shared strategy or vision.
Strategic leadership and central firms bring in certain issues of centralisation
and formal structure to the governance of strategic alliances. Clearly a
company that is in the centre of an alliance, as well as participating
companies, are highly dependent on making the position of the central firm
powerful, this may tempt the central firm to make their piece of the cake
bigger than it would be otherwise. This can be dangerous in marketing
alliances where the connection to the market and ownership of brand is of
great importance. A central firm having such a position is in a powerful
position against other participating firms. Also the strategic leadership
raises the question of the importance of strategy, shared objectives and
vision to the governance of the alliances. Is it, for example, possible that
shared strategy could guide participating companies more efficiently than
using more formal methods of authority, and could reduce the need for
formal methods of coordination in the alliance. For alliances with a high
number of participating companies, the strategic leadership and centre imply
that it could be an effective way of co-ordinating resources and activities
138
which otherwise could be difficult. For such alliances it is essential to have
strategy and structure, so that all the participating companies can work
within it and benefit from it214.
This literature review has also shown that there are many influencing factors
on the governance of strategic alliances. These factors include for example,
the nature of the alliance, the number of participating companies, inter-
dependency between companies in the alliances and the dependency of
companies on the alliances. Other factors include, for example, the internal
barriers that are in many companies towards inter-organisational
relationship. These internal barriers are, for example, willingness to co¬
operate, attitude, trust, culture and the organisational structure. Other
elements that influence the strategic alliances are, for example, power
structure in the alliance, and the balance of power between participating
companies. All these elements and more influence the way the inter-
organisational relationship is managed which is in most cases through a
mixture of informal and formal administrative mechanisms.
The understanding and discussion of the administrative coordination in
strategic alliances is far from clear in the academic literature and it has been
pointed out that further research is needed in that field. Recommendations
for further research taken from Osborn and Hagedoorn include a "clear need
for more studies concerned with how alliances are actually established, who
manages various aspects of their operation, and how managerial lateral
and quasi-lateral relationships across legal entities differs from managing
more hierarchically structured entities"215. In a similar way Axelsson
suggests "more research is required into the long term development ofsuch
alliances and methods ofmanagement to support a better understanding of
the way they operate"216. Alter and Hage add that there is a need for further
research on the operational level of companies' relationships which depends
much more on the informal co-ordination mechanisms because this is the
critical point in the relationship where the problems of mismanagement can
214 Nam. H. S.
215 Osborn, N. R. & Hagedoorn, J., page 267.
2,6 Axelsson, B., page 247.
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occur217. From these quotations it is clear that further research is needed
into the operations of strategic alliances.
The empirical research of the two marketing companies in the Icelandic fish
industry (see Chapter VI and VII) is meant to contribute to these identified
gaps in the literature. The main object of this research is to analyse key
factors in the role of the "central firm" in strategic alliances between large
groups of SMEs. The aim is to increase understanding about this
development and generate knowledge emerging from the empirical part of
the study. Concerning this research the most relevant elements emerging
from the literature review are the need for strategic leadership and the
administrative structure in alliances. These are mainly due to the high
number of participating companies and the nature of the alliances (that is,
spanning over many levels of the value adding chain with the marketing
companies in the centre, leaving them in the position of central firm). It has
emerged from the literature review that there is no clear formula or model to
study strategic alliances. The network perspective offers helpful guidance
but, as has been pointed out, further research is needed to establish a better
understanding of inter-organisational relationships. The use of the network
perspective affects this research because it is not enough to study the two
marketing companies as a single unit but instead it is necessary to look at
the whole process from the processing companies to the customers. In order
to do that the following topics that have emerged both from the literature
review and Chapter IV about the Icelandic fish industry will be studied:
1) The role of the two marketing companies as "central firm" in
alliances spanning over several levels in the value adding chain
• What is included in the role?
• How do participating companies view the role of the central firm?
• What dangers are involved in the role of the central firm?
2) The role of the central firm in the "governance" of the alliances as a
whole and what impact changes have on the administrative
mechanism of the alliances.
• Through what mechanism are the alliances co-ordinated?
• How has this mechanism changed?
• What has influenced these changes?
• What is the importance of strategy in the administrative mechanism?
217 Alter, C. & Hage. J.
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3) The structure of the strategic alliances and how these have evolved
and developed.
• Draw out the different forms that the alliances have taken through the
operation time
• What has influenced the structure?
• What characterises the structure?
4) Finally, the academic literature in strategic alliances will be
compared with the findings of this research.
Topic one includes studying the general role of the marketing companies as
"central firm" in the alliances and how participants view that role today;
changes in that role will also be studied. Topic two is more specific about
the role of the central firm in the governance and the administrative
mechanism of the alliances. This topic also includes what methods have
been used to co-ordinate activities and actors in the alliances and how that
has changed according to changes in the role of the central firm. Topic
three includes analysing the main elements of the structure and different
form that the alliances have taken over the operation time, but not the
economical justification of the structure. Analysing the main structural
form that the alliances have taken, as well as their characteristics, is
considered to be essential in order to get a more holistic picture of the role
of the central firm in the alliances.
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VI Research Findings
In this chapter the two cases, Union of Icelandic Fish Producers and
Icelandic freezing plants, are presented. The discussion of each case is split
into three parts. First the historical development of the companies is
introduced which is mainly built upon archival data, although some
interviews were taken to clarify some aspect of the history and to be able to
go deeper into some matters. The second part includes more analysis
concerning the research aims, that is, the governance of the network and the
role of the marketing companies as a central firm in those networks. This
part is based on interviews as well as archival data. In the last part the
conclusion from each case is put forward.
VI. 1 Union ofIcelandic Fish Producers
Union of Icelandic Fish Producers Ltd., abbreviated UIFP, was established
in July 1932 after the merger of three of the five salt fish merchants and
pressure from the commercial banks and government. In addition to this,
producers and ship owners in Iceland supported the establishment of UIFP.
The main objectives were to improve the organisation of the export of salted
fish from Iceland and minimise internal competition in the market. This
was achieved by UIFP taking care of the sales (for a commission) for the
producer. If exporters and producers had not reacted in this way it seems
clear that one of the options they were facing was the establishment of a
state owned company that would have a monopoly on all sale of salted fish
from Iceland1. UIFP was initially only meant to be a temporary solution
but, after an experimental year, the government granted UIFP a virtual
monopoly on the export of salted fish.
VI.1.1 History and Development
The operation of UIFP can be divided into four periods. The first period is
from the establishment in 1932 to 1957 when UIFP went through difficulties
leading to changes in operation. The second period is from 1957 to 1990
1 Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
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when the operation was characterised by monopoly of export and taking
care ofmatters of interest for the producers. The third period is from 1990 -
1993 when UIFP faced increased competition in exporting leading to
changes of ownership of UIFP. The last period is from 1993 until the
present, when UIFP has operated as a limited liability company.
VI.1.1.1 Establishment and Entrepreneurship 1932 - 1957
UIFP was established as a non-profit2, co-operative company whose main
aim was to sell its members' products for as high a price as possible and to
push for increased quality of production3. The aim of the company was not
to build up assets but to retain sufficient commission to enable it to pay the
operational costs. Then, at the end of each year, the amount left over after
the operational cost had been paid was given back the members in
proportion to their export through UIFP.
During the first three years of UIFP, it operated in the form of a merger of
three exporters' and producers' companies in Iceland, where the managers
of these three companies acted as managers over UIFP. Due to the changes
ofUIFP in May 1935, the nature of the company changed to become a joint
venture of nearly all salt fish producers in Iceland, where the producers were
the "parents" (owners) and UIFP was the "child"4. To get the necessary
acceptance of the government of Iceland and the exclusive export licence,
representatives of companies that accounted for at least 65% of the total
production of salt fish in 1934 had to be willing to join this joint venture.
UIFP got the support of almost 66% of the producers, leading to agreement
of the establishment of this joint venture of salt fish producers5.
When UIFP was established, there were around 322 members, but after a
difficult period during WW2, in 1949 the number of members was down to
around 138; mainly due to there being fewer companies in salt fish
2 The term "non-profit" is used here in the sense that UIFP was supposed to make profit but to return
it to members after operational and other costs and investments had been paid for.
3 Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
4
See, for example, Harrigan, R. K., 1985 for a definition ofjoint venture.
5 Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
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production, as well as competition from other production methods such as
freezing6.
Another aspect of the changes in 1935 was to give UIFP stronger financial
status, and in order to do so a reserve fund was established that was 0.25%
of the total sales value of the exported fish. This fond was connected to
each member's contribution and therefore each member of UIFP owned a
separate slice of it, which they could get paid back in 10 -12 years,
according to agreements with UIFP, if they decided to leave the
organisation. Due to the fact that UIFP returned its profit to the members it
meant that UIFP, as well as IFPC, was free from paying taxes in Iceland.
Operation ofUIFP was based on commission sale of the members' product,
which was coordinated from an office in Reykjavik that took care of the sale
through representatives located in each of the main market countries. Other
operations during this time included the arrangement of transport of the
products as well as supplies of accessories for the production of salt fish.
During the period from the end ofWW2 to around 1965 there were around
8-10 representatives, two were Icelandic and the rest were foreigners with
business connections in the market7. In addition to this representative
system, managers, the chairman of the board or other members of the board
went on regular sales trips abroad.
UIFP started its operation in troublesome times for export of salted fish due
to overproduction of salted fish worldwide followed by the civil war in
Spain in 1936, which closed the single most important market for salted
fish. Soon after that, WW2 started and again the markets for salted fish
collapsed. In addition to this, other production methods such as freezing,
took over as the main production methods for fish in Iceland. It was not
until after WW2 that UIFP could start its operation again after having
almost stopped during the war. Before WW2, 10-15 people worked in
UIFP but during the war, in 1943, UIFP had only three foil-time employees
working in the sales office: an office manager, an accountant and a secretary
6
Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H. The precision of these figures is debatable due to different
methods in counting members over the years.
7
Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
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(other jobs such as managerial ones were part time). After WW2 the
operation increased, as did the number of staff, and in the 1950s 10-15
people were employed by UIFP8. Other operations ofUIFP were a canning
plant, which UIFP included during the period 1938 - 19529. This plant was
supposed to be an experimental plant for the canning industry in Iceland. In
1952, the plant was sold because UIFP found it had delivered its objectives
and that the plant did not fit into its operation. UIFP planned to use the
money from the plant in connection with plans to buy a cargo ship, but this
did not eventually happen at this time.
From the establishment of UIFP in 1932 to 1935 the board had five
members, two nominated by the banks and three from the exporters that
merged with the establishment of UIFP. During 1934 and the first part of
1935 producers become increasingly dissatisfied with their influence in the
running of the organisation, especially producers from the rural areas of
Iceland whose opinion was that they did not sit at the same table as
producers closer to the headquarters in Reykjavik. This dissatisfaction lead
to changes of UIFP's governance, which were agreed during an annual
meeting in May 1935. After the previously discussed changes of UIFP in
May 1935, the number of members of the board was increased to seven,
where the Icelandic government nominated two, three came from producers
and two from the two banks, Landsbankinn and Utvegsbankinn. In 1938,
Utvegsbankinn stopped nominating its member of the board and that seat
went to the producers, but Landsbankinn kept its member until 1976.
From May 1935, the voting system on the annual meetings was such that
each member got a vote, which was proportional to the quantity of
merchandise that the particular company sold through UIFP. No company,
however, could have more than 8% of the total votes, in order to avoid
having one single company with too much power or influence on UIFP.
This was done to meet the demands from political parties and the Federation
of co-operative companies (SIS) that sold through UIFP, which put great
8 Valdimarsson. U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
9 This canning plant was operated separated from the sales operation ofUIFP and is not included in
the number of employees ofUIFP.
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emphasis on equality of the members. This equality and limitation of power
of each company was in opposition to what a membership meeting in May
1935, had agreed, where they argued that votes should be in proportion to
products sold through UIFP10.
In 1943/44, the formal nomination of the two representatives from the
government ran out. However, according to proceedings of UIFP boards
they both attended meetings of the board until November 1944 when one of
the representatives stopped attending, and the other one continued until
November 194611. After that, until 1952, the board had only five members
but in 1952 the number increased again to seven where the producers got the
two extra seats. Producers had a majority in the board from 1938 when the
seat of Utvegsbankinn went to the producers, then after the increase in the
board in 1952 the producers had six members and Landsbankinn one.
During this period there were two to three managers of UIFP. In the first
years ofUIFP operation there were three that is, the former managers of the
three exporting companies that established UIFP. After 1947, two managers
controlled UIFP's daily operation.
VL1.1.2 Monopoly 1957 - 1990
The period 1957 - 59 was in many ways an important turning point in the
history of UIFP due to members' increasing dissatisfaction with its
operation. There were mainly three issues which dissatisfied the members.
Firstly, the sales organisation in many ways appeared to have stagnated;
secondly, the members' found that UIFP did not pay as much attention to
matters of its members common interest as it should have done; thirdly, the
members were of the opinion that they had very little to say in the
governance of UIFP as they found the board too remote from the members
and their needs. A reflection of this criticism was apparent in the
composition of the board, where in 1959 not all of the board members were
10
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in direct contact with salt fish production, and most of them were getting
rather old and had been on the board for a long time12.
The dissatisfaction with the governance and the increased emphasis on
matters of common interest are closely connected. It was not until after a
meeting of at least 39 members of UIFP in September 1959, where they
planned to establish an organisation separate from UIFP to take care of
common interest matters of salt fish producers, that the board of UIFP
started to react to the members' requests to act more in such matters. This
resulted in UIFP establishing a special interest committee to take care of
common interest matters with three members nominated by the board and
six by the producers13. By this UIFP widened its aims and acted
increasingly as a pressure group in common interest matters such as putting
pressure on the government about better operation bases for salt fish
production, on banks about increased loans towards producers, on the
governments fund controllers about increased loans for new equipment and
houses, and other matters that could concern the salt fish production14. This
emphasis on common interest matters is easily understandable considering
that the economy in Iceland during this time was under great interference
from the government. This meant that having a strong position in putting
pressure on government was very important and in many ways essential in
order to have operational bases for the companies.
The dissatisfaction of members lead to the members becoming much more
active in the governance of UIFP, first through the common interest
committee and secondly by changes on the board where more active
producers came into the board in 1960 and then in 1965 when all the seven
substitutes started attending all board meetings. Later, in 1983, the number
of the board members was increased to fourteen and the substitutes were
promoted to full members.
It can be argued that around this time (1960) the strategy ofUIFP changed
in that it stopped acting only as a sales organisation and took up much
12 Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
13 Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
14 Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
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broader service with its members as the interest matters reflect. The major
players in this change were clearly the producers that found UIFP to have
stagnated. It could be questioned whether the protected environment that
followed the exclusive licences, and having a virtual monopoly of export,
made the environment ofUIFP too secure and lacking of the motivation that
often comes with competition.
Changes in the sales system came around the middle of the 1960s when
increased emphasis was placed on sales trips ofmanagers and the chairman.
In the same time, less emphasis was placed on the representative system,
which meant that their number declined, as well as their commission. UIFP
also opened its first sales office in Italy in 1965, which operated there until
1989. By establishing a sales office, UIFP was aiming to build up a closer
relationship with the customers as well as cut the cost of the sales system.
The sales system was always under close inspection by the members; for
example, they compared it to the sale systems of IFPC and SIS, which were
also built on sales offices abroad. However, the representative form by
UIFP was kept more or less unchanged until 1987, when UIFP opened a
sales office in Barcelona in Spain that in 1990 became a subsidiary, Union
Islandia, which was the first subsidiary that UIFP established abroad. In
addition to the sales operation there, the subsidiary operated cold storages
and took care ofdistribution of the product to customers15.
Another change on UIFP's operation that is worth mentioning is that,
around 1980, UIFP started to take loans to be able to offer its members
quicker payment for their production and save some costs in credit that was
secured by inventory. In this way UIFP used the economy of size and got
more effective loans than individual companies could get, and this cut the
financial cost for the producers.
During the period 1957 - 1990, the operation of UIFP increased very fast
mainly due to increased service to members as well as the broadening of its
role. An example of this increased service with members and operation of
UIFP occurred in 1962, when UIFP hired employees to take care of
15
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technical matters for both UIFP and its members. This was the start of the
operation of a technical department of UIFP16. In 1967 UIFP built its own
warehouse where fish were collected before being exported, and could also
be packed and graded if necessary. In 1972, UIFP hired an employee to
take care of the quality control of the products of its members, which was
the birth of a quality department. Later, in 1984, UIFP started its own R&D
work to develop new products. Following the establishment of the R&D
department, UIFP operated the packing of fish in consumers' packing from
1987 to 1990 when the equipment was passed over to producers in
Iceland17. Other changes that followed the increased operation of UIFP
were all kinds of information sharing with members, in the form of
production guides, guides to expected price and stocking time, as well as
regular newsletters. During this time, the number of employees rose from
10 -15 in the 1950s and 60s, to just over forty in 1990. Around 25
employees were working in the headquarters in sales and administration and
the rest in quality control, R&D, warehouses and other handling of the
production.
The number of members fluctuated over this period but in 1970 there were
219, 311 in 1982 and in 1986-'87 it reached its peak when the number rose
to 405, but in 1991 the number had gone down to 28618. Most of these
members are very small companies with production under 25 tons.
From 1962 - 1978, there was only one manager ofUIFP and then two were
titled as managers until 1985 when one of them retired. In 1986, the acting
manager, Fridrik Palsson, was hired as the manager of IFPC and after that,
Magnus Gunnarsson was hired as the manager until the change of
ownership ofUIFP in 1993. Most of the time when two or more managers
were acting in UIFP they took care of different market areas, and office
managers were responsible for the day-to-day operation of the office and
domestic operation. From 1986 until 1993 the manager acted more as a
spokesman for UIFP and its members, aiming at improving the competitive
16 Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
17 Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
18
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status of salt fish producers. In the same time, a new job of assistant
manager was created which the acting office manager took over. The main
activities of an assistant manager were to take care of all sales operations of
UIFP19.
VI.1.1.3 Increased competition 1990 - 1993
During the period before 1990, UIFP almost had a monopoly on the export
of salted fish due to limits in the number of export licences granted by the
ministry of Fishery and later the Foreign Ministry. However, this time other
companies got a limited licence to export salted fish from Iceland, but
usually in very little quantity or by rather strict conditions. Different
pressures were put on these export licences, for example in 1987 when
producers not bound to UIFP started exporting fresh split fish20 to Denmark
or the UK where it was salted and then sold on to Spain, mainly as Icelandic
salted fish. This meant that the exporters could circumvent the export
licence that blocked them from exporting frilly produced salted fish from
Iceland as well as circumvent the high import taxes into the EU. Other
pressures during this time came from the imminent implementation of an
international contract between EFTA and the EU about the European
Economic Area and the single market, where Iceland had to adapt to free
trade between European countries. To cut a long story short, in 1991,
Iceland's Foreign Ministry granted companies other than UIFP limited
licences to export salted fish mainly to Latin-American countries. The
Foreign Ministry also granted other companies experimental licences to sell
salted fillets to Mediterranean countries, and, in 1992, to sell split fish21.
After these experimental licences were granted in 1991 and 1992, and with
the prospect of free trade with EU countries, it was clear that the exclusive
licences that UIFP had on export would be abolished; they were indeed
abolished in January 1993.
19 Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
20
Split fish is fish that has been split open and the front part of the spine removed.
21
Morgunblabid 27/3 '94, interview with Jon Asbjornsson.
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In 1990, UIFP clearly changed its strategy when it bought a French
company Nord Morue, that operated secondary processing and selling of
fish products. The main emphasis of this company was on producing
consumer packed products from salted and smoked fish. With this UIFP
was aiming to avoid high import taxes on fish products in the EU, get a
broader knowledge of the production of different fish products, gain
important business connections and be more flexible in order to respond
more quickly to the increasingly fast rate of change of the food market22. In
many ways this can be seen as a continuity of its experiment with the
packing centre in Reykjavik, but there was a clear change in strategy
because UIFP had not been involved in direct processing before. The
involvement of UIFP in secondary processing in France means that UIFP is
going deeper into the supply chain by increasingly selling products to
supermarkets instead of rather traditional salt fish markets in Mediterranean
countries. Hence, the market for UIFP is changing from small shops and
distribution companies for salted fish to direct selling to supermarkets where
'J "3
reliability and long-term relationship is often one of the main issues .
Following the operation of the Nord Morue, UIFP's strategy in sales
organisations started to change. Before 1990 almost all of UIFP's sales
were commission sale of its members' products, but after 1990 UIFP
increasingly bought the fish from producers instead.
Before 1990, UIFP depended completely on the Icelandic producers for fish
to sell, and the producers also depended on UIFP for selling their products.
With the acquisition of the company in France, UIFP started to become
more independent from its members because the secondary plant bought raw
material from more than just Icelandic producers.
Another aspect of the strategy changes during 1990 was that members
started serious discussions about changing the form of the organisation,
realising that the organisation was not very fit for free competition, mainly
due to its laws and duties with its members. These duties concerned
information sharing, equality of members inside UIFP, having to act as an
22 Based on interview with former manager ofUIPF and Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
23 Cook, R.; Fearne, A. & Dedman, S.; Wysocki, F.A.
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interest group and other services with the members that were not compatible
with free competition. The laws of UIFP made it in many ways inflexible
and very dependent on its members, especially in financial matters. An
example of this is that UIFP had to return the profit to members and
therefore depended on them to agree on leaving more of the profit in the
company when it was needed for some investments. Due to often-poor
profitability of the producers, this could be difficult and then UIFP had no
other option than to get the necessary funding as a loan. This could have
delayed changes and was not a feasible form for free competition. Hence,
the next step to increase UIFP's ability to become more competitive was to
grant it more freedom and independence from the producers. In order to do
that it was necessary to move from the duties and the equality principle that
had been the essence of connecting UIFP with its producers. An annual
meeting for 1991 agreed on changes aiming at giving UIFP more flexibility
and independence from its members. The suggestion for changes took on
the following issues, among others:24
• Grant UIFP more authority to influence the quantity and production
ofproducers.
• Grant UIFP authority to let individual producers take on special
production that is not necessarily on offer to all producers.
• Grant UIFP more freedom in ways of payment to producers to be
able to return higher prices to the producers
• Grant UIFP permission to buy products under its own name as well
as grant permission to own and operate primary processing
companies, both domestic and foreign, if they were appropriate to
the operation ofUIFP.
• Grant UIFP permission to sell all products those members wanted
not just salted fish.
• Grant UIFP permission to sell for non-members' companies.
These changes, which came were finally implemented in 1991, did not go
too smoothly through the system of UIFP; for example, the manager,
Magnus Gunnarsson, resigned after a members meeting in October 1990
had failed to agree whether to stop exporting fresh split fish in competition
with their own salt fish sold through UIFP. Later the same month the
24 Valdimarsson, U. V. & Bjarnason, H.
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manager withdrew his resignation when over 90% of the members signed a
statement of support for him25.
At the same time as UIFP faced this increased competition, the fish quotas
were declining, leading to a decline in salt fish production. This meant that
UIFP's operation declined and from October 1992 to October 1993 the
number of staff was cut to half of what it had been (from just under 50 to
around 25)26. This also affected the profitability of UIFP; in 1990, UIFP
made around 483 million ISK. (Icelandic krona) in profit, and in 1991 it
made a profit of 150 million ISK., but in 1992 it made a loss of 118 million
ISK., which was the first time in the history of UIFP that it had not returned
a profit on its operation.
Due to these difficulties, a members' meeting on 26th of January 1993
agreed that it was necessary to go one step further in the changes ofUIFP by
changing the ownership ofUIFP into a limited liability form, to increase the
flexibility of UIFP as a company. In order to achieve this, UIFP was
abolished and a new company, UIFP Ltd., was established in February
1993. The allocation of shares in the company was in proportion of the
members' ownership in the reserved fund, and present or former producers
owned almost all of the shares.
In 1993, UIFP sold products for around 200 Icelandic companies, where 50
(i.e. a quarter of the total number of companies) produced 86% of the total
quantity of good. The other 150 companies produced only 14% of the total
quantity ofUIFP's sale in 199327.
The motivation for the changes of UIFP during this time seem to have come
from outside pressure, mainly from other companies, politics and the
implementation of international contracts which created pressure for the
abolition ofUIPS's exclusive licence. Internal motivation does not seem to
have greatly influenced the changes of UIFP, neither from the managers nor




Morgunbla5i5 26/11 '93 interview with Magnus Gunnarsson CEO ofUIFP.
27
Morgunbladib 12/5 ' 94.
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members of UIFP focused more on preserving the exclusive licence rather
than adapting to the changes of their environment in time. However, both
UIFP and its members had in many cases good reasons for supporting
changes in UIFP. These reasons, included, for example;
for UIFP
• more flexibility by working as a limited liability company
• better access to money through increased share
• more expansion possibilities by selling for non-members
• more emphasis on business matters instead of common interest
matters
for members
• exit barriers for leaving UIFP would become lower
• better value for their share in UIFP
• more options in selling their products
These exit barriers for members to leave UIFP included, for example, the
ownership in the equity fund of UIFP, which was paid out over a long time
if members decided to leave UIFP. In addition to that, it is clear that the
value that members got from the equity fund was far from what the market
price for the share in UIFP would be if it were a limited liability company.
This could have increased the pressure for the ownership change of UIFP,
especially considering the poor financial status of many companies inside
UIFP28.
Vl.1.1.4 Transformation 1993 - 1998
UIFP Ltd. took over equity and operation ofUIFP on 11th of October 1993
when the accounts of the old UIFP had been settled. After the establishment
of UIFP Ltd., around 700 shareholders owned the new company, where
most of them were present or former fish producers. The biggest owner had
a 4.71% share so the ownership was well distributed and no one had
obvious power to dominate the company. In March 1997, UIFP was
registered at the Icelandic Stock Exchange market, meaning that its shares
28 See for example discussion about Icelandic fish industry in chapter III.
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were on the free open market, and that UIFP had to give information on a
regular basis concerning its operation and profitability29.
In the year of 1993/94 the company hired a new general manager Gunnar
Orn Kristjansson after the former manager had resigned, in order to give the
board and the new manager a clean table to decide a new strategy and
vision30. Apart from the change ofmanager, the staff ofUIFP was the same
as before the ownership change.
Although this ownership change did not formally change the operation of
UIFP as a company, it is evident that when UIFP was changed into a limited
liability form and having a new general manager, the strategy of the
company changed dramatically. The main changes that followed were that
UIFP had much more independence from the producers in Iceland and did
not only act as a sales organisation for the Icelandic processing companies.
Instead UIFP started, for example, to buy and sell salt fish from foreign
producers, beginning in Norway. This move led to the establishment of a
subsidiary in Norway, UIFP Union a.s., in 1995, which was later changed
into Mar-Nor a.s., to take care of selling products from Norwegian
companies. UIFP also started to buy the fish from the producers instead of
selling it in commission sale, which meant that producers got paid earlier,
but at the same time meant that there was often the opportunity for UIFP to
buy fish when the price was low and keep it until the price went up before
selling it again31.
In 1994, UIFP established a company in Spain, Copesco & Sefrisa s.a., with
one of the biggest Spanish salted fish distribution companies. This
company took over the operation of UIFP's subsidiary in Spain, and was
intended to strengthen UIFP's position on the market. In 1996 this
cooperation between UIFP and the Spanish partners collapsed, leading to
the resurrection of UIFP's subsidiary in Spain to take care of UIFP's
activities there. In 1996, UIFP went into a new sector by buying a 40%
29 UIFP Annual Report 1996.
30
Morgunbladid 26/11 '93 interview with Magnus Gunnarsson CEO ofUIFP.
31
Morgunbladi5 21/5 '95 interview with Gunnar Orn Kristjansson CEO ofUIFP.
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share in Icebrit Ltd., which is based in Hull, UK and takes care of selling
fresh fish.
The expansion of UIFP boomed in 1997, starting in March when UIFP
bought the Hvitanes, a cargo ship which previously had taken care of about
80% of the transport for UIFP from Iceland and Norway to France and
Mediterranean countries32. In May, UIFP bought a 50% share in a
Norwegian processing company to strengthen its position on the Norwegian
market. Then in September 1997, UIFP bought two Canadian companies in
Nova Scotia: Sana Souci Seafood Ltd., which operated fish processing,
secondary processing, distribution and marketing of salt fish mainly in
North and South-America; and Tara Nova Ltd., which is primary a
processing company33. This meant that UIFP bought access to the fish
market of (mostly North) America, where it had not been strong before.
The final move of UIFP in this foreign investment was in November 1997
when along with its Norwegian partners, it bought another primary
processing company in Norway.
After these changes, it is estimated that UIFP and subsidiaries controlled
around 16% of the total salt fish sale in the world, making UIFP the biggest
single seller of salted fish in the world34. In table VI. 1 a few essential
figures of the financial status of UIFP are summarised. It can be seen that
the operation has expanded quite rapidly, its revenue has increased by
around 25.5% from 1993 to 1996. In addition to this the latest investment in
1997 is estimated to have boosted the revenue significantly, by about 1.8
billion ISK or 17.5% compared to revenue in 1996. Profitability, however,
has been moderate from 3.6% of operating revenue in 1994 to 1.1 % in
1996, compared to the general nominal interest rate on non-index secured






34 Morgunbla3i3 12/9 '97.
35 Se51abanki Islands, Hagtolur manaSarins agust, 1997.
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Year Operating Return on Equity Return on Number of staff
revenue in operation ratio equity leel. Abroad
ISK '000 revenue
1993 8,209,000 1.8% 25.4% 10.3% N/A N/A
1994 9,200,054 3.6% 21.2% 24.1% N/A N/A
1995 9,473,7333 1.8% 18.9% 20.5% 59 162
1996 10,304,499 1.1% 25.4% 9.0%36 70 154
1997 11,675,880 1.3% 24% 11.0% 64 330
1998 18,834,193 2.7% 28% 24% 60-70 776-
786
37
Table VI. 1 Consolidated financial key figures .
In 1999 came another boom in the growth ofUIFP. In the beginning of the
year (or from 1st of December, 1998) Islandssfld hf., formally Icelandic
Herring Board, merged to UIFP38. Then in the autumn 1999, Icelandic
Seafood and UIFP merged under the name of UIFP39. In this way, UIFP
diversified its operation significantly from the time before the merger with
Icelandic Seafood, when it defined its role as an "international marketing
and production company in chilledfish production"40. Now UIFP handles
frozen fish products as well, so theoretically speaking it covers almost all
forms of fish product exported form Iceland. Islandssild hf. was mainly in
the business of marketing slated herring, which is not very different from
UIFP's business. Additionally, most of the biggest producers of slated
herring are also big producers of slated cod and were already in business
with UIFP. Hence the merger with Islandssfld hf. did not signify a strategic
change in UIFP's operation. On the other hand the merger with Icelandic
Seafood was different because the producers were in many cases bigger and
the value adding is more than in salt fish production. This could create
pressure on UIFP's strategy and on tis relationship with producers. This
research does not take in account the merger with Icelandic Seafood because
it did not happen until after the data collection and analysis was done.
However, further discussion about possible effects is discussed in the
conclusion chapter. Before the merger with Icelandic Seafood, in June
36 This decline in revenue on equity is due to increased of equity by new share sold in 1996.
37 Annual report 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. In this table revenue is taken from the





40 Taken from UIFP strategy on the www.sif.is.
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1999, UIFP changed its structure to improve efficiency. UIFP Iceland was
then established to take over the operation in Iceland and connection to
producers in the same way as the old UIFP had done. The UIFP Mother
Company was established to head all its subsidiaries in Iceland and abroad.
VI.1.2Analysis of UIFP case
VI.l.2.1 Forms and nature of the alliance
It can be argued that the UFIP network has been in three basic forms during
its operation time. The first was the first three years after the merger of
three biggest fish export and production companies in Iceland formed it.
After that, in 1935, UIFP became a joint venture between producers for the
export of their production. The third form is from 1993 when UIFP became
a Limited Liability Company and the alliances changed from being joint
ventures between producers to individual alliances between UIFP and each
producer.
During most of this time, the form of the alliances has not changed much.
The interaction between actors in the alliances has been between producers
and the central firm, that is the UIFP Mother Company. Before 1993 UIFP
had few marketing subsidiaries, but although they were few, there was very
limited direct connection between each producer and the subsidiaries. This
can be traced to the homogeneity of the products. The main form of
interaction is therefore as presented in figure VI. 1 where the entire
interaction is between UIFP MC and each producer.
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During the time until 1993, UIFP treated producers on an equal basis.
Hence, producers with different strategies to UIFP had difficulties fulfilling
them due to the exclusive licences of export of salted fish from Iceland that
UIPF was granted, almost exclusively, until 1993. Producers of salted fish
were therefore enforced to sell their products through UIFP. Therefore,
there was no freedom or real competition with other marketing companies
for the producers. Not everyone appreciated this enforcement, as can be
seen from the following quotation:
"It did not work out to produce carefully your products and bring it to
markets when the sale organisation that sold it treated you as a dog. If I
asked about something I was told that this was not for me to be concerned
about. "41
This producer left UIFP in 1992 and established its own marketing company
to sell its products. This enforcement meant that UIFP had to serve all
producers no matter of how different the strategies and needs of the
producers were. In the same way UIFP had, to serve big and small, good
and bad as former manager ofUIFP claimed.
"We had to serve all the producers no matter of the importance of the
producers or the quality of its products. Often it took same time to serve
producers that produced 600 ton and the small ones that produced 10
tons. "42
Another factor that affected the alliances before 1990 was that the nature of
the sale was very much influenced by international contracts such as the
quota on toll free import to the EU countries. Much of the attention of
managers of UIFP went into matters of mutual interest to the members and
the role of UIFP was very much focussed on improving the competitive
stance of salt fish producers and salt fish export, or as a former manager of
UIFP claimed:
"The fish export from Iceland was in many cases not business to business
relationship but rather contracts between countries as in former USSR as
well in the Mediterranean countries. Selling to the Mediterranean countries
turned out to be contracts with EU about the toll quota in competition with
Norway. This called for putting pressure on officials in Brussels. In
41
Frjals Verslun, interview with Saeunn Axels.
42 Interview with former manager ofUfFP, 1-32.
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addition to this lot ofenergy went into the European Economic Area (EEA)
contracts between 1988 - 1993 about the status ofthe fishing industry. This
was very much on UIFP hands because there met both the companies blocks
thatisIFPC and IS."43
With increased freedom in international trade, as well as increased freedom
in the Icelandic economy, it was clear that there was increased pressure to
abolish the exclusive licence of UIFP to export salted fish form Iceland.
Other companies got limited licences to export salted fish from Iceland,
leaving UIFP in the difficult position of having the duty to serve all
producers while other companies got licences to export their products. As
one employee ofUIFP claimed:
"The reason for UIFP difficulties when other companies were given licence
to export salted fish was that there was an official system operated during
this time which UIFP had to follow. We had to stock salted fish in the
spring to sell in the autumn with the cost of stocking it. Then when other
companies got free licence to bring in new product in the autumn without
the cost of stocking them therefore in lower price it disorder the official
system that was active. Therefore it was much better to give the export free
instead of operating two systems where the competitive status of UIFP was
limited having all the duties to producers. " 4
It is clear that the nature of the alliances until 1990 was just as much about
acting as a mutual interest group as it was about being a sales organisation.
After 1990, the importance of mutual interest matters declined, creating
increased pressure to change the ownership form of UIFP. The difficult
position of UIFP can been seen from the rather poor financial results after
1990, where in 1992 UIFP returned negative return on its operation for the
first year in a long time. It was clear from the operation of UIFP that the
form of a joint venture between producers, and UIFP's duties to producers,
limited the effectiveness of its operation.
After 1993, the nature of the alliances changed from a joint venture to
individual alliances between each producer and UIFP (see figure IV.2). In
the first month after the ownership change, UIFP tried to make a contract
43 Interview with former manager ofUIFP, 1-32.
44 Interview with employee ofUIFP, I- 25.
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with each individual producer such that UIFP took on sales for producers on
various different bases. As an employee ofUIFP stated:
"In the beginning after the ownership change, we tried to establish contract
with each producer. The idea was to have different groups ofproducers for
example "A " group with producers that were committed to sell only through
UIFP etc. We made this experiment but we found out soon that it was not
worth all the bureaucracy that this demanded. "45
UIFP still groups the producers into certain groups: the "A" group,
comprising those producers that are selling their entire product to UIFP and
get priority to sales and information; the "B" group that sells part of their
products to UIFP and do not get the same priority to the information and
services of UIFP; and the "C" group, that UIFP avoid having business with
unless with some special agreement. The relationship is not built on
contract, but rather on mutual trust. Producers are free to leave if they think
that they can get a better opportunity somewhere else. The form of the
relationships changed from treating all producers in the same way into
individual alliances where, for example, producers benefit in higher price if
they produce quality products something that was unthinkable before
199346.
Direct business relationship between UIPF and each producers
about their production, service and price.
Figure VI.2 Form of UIFP relationship with producers from 1993 - 1999
45 Interview with manager ofUIFP, 1-25.
46 Based on interview with manager ofUIPF, 1-24.
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After the change in 1999 the structure ofUIFP changed but it had very little
effect on the relationship with producers (see figure IV.3). The main effects
were on the governance of the network, where the UIFP Mother Company
had the role ofgoverning, coordinating and leading the network.
Direct business relationship between U1PF and each producers
about their production, service and price.
Headquarters relationship, co-ordination, governance and
leadership.
Figure VI.3 UIFP structure 1999-
The first response by interlocutors when they were asked about the nature of
the relationship between UIFP and producers after the ownership changes
was that it was a clear suppliers/buyer's relationship47. As the interviews
went on however it was clear that the relationship included much more than
a traditional supplier's/buyer's relationship. This is especially true for "A"
producers where UIFP provided them with information and service that "B"
producers for example, does not get. In addition to this UIFP are committed
to buy all the fish from "A" producers at market price, and in the same way
"A" producers are committed to sell all their salted fish to UIFP. Hence,
these commitments on both sides indicate that the relationship is much more
based on alliance than just supplier's/buyer's relationships. For other
producers such as "B" producers the relationship is much more clearly on a
supplier's/buyer's basis. It is clear from the interviews with managers and
employees of UIFP that they look at the "A" producers as their producers
47 Based on interviews with managers of UIFP and PPCs.
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(for example, one manager talked about "our producers" where he meant
the "A" producers48.).
Although the relationship can still be counted as a strategic alliance between
producers and UIFP, has moved much closer to a supplier's/buyer's
relationship than the former sales organisation relationship that it was before
1993. An indication of this is the fact that UIFP buys all the products from
the producers instead of selling it through commission sales. Another
indication is the ownership of UIFP, which is much more diverse now in
1999 than it was when UIFP Ltd. was established. Although producers still
have a majority on the board of the company, other investors such as
pension funds and private companies that are not producers have become
the biggest owners. It is interesting to see how the ownership has developed
from 1993 when UIFP was changed into a limited liability company.
Producers have lost their majority in UIFP share: of the twenty biggest
shareholders only five are producers have, and they hold only 10,87% of the
52,15% share that these twenty shareholders won in total (see table VI.2).
In total, producers count for less than 20% of the total shares in UIFP49.
Shareholders ownership 01.06.99
Ownership of 10 biggest shareholder 38,02%
Thereofproducers 8,13%




It is clear from these figures that producers no longer own a majority share,
or even a ruling share, in UIFP. This declining ownership can in many
cases be traced to the poor financial status of producers inside UIFP. In
addition to that many producers either stopped production or did not see
only point in owning share in UIFP where their influence would be very
limited.
Another aspect of the nature of the relationship between UIPF and
producers is concentration by the producers, where the number is declining
and they are getting bigger. This can be seen from figure VIA where the
48 Interview with manager ofUIFP, 1-24.
49 Information given be manager of UIFP.
50 litbod og Skraningarlysing SIF Jiili 1999. UIFP stock bidding rapport July 1999.
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development of the number of producers and their percentage of total export
ofUIFP from Iceland is shown.
Percent of total sale
Figure VL4 Number of producers and percent of total sale UIFP 1194 - 199851
From figure VI.4 it can be seen that the share of the 10 biggest companies in
the total export ofUIFP from Iceland has increased from 1994 when it was
around 46 % to around 61% in 1998. Similar can be said of the 20 biggest
companies, which in 1998 stood for around 82% of the total export. In 1998
52the number of producers associated with the UIPF group was around 107 ,
around 50 ofwhich were "A" group producers .
The diversification of UIFP into both primary processing and secondary
processing abroad and the increased emphasis on other types of products
than just salted fish, has also affected the nature of the alliances. It is clear
that UIFP is no longer just selling salted products from Iceland but much
rather they have created a network of subsidiaries that are involved in
"marketing andproduction ofsalted and chilled seafood products"54. It is
therefore a question whether it is not more correct to talk about a UIFP
51 Information given by manager ofUIFP and from stock bidding analyses July 1999.
52 In these numbers the smallest producers that use the service ofUIPF to grade and pack their
product are not counted instead; the packing department ofUIFP counted as one producer.
Therefore, it is clear that the number ofproducers in UFIP's business could be higher although the
importance of the biggest would not change much.
53 Based on interviews with managers ofUIFP.
54 Utbod og Skraningarlysing SIF juli 1999. UIFP stock bidding analyses July 1999.
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network rather than talking about strategic alliances or joint venture as it
was before 1993. Inside this network are then individual strategic alliances
between UIFP and producers (at least "A" producers), which then are part of
the network. Hence, the nature of the relationship has changed from being
strategic alliances between high number of small producers to become much
closer to a network with individual strategic alliances between UIPF and
producers. Inside this network UIPF can establish strategic alliances with
individual producers or others.
In table VI.3, the main factors involved in the network are summarised as
they are seen in 1999. The main changes in the last year are the increased
emphasis that UIFP has put on primary and secondary processing as well as
















































Table VI.3 Actors, Activities and Resources
The ownership changes and the income of other investors than producers
into UIFP have brought the concept of the stakeholder into this network.
Although managers ofUIFP are not afraid of balancing the different aims of
producers and other investors, it is clear that producers are in some cases
afraid of too much influence of other stakeholders who could have other
interests than those of producers. An example of this is the fact that ten
producers formed an occupational organisation (SaltfiskframleiSendur hf.)




As previous discussed, the producers have now less than 20% of UIFP
shares, so it is clear that they have not succeeded in maintaining their share
in UIFP. On the other hand, the majority of producers in the UIFP board
indicate that other investors than producers are concerned about keeping
some balance and keeping up good relations with producers on more than
just a buyer's/supplier's relationship basis.
VI.1.2.1.1Dependency ofactors in the network
Due to the exclusive licence UIFP had on the export of salted fish from
Iceland more or less until 1993, producers and UIFP were almost
completely dependent on each other. However, this high dependency
started to break before 1990 when producers started to sell split partly salted
fish mainly to Denmark for further processing. This high dependency
affected the relationship in many ways. To UIFP's disadvantage it meant
they had duties to serve every producer regardless of their capability to
produce salted fish or their strategy. UIFP responded to this by treating
producers as a homogeneous group. Many producers felt they were being
forced to adapt to UIFP's strategy. Hence, many producers viewed this as
enforcement and the relationship missed the necessary flexibility to meet
their own aims and strategy56. On the other hand these duties put great
demands on UIPF and managers often spent lots of their time in making
compromises between the different aims ofproducers57.
Around 1992 the Foreign Ministry started to give limited licences for
export, breaking this dependency for producers. At the same time UIFP
bought a secondary processing plant in France making its operation not
completely dependent on Icelandic fish. After 1993 the dependency
decreased again by the abolition of the exclusive licence, making producers
free to sell their product wherever they wanted. Due to the diversification of
UIFP, mainly after 1994, into primary processing, secondary processing and
distribution, UIFP has become less and less dependent on the Icelandic
producers. In the same way, by the increased number of companies that are
selling salted fish and the fact that they are not bound with UIFP, the
56 Built on interview with present and former managers of PPCs.
57 Interview with former manager ofUIFP, 1-32.
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producers are free and have the option of selling through other companies.
Along with this, the traditional markets are in a good condition so there is
no problem in selling salted fish today (1999). In difficult marketing
conditions however, it is uncertain whether this dependency for producers
can increase depending on the abilities of the other marketing companies to
sell the products while UIFP are committed to buy all products from group
"A" producers. On the other hand producers can become dependent on
UIFP services as one manager ofUIFP stated.
"Some producers are becoming dependent on our service. Producers in
many cases have not the space to stock products and have built up their
production in that way that they need to get rid of its productions every
week and get it paid. For these producers it could be difficult to change to
the old system where they needed to stock their products them selves and
capitalise the stocking. "5
In a similar way, one employee of a production company selling through
UIFP claimed:
"Some producers are become dependent on the financial assistance of
UIFP. Where UIFP are starting to finance their fish buy or quota it is
difficult for them to leave UIFP and in many cases UIFP has kept them a
live by their assistance and service. "59
In this way, the dependency between actors in the network depends on the
service and financial status of the producers.
From the history it seems that the dependency has been equal for both UIPF
and producers. It is clear, however, that it did not matter for UIFP whether
one producer did or did not want to sell through them before 1993.
Meanwhile producers had no other option if they wanted to produce salted
fish but to sell through UIFP. Hence, producers were more dependent on
UIFP than UIFP was dependent on them. UIFP subsidiaries, such those in
Norway and Canada, are not in any way dependent on producers; it is rather
the secondary processing plants in France and the marketing subsidiaries as
in Spain that are dependent on Icelandic fish producers. UIFP claims that
they are still dependent on the Icelandic fish due to its better quality and
58 Interview with manager ofUIFP, I 25.
59 Interview with employee ofPPCs, 1-27.
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higher selling price than fish from their subsidiaries in Norway and
Canada60. In 1998 UIFP had over 51% share of the value of the total export
of salted fish from Iceland61. The diversification of UIFP from 1994 was
meant to spread the risk in the operation of UIPF by not having to depend
on Icelandic producers. Gunnar Orn Kristjansson, CEO of UIFP claimed in
an interview to ViSskiptabladid (The Business paper) that there was an
unacceptable risk during the time when UIFP had to depend solely on
Icelandic producers62.
VI. 1.2.1.2Conflict ofinterest and value creation in the network
The vertical integration of UIFP raises the question of whether it could, or
has develop(ed) conflicts with the producers in Iceland. First comes the
question of the vertical integration of UIFP into foreign producer? This
could cause interest conflicts with Icelandic producers who may interpret
such integration as UIFP exporting the knowledge and reputation of
Icelandic salted fish into countries that have been in hard competition with
the Icelandic production. Hence, the buyers that appreciate the quality of
the Icelandic fish are not bound to buy just from Icelandic producers but
also Norwegian or Canadian. A manager of UIFP claimed this was not the
case, but rather what he stated:
"The fish from our diversification abroad have not the same quality and the
Icelandic fish that have special status. In our system it is the cream that
floats on the top but there is much more in the cup but the cream on the top
and there is difference between markets and different customers some can
buy expensive Icelandic fish while others buy cheaper products. By this we
are serving different segments on the markets. "63
This indicates changes in the driving force in the network. Before 1990 the
network was completely production driven, where the main aim was to sell
producers products. After 1990 this started to change and the UIFP's own
value creation starts to be more the driving force for changes. It is though
not until after 1993 that this becomes obvious, and after the diversification
60 Utbods og skraningarlysing SfF juli 1999. UIFP stock bidding analyses July 1999.
61 Utbods og skraningarlysing SIF juli 1999. UIFP stock bidding analyses July 1999.
62
Vi6skiptabla5id 27 January - 2 February 1999, interview with Gunnar Orn Kristjansson CEO of
UIFP.
63 Interview with manager ofUIFP, 1-24.
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of UIFP that it becomes explicit, that the main driving force for changes is
value creation inside UIFP.
The vertical integration of UIFP into primary processing introduces the
danger that UIFP, unconsciously or consciously, puts more emphasis on
selling fish from companies that they have ownership in rather than selling
products from other companies. A manager ofUIFP claimed that there was
a conflict of interest when they did not buy all their fish.
"When we both bought and soldproducts in commission sale there came up
conflicts concerning the stocking time. Many producers claimed we put
more emphasis on selling our products than theirs. Now we buy all our
products and are committed to take all products from our "A " producers so
this is no problem today. "64
According to producers they do not see this as a problem now. This can in
many cases be traced to the marketing condition, that is, there is rather a
lack of supply of salted fish, making it no problem to sell the products65.
A similar question concerns interest conflicts in the operation of the
secondary processing plant and how producers interpret that. The question
is, for example, whether the plant will, or have, delay(ed) development of
secondary processing in the processing companies in Iceland. From the
producers' point of view it can be argued that UIFP put much more
emphasis on getting raw material for this production rather than supporting
further production in Iceland that could then even be in competition with its
own products. In most cases the salt fish products from Iceland are
homogenous, and furthermore many production companies are rather
primitive. Hence, demands for further processing or value creation is not
very high. This makes the conflict between UIFP and producers about value
creation not as obvious as for example in the IFPC network; as one manager
of production companies said when he was asked about the value creation in
UIFP:
"The value creation in UIFP is mainly in the form of that if their operation
is efficient they can pay higher price than before. It is clear that the
64 Interview with manager of UIFP, 1-25.
65 Based on interviews with managers of PPCs.
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emphasis on the value creation in UIFP network is in their own companies
andproducers are suppliersfor them "66
Due to the nature of UIFP and the emphasis on value creation inside their
own secondary processing plants, this comment of the producers is in many
ways right. In the same way, because UIPF buys all the products for further
sale, they are not encouraging producers to produce special products that
demand direct connection between producers and customers. In many ways
the development of production inside UIFP has been in the other direction
than by for example IFPC, as one production manager stated:
"UIFP is always stimulating producers to hand in their products less and
less processed. Week old salted fish has not been processedfully and not
taken on the colour and texture that it will take after two to three week.
Therefore UIFP is taken more and more of the value creation in this
process. For many companies this is very good but others want rather to
increase their value creation instead ofdecreasing it. "67
In a similar way, a manager of PPC, that has been experiencing in further
processing, claimed:
"We tried to sell our products through UIFP and they showed us great
interest but our need seemed never be able to go through their system. It is
difficult to say what causes this but UIFP emphasis on their own value
creation can affect this as well as they buy all their products so this would
maybe not fit to their strategy. There is nothing wrong with this strategy of
UIFP but it does not harmony with our strategy of increasing the value of
our products. "68
This change in value creation and the value chain is good for many
companies and fulfils their aims towards the production. It is clear though
that the emphasis is now on the value creation ofUIFP, which in many ways
is very well understandable in the light of the demands on UIFP, that is, to
make profit and return it to the owners.
This leads to another conflict that interlocutors state is a conflict between
shareholders and producers, or as one manager of a production company
claimed.
66 Interview with manager of PPC, 1-19.
67 Interview with manager of PPC, 1-28.
68 Interview with manager of PPC, 1-28.
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"I can not see how the demands on UIFP to return as high profit as possible
to return to its owner that are no longer producers and the aims of
producers can fit together. "69
These conflicts between shareholders and producers could be defined as
shareholders/stakeholders conflicts and are well known. It is clear from
interviews with general managers of UIFP, both present and former, that
they were not afraid that although ownership ofUIFP would move to groups
unrelated to the fish industry, UIFP would still be able to serve its purpose
and offer the producers the best price and service. Hence, without offering
producers the best price and service UIFP would not be able to make profit
to return to the shareholders70. The managers seem unanimous that the
interests of the two groups of producers and owners are parallel and that it is
possible to serve both at the same time. For many producers, especially
those who were used to the old days of SIF when profit was returned at the
end of the year, this is difficult to admit. Managers ofUIFP point out on the
other hand that cost awareness has increased after the ownership changes
where UIFP returns the correct price immediately, not the end of the year
when all the cost has been withdraw. By this they have cut down the cost of
selling the fish and can pay a higher percent of the actual price that they get
for their products on the markets. Or as one manager ofUIFP stated:
"For many "old" UIFP producers this is difficult to adjust to but this is a
simple calculation to show them that they are benefiting from this but they
missed the time when they had operated their company on the temporarily
price and when the payback came in the beginning of the next year they felt
that they got bonus. "7
It is clear from the interviews with both producers and UIFP managers that
the interest conflicts are not affecting the relationship today. It is however
clear that there are underlying conflicts that could come up to the surface in
worse marketing conditions or if more producers moved go into further
processing that demands a close connection to the customers which the
UIFP system does not offer.
69 Interview with manager of PPC, 1-28.
70
Morgunbla5i6 26/11 '93 interview with Magnus Gunnarsson CEO ofUIFP 1985 - 1993; and
Morgunbla5i5 21/05 '95 interview with Gunnar Orn Kristjansson CEO ofUIFP from 1994.
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VI. 1.2.2 Role of the central firm in the alliance
UIFP has in many ways had a strange position in the Icelandic fish industry.
This is due to the exclusive licence of UIFP, which meant that all the
different blocks inside the fish industry, such as IFPC, IS and salt fish
producers, all met in UIFP72. UIFP was therefore not only a central firm in
its own network but also central firm in interest matters concerning the
general competitiveness of fish processing. Hence it is claimed here that
UIFP had two main roles that is, the role inside the network against
producers, its subsidiaries and representatives and then the outside role as an
interest group for fish producers. This role of acting as an interest group
was finally abolished in 1993 except for a moral role, according to one
UIFP manager:
"Our voice outside for producers is more a moral one now rather than we
are acting as a interest group for them as we did in the past. "73
The interesting part of UIFP role is the internal role both against the
producers and the markets. Before the ownership changes, the exclusive
licences and the duties associated with them circumscribed the role ofUIFP
during that time. This can been seen from what the former CEO of UIFP
claimed.
"When we had the highest number ofproducers around 1986-87 we had
around 400 producers inside UIFP. Due to the duties that is to serve every
producer despite what they produced a lot of our time went into visiting
producers to reconcile their different view. "74
Due to this, much of the effort ofmanagers of UIFP went into coordinating
activities and the different aims of producers. As an example of that one
interlocutor that worked inside UIFP around 1990 claimed it was not easy to
convince the producers of buying Nord Mure, the secondary processing
plant in France75.
71 Interview with manager ofUIFP, 1-25
72 Interview with former CEO ofUIFP, 1-32.
73 Interview with manager ofUIFP, 1-24.
74 Interview with former CEO ofUIFP, 1-32.
75 Interview with former employee ofUIFP, 1-32.
172
Selling of the products has always been coordinated inside UIFP. The UIFP
took care of all the communication with the representatives and later
subsidiaries on the markets, and also sold products direct to customers.
After the diversification of UFIP and establishment of marketing
subsidiaries, the UIFP in Hafnafjordur still has a role in selling products.
This is, for example, to Spain to producers that see UIFP subsidiaries in
direct competition there. Also, all selling to Portugal is done from
HafiiafjorQur76. Due to that the interface between producers and UIPF is all
through the marketing division ofUIFP, and later UIFP Iceland. The role of
the marketing division of UIFP was to take care of both buying products
from producers as well as selling them on to the markets. After the changes
in 1999, UIFP Iceland took over the role of the old UIFP as the connection
to producers and the marketing operation. This role of UIFP Iceland
includes reporting information from markets to producers. This is done
through the channel of the central firm and in a way cuts out all connection
between the producers and the markets. This simplifies the connection
between the producers and UIPF and it was interesting that interlocutors
were not concerned about that, as can be seen from this quotation in an
interview with one manager ofPPCs:
"We concentrate on fishing and processing but the sale is in the hand ofa
company that has good overview over complicated marketing activities. "71
There the manager is referring to UIFP. It is however clear that producers
have the need to follow the marketing situations so they can base their
production decisions on the development in the markets. This information
is distributed from the central firm in the form of newsletters, personal
contacts and the service people from UIFP that travel between producers
(mainly "A" group producers).
Before 1993 UIFP was the marketing division ofproducers in that sense that
they sold their products more or less all in commission sale. Due to the
exclusive licence nothing was done on the markets without UIFP doing it.
This put pressure on UIFP to be the leading firm in the network as they had
76 Interview with manager ofUIFP, 1-24.
77 Saltarinn 3. tbl., 5. arg., 1998. Interview with Petur Palsson manager in Visir hf.
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the connection with the markets and exclusive licences to sell there. On the
other hand UIFP was dependent on producers for products and on all major
investment or strategically changes. Thus the role ofUIFP before 1993 was
to "serve producers'" needs, making the network product driven much
rather than marketing driven. UIFP has definitely been leading the network
in many matters. This is visible in all kinds of quality matters concerning
production, and in interest matters. In the same way the governance role of
UIPF in the network before 1993 is obvious and can been seen from the
importance of co-ordinating activities in the network. Hence the main role
until 1993 was to serve producers and govern the network.
The ownership changes on UIFP and the abolishment of the exclusive
licence changed also the role of UIFP as the central firm in the network.
After these changes UIPF was on the free market and producers were no
longer forced to sell through UIFP. This has made it clear both to UIFP and
producers that there is free competition on the markets, as Gunnar Orn
Kristjansson CEO ofUIFP claimed.
"UIPF operates now under the law of the markets. We are in full
competition with other exporters about producers' products and we have to
be competitive in that competition. Our future is based on that producers
find motivation to be in our business. The producer chooses the exporter
that returns best service and best return. This is vice versa UIFP can if that
n78
is the case refuse to take producers in our business. "
After 1994 UIFP stopped taking on products in commission sale and started
to buy all their products for further sale or production. Gunnar Orn
Kristjansson claimed in an interview with ViQskiptablaSiS (Business paper)
that:
"Commission sale can not work if we are operating company on the free
stock market. Investors' demands return on the capital that is bound in the
company. It is very difficult to return when companies are almost only
operating on commission bases. If company is going to be operating on
commission bases I find it more appropriate to operate the company as a
sale organisation in Co-operative bases in ownership ofproducers and not
to have them on the free stock market. "79
78 Saltarinn 2. tbl., 2. arg., 1995. Interview with Gunnar Orn Kristjansson CEO ofUIPF.
79
VidskiptablafliS 27 January - 2 February 1999, interview with Gunnar Orn Kristjansson CEO of
UIFP.
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According to the UIFP CEO the ownership changes have demanded that the
company can no longer operate on commission bases or act as a marketing
division of producers. Hence, the role ofUIPF has changed. It is no longer
there to serve producers but to be competing with other marketing
companies for their business. According to the CEO of UIFP, they do this
by offering producers competitive price and good service80. Still UIFP as
the central firm had the role to take care of all the relationships with
producers in the day-to-day activities, and to co-ordinate the activities
between the markets and producers in sales matters. The main change is
that UIFP gets new demands of profit, which they respond to by increasing
their own value creation and by diversification where they use their formal
knowledge of markets. Hence, the central firm has increasingly the role of
strategically leading the diversification of their constellation. For producers
this means that they still have more or less to adjust to UIFP's strategy
rather than UIFP compromising between their different strategies. The
same can be said about the governing role of UIFP: that is, its emphasis is
more on the internal in the constellation instead of the external against its
producers. The changes of the relationship with producers have simplified
the role of UIFP against the producers. Now it is more about being
competitive instead of having duties to serve all and be responsible for
governing, leading and coordinating all activities that were connected to the
marketing operation.
The separation ofUIFP operation in Iceland into the UIFP Mother Company
(MC) and UIFP Iceland clarified better the different role ofUIFP. After the
changes, the governance of the networks and strategy leadership moved to
UIFPC MC. UIFP MC has no core activities on their shoulders; much
rather it acts as a traditional headquarters with the responsibility of co¬
ordinating activities and strategy of the UIFP subsidiaries. Included in this
are matters as co-ordinate accounting, information systems and computer
systems81. Then UFIP Iceland is responsible for the operation in Iceland,
with the main emphasis being on the relationship with producers that is, to
80
Vidskiptabla5i5 27 January - 2 February 1999, interview with Gunnar Orn Kristjansson CEO of
UIFP.
81 Based on interviews with managers ofUIFP.
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coordinate the day-to-day activities concerning the buying and selling of the
products as well as the service.
VI. 1.2.3 Governance of the network
The governance of the UIFP network has changed in harmony with the
changes to the network in 1993 to 1994. After the changes in 1994 the
governance of the relationships with producers has moved closer to a
supplier's/buyer's relationship than before that time. It is, however, though
very interesting how UIFP has tried to maintain social connection with its
producers.
VI. 1.2.3.1Mechanism
The governance before the ownership changes was based around UIFP,
which took care of all the marketing activities. In the same way, it was
UIFP's responsibility to coordinate all activities that were included in the
marketing operation. Hence, the mechanism during this time was based on
centralisation by UIFP. In coherence with this centralisation, direct
connection between producers and the markets was not practised. In many
ways this is understandable due to the often high number of producers and
the little quantity they produced. This centralisation has caused clear
separation of activities in the value chain. Producers are not meant to have
direct connection to the markets, as an employee ofPPCs claimed:
"I once tried to contact a sales man of UIFP that I knew to get information
from the markets. I just got the same response as I got from UIFP in
Hafnafjordur. It is clear that they were not allowed to give more
oi
information."
Due to the centralisation and high number of producers the mechanism
seems to have worked fairly well. There were little evidence of producers
avoiding the centralisation and interference of the central firm, and,
according to managers inside UIFP, this centralisation has remained over
the operation time of the union and they have not noticed any need from
producers to operate differently83. After UIFP started to buy the products
82 Interview with employee ofPPC, 1-27.
83 Interview with managers ofUIFP, 1-24 and 1-25.
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this has not been a relevant question, but producers still want to follow what
is happening on the markets. A manager inside UIFP claimed, though, that
they watched out for changes and developments in the relationship with
producers:
"With more concentration by producers where they are becoming bigger
their needs and aims can change. This can cause that they want
increasingly to be more involved in the marketing activities and to be
connected to customers with further processing in mind similar what has
been happening in the frozenfish. If this will be then we will have to face it
and adjust our system to that but this is not happening today. "84
The mechanism of UIFP does not offer many other options for producers
than to be a supplier that is; UIFP buys the products from producers for
further sale. Despite this separation, UIFP tries to inform "A" producers
about the marketing conditions and changes on the markets.
This clear separation of activities can be claimed to be economical for the
network as a whole due to its simplification of the relationship and
coordination of activities, which both bring down the cost of selling in the
network. On the other hand, this opens up the possibility of a lack of
understanding of the needs and expectations of actors in the network. One
former manager of a production company took an interesting example of
what can happen in this case. This producer was producing stockfish, which
UIFP was also selling.
"In Iceland we have always graded the skinned fish as the lowest quality
and therefore got the lowest price for it. When we were travelling in Italy
visiting customers we meet an Icelandic salesman selling fish from Norway
our main competitor there. This Icelander informed us that the Norwegians
graded the skinnedfish in special group and sold it to Northern Italyfor top
price. The company that this Icelander worked for used the same
representative as we did. This representative never returned this to us or at
least our sale organisation never told us about it. Later we found out that
the customers in North Italy bough the lowest quality from Iceland and it
was as a lottery to see how much ofskinnedfish they got. The next year we
graded the skinnedfish specially which returned us around 3% higher price
for the whole production that spring"85.
84 Interview with manager of UIFP, 1-24.
85 Interview with former manager ofPPC, I-I2.
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Although this example is not taken from UIFP, they used the same grading
system and did not change it until after this. This is a good example of how
a distancing of the relationship between production and marketing can
create barriers against learning and value creation, which both emerge from
good understanding of each other's needs and expectations.
One interesting aspect of the governance mechanism is the board of the
subsidiaries. Producers are in the majority of the board of UIFP MC that
then nominates the boards of subsidiaries. Hence, in 1999, producers are in
the majority in the boards of subsidiaries. The CEO of UIFP is the
chairman of foreign subsidiaries, and the general manager of UIFP Iceland
is the chairman of the board of the subsidiaries in Iceland. According to a
manager of UIFP, this is done to maintain good relationships with
producers86. In this way, UIFP has the option of building up the trust of the
producers in the operation ofUIPF abroad. Coordination of the operation of
the subsidiaries is gained by the fact the CEO of UIFP MC and General
Manager of UIFP Iceland are the chairman of the boards as well as other
members of the UIFP board are in majority of the boards of subsidiaries.
Theoretically this introduces the possibility that UIFP MC can lack formal
authority over its subsidiaries. This is unlikely however, due to the fact that
members of the UIFP MC board are usually in the majority on the board of
its subsidiaries. It is, in a way, strange that the boards of the subsidiaries are
not executive boards of managers of UIFP MC and managers of each
subsidiary. This indicates the tendency of UIFP to maintain good
connections with producers and to involve them in the governance of UIFP
even though UIFP is not acting as their sale organisation any longer.
Although the mechanism of governing the UIFP network is built around the
central firm and centralisation personal, social contacts are an important part
of the mechanism87. Before the ownership changes managers of UIFP
claimed that a lot of their time went into making compromises between the
different views of producers, and a lot of their time went into visiting
producers as well as personal contacts. After the ownership changes UIFP
85 Interview with manager in UIFP, 1-24.
87 Interview with former manager ofUIFP, 1-32.
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has maintained the personal contacts and social connection. This can be
seen from the previously described domination of producers on the board of
UIFP and its subsidiaries, as well as the gathering for producers after annual
meetings, trips for producers and marketing meetings for producers. In
addition, UIFP does not have contracts with producers but the relationship is
based on trust and the will to be in each other's businesses. Despite all this,
it is clear that one of the main characteristics of the governance mechanism
of UIFP and the interaction between producers and UIFP is an inflexibility
to meet the different needs ofproducers.
VI.1.2.3.2Power
Formal authority was for a long time in the hands of producers. Until the
ownership changes, producers had the formal authority in the network and
producers dominated the board of UIFP. Equality between members,
together with the high number of members, made it difficult for a small
group of members to gain a dominant position. Through the centralisation
of activities and information from the markets it is unquestionable that UIFP
gained much informal power or authority in the process. This was primarily
authority over the day-to-day activities of sales. As an example of how
some producers viewed this authority, the following quotation is taken from
an interview with a manager of a production company that sold through
UIFP:
"Inside UIFP I felt like I was enchained. It was either to lay down and give
>>88
up or rise up and try to break the concatenations away. "
According to this producer and others it is clear that if producers had to
follow the UIFP sale strategy they did not have any other options. This also
reflects the lack of flexibility that has characterised the interface between
UIFP and producers. On the other a hand former manager ofUIFP pointed
out that, due to the separation of activities, producers often placed
unrealistic demands on UIFP, which were almost impossible to follow89.
Producers had the formal authority due to the ownership that is, UIFP was
their sale organisation. During that time producers had to agree on all major
88
Frjals Verslun interview with Saeunn Axels.
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investment, limiting the independence of UIFP and its authority to overtake
the governance and dominate the network. Hence the formal authority was
in the hand of producers but the informal authority was in the hands of
UIFP.
After the ownership changes, the situation has altered such that owners
other than producers have gained a majority share in UIFP. Hence,
shareholders have gained the formal authority of UFIP, which they have
then assigned to their representatives on the board (that still are, in the
majority, producers). The individual producers have no longer formal
authority to stop investment, and all equality has been abolished. UIFP
itself has also gained much more authority in the process, both in its
business with producers as well as in fulfilling its own strategy. It is clear
that UIFP has used this increased authority to change its operation in
accordance with the new demands on its operation from shareholders, but
this has been to return profit on its operation.
VI.1.2.3.3Strategy
Before the ownership changes in UIFP it is in many ways difficult to point
out a strategic leader in the network. From 1957 producers started to have
much more impact on the strategy, which held until 1990. From that time
the strategy of UIFP started to change rapidly and move more towards the
interest of the owners and the independent interest ofUIFP as an individual
company. The strategy from 1993 seems to be focused on the interests of
shareholders, and producers are best served by UIFP having more
independence and playing a bigger role in the international business of salt
fish instead of isolating itself with Icelandic producers. In that way UIFP
could use its knowledge, connections and its competitive strength to sell fish
from other nations, and in return bring that back in the form of profits that
could be returned to shareholders and thus benefit other producers through
higher prices and better service. Hence, it is clear from the ownership
changes in 1993 that the strategy ofUIFP has changed and the emphasis has
moved, from just bringing the producers the highest price, to making profit
that can be returned to shareholders.
89 Interview with former manager ofUIFP, 1-32.
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Before the ownership changes, UIFP was a rather conservative organisation.
This is in accordance with the products that it has been selling, which are
traditional foods in most of the markets countries. It is also in accordance
with the nature of the organisation, that is, to be a sale organisation for
producers, built on equality, where it is difficult for one or a few companies
to become strategic leaders. The strategy of UIFP for most of its time was
to serve members and sell their products. UIFP had however also led
certain changes in quality as well as in R&D. It is claimed, though, that
UIFP lacked strategic leadership during most of its operation time where the
main strategy is to serve its members and sell their products. An example of
this can been seen from the following quotation:
"It is difficult to say why UIFP did not build up stronger position on the
markets when they had the exclusive licences to sell on the markets. It
seems that they were too occupied to sell products rather than built on
strongposition on the markets. "90
It was not until 1990, when UIFP bought Nord Mure in France, that it could
be said that UIFP started to lead real changes in the network. This changed
after the ownership change when UIFP started to take on clear leadership in
its diversification of the network's operation. It has to be considered,
though, that UIFP lost around half of their export from Iceland to other
competitors. This of course led them to look elsewhere for increased
business, or as a manager ofUIFP stated:
"Now we export around 50% of the total value ofsaltedfish products from
Iceland. We are not looking for some certain percent of the total export
rather we are looking for good producers and return on our operation. We
have no intention to build up some Empire and some dominance approach
to producers. Some producers are such that we do not want to have them in
our business and fighting for higher percent would be much too
»9I
expensive.
The period 1993 - 1998 is characterised by a transformation of the company,
from a "sales organisation" for Icelandic producers to an "international
marketing and production company in chilled fish production"92. It is
90 Interview with manager inside UIFP, 1-24.
91 Interview with manager inside UIFP, 1-24.
92 Taken from UIFP strategy on www.sif.is.
181
interesting to observe how the strategy of UIFP is always changing more
and more into marketing and production of chilled fish products. Salted fish
is of course a chilled product, but it seems to be clear from documentation
from UIFP that the emphasis is always moving from mentioning salted fish
products to chilled product. Hence, this opens opportunities for UIFP's
operation to become much more diverse than it is now and indicates
strategic changes, where the emphasis will be on all sorts of chilled products
instead of salted fish.
It is difficult to judge the impact that strategy has had on the governance of
the network. Before the ownership changes the strategy ofUIFP was to be a
service unit, not to lead the network in strategic ways. After the ownership
change the strategy becomes clearer as well as the relationship with
producers. The strategy is to buy all products, which makes the governance
much simpler than before, but the governance of UIFP has opened up to
allow the possibility ofmeeting different strategies ofproducers.
VI. 1.2.3.4Socialmaturity and trust
One of the most interesting parts of the governance of the UIFP network is
that although the relationship has moved more into business-to-business
relationship, UIFP has put great emphasis on the supportive and social
aspect of the relationship. As an example of this, a manager inside UIFP
pointed out that after the ownership change the new general manager
planned to abolish the tradition of inviting producers to a big gathering after
the annual meeting in 1994. Members of the board could persuade him to
change his mind and hold the party93. In the same way, UIPF invited
producers to France when they reopened their secondary processing there.
This manager inside UIFP claims it is just part of building up a good
relationship with their suppliers. It is also clear that many of the producers
are, and have been, very loyal to UIFP and claim that they are "UIFP men".
Hence, there are many social links/ties, both between producers inside
UIFP, and between UIFP and producers. UIFP has increasingly used this,
and, as a manager ofUIFP claimed, this will even be increased in the future
by the change ofUIFP MC and UIFP Iceland.
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VI.1.3 Conclusion
Until 1993, the UIFP network operated as a formal joint venture that was
enforced on the participants through the monopoly that UIFP had on the
export of salted fish products from Iceland. The development after that has
been in the direction of informal alliances between UIFP and each producer.
This development into informal alliances that are not based on contracts, but
rather on trust and personal relationships between actors, is in accordance
with, and supports, what has been pointed out in the literature about
strategic alliances and network where the tendency is to have much more
informal relationship instead of strict contracts94. After the ownership
changes, UIFP tried to establish contracts with producers but soon gave up
due to the complexity and difficulties in maintaining them. This supports
Grandori, where she claims that the establishment of formal contracts is too
expensive and complicated95.
Abolishing the monopoly that UIFP had on the export of salted fish
products in 1993 brought new factors into the network. First of all it
brought competition into the network. Until then, competition was almost
unknown. According to most of the interlocutors inside UIFP, they put
much emphasis on competition and on the fact that they are now operating
in a free market. According to the analysis of the relationship that UIFP has
with its producers, it is clear that UIFP is operating strategic alliances with
its "A" producers, and is a free market with "B" and "C" suppliers. This
supports the use of the two dimensional scale put forward by Ouchi, where
the relationship UIFP has with its producers is on the marketing side of the
scale the "A" producers in the strategic network on a Win-Win strategy: and
the "B" producers on the Classic Market, where the relationship is based on
ad hoc relationships96. Before the ownership changes, UIFP was operating
much more in the clan section on Ouchi's scale, where the relationship is
built on hierarchy methods but the strategy was a win-win strategy for all
93 Interview with manager ofUIFP, 1-24.
94 See for example Devanna, A. A. & Thichy, N.; Grandori, A.; Lorange, P & Roos, J.; Killing, P. J.
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Grandori, A.
96 Jarillo, C. J.
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participants. Hence UIFP now is operating in a free market both in its
export and in buying products, but it is obvious that with their key suppliers
(the "A" suppliers) they build their relationship on cooperation or strategic
alliances. This conclusion supports Axelsson when he claims that the
environment should not be viewed as totally faceless and completely
competitive: rather, it should be viewed as a mixture of cooperative and
competitive environment97. It is clear from interviews with managers of
UIFP and producers that they recognise this although, in public, they put
most of the emphasis on competing in a completely competitive
environment.
It is clear that the competition has brought around changes in a rather
conservative or even stagnated network, as UIFP was before the ownership
change. Now actors can evaluate their options with other methods of selling
and have the option of leaving the network, which was unknown before
1993. The other factor that the ownership changes brought into the network
was stakeholders in the form of shareholders who were not producers. This
caused concern to many producers that this would change the operation of
UIFP in such a way that it would not benefit them any more. Conflict
between these two types of stakeholders, that is shareholders and producers,
have not been very visible, but clearly UIFP has sharpened up its strategy
and aims (that is, to return profit for its shareholders). In favourable
marketing conditions for UIFP, as they have been, this is not a problem, but
in a more difficult situation there is the danger that the short term view of
shareholders will not be parallel with producers' aims.
An interesting part of the diversification of UIFP is its strategy to take care
of almost all of its sea transportation by buying the cargo ship that had
previously taken care of its transports. In this matter UIFP seems to be
moving in an opposite direction to many of today's companies, which is to
concentrate on the core business and let other companies take care of
peripheral businesses98. By this UIFP controls the main transportation of its
97 Axelsson, B.
98 See for example Hamel, G. & Prahalad, C. K., 1994.
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products that, as claimed, can make them more efficient and economical".
This also indicates the strategy of UIFP to control as much of the value
creation and cost in their network as possible. This started to change in
1990 when UIFP bought the secondary processing plant in France then
starting to add value by secondary processing to the products, which they
had previously just sold. After 1994, when UIFP started to buy all the
products itself and increase its diversification into primary processing and
secondary processing, the focus moved completely to their own value
creation. Hence, the strategy of UIFP has changed in the way they control
their own supply chain where they are involved in almost all the steps of the
chain. In a way this contrasts with the trend in the supply chain
management where the emphasis has been on building competitive supply
chains through cooperation as described earlier in chapter IV describing
market developments and in chapter V, Literature review 10°.
These changes to the UIFP value chain mean that UIFP's competitive stance
against producers and other exporters is built on its ability to create value in
a more effective way than other competitors and then return higher prices
and better service than its competitors. Hence, they create value for the
producers through their own constellation. From the producers' point of
view this is fine as long as they are not motivated to go into further value
creation themselves or to go closer to the consumers in the markets. Then
the system for value creation inside UIFP would not be the right channel for
those producers.
The governance of the UIFP network has for all its operation time, been
based on centralisation. The reason for this can be traced to the
homogenous products UIFP was selling and the high number of producers
inside the network. Therefore the central firm in the network has played a
major role in the process. This role has mainly been to coordinate the
activities through the markets and through production. The role of the
central firm has also been in leading changes in the network such as
99 Saltarinn 1. tbl., 4. arg., 1997. Interview with Jon Runar Halldorsson sailing manager
100 Cook, R.; Fearne, A. & Dedman, S.; Wysocki, F. A.
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improving quality, processing methods and packing. Later the role was also
to act as a pressure force for producers in interest matters.
The governance mechanism of UIFP before the ownership changes was
inflexible and conservative. It can be argued that it needed to be
conservative with so high a number of small producers, many of which
would have difficulties keeping up with fast changes. This, however, raises
the question of why the mechanism and the environment ofUIFP had to be
so conservative and even stagnated? One explanation of this may be that
UIFP had no formal authority over its members except through its
monopoly and access to the markets. Despite this it is clear that UIFP built
up much more power in the process by controlling resources such as the
day-to-day marketing activities. These day-to-day activities included the
control over the brand names and the marketing know-how. This supports
Pfeffer's conclusion when he claims that power in a network often arises
from centralised control or coordination over other participants in the
network101. This suggest that the informal power that is gained by this is
much more active than the formal power that is based on companies'
constitutions and is really only exercised at the annual meetings. This also
suggests that there has been a power struggle in the network, where the
UIFP, as a central firm, has built up its position in the network through
coordination and control to overcome the lack of formal authority. This
power struggle and lack of authority, which meant that UIFP had to get
producers' approval for all major changes, could have led to stagnation in
the network, whereas compromises between the producers would not be a
very quick way to respond to changes. This can be interpreted as a lack of
clear ownership in the network, where the equality and high number of
owners before the ownership change has caused it to lack vision and
strategy. After the ownership change the strategy and ownership structure
of the network is much clearer than before.
There was very limited indication of existence of an informal governance
mechanism that was boycotting the formal centralised mechanism. This can




Producers have showed limited interest in further value creation that
demands more direct contacts to the markets and customers there. From the
analysis it is clear that, although the formal mechanism is built on
centralisation and standardisation, the personal contact and trust are still
major factors in the relationship between UIFP and producers. This is
especially interesting to see after the ownership changes, when many said
that the "old" time of social relationship had been abolished. It is clear that,
although the relationship between UIFP and producers is more based on a
business-to-business relationship than it was before the ownership changes,
UIFP has put greater emphasis on their social relationship with the
producers, and that they are "UIFP men": that is, almost a part of a family.
It could be claimed that this is to develop or maintain a good relationship
with the suppliers (the producers) and, in accordance with the previously
described view of cooperation in the supply chain, to make it more
competitive. Hence UIFP is consciously working on building up UIFP
culture (that is understanding and trust between the two sectors) in order to
improve the relationship. This supports the literature on strategic alliances
and networks, where, as Nam102 and Doz103 point out the danger of different
national cultures can jeopardise the alliances. In UIFP it is not national
culture but differences in the cultures of companies that are operating in the
international market and the often-local small companies in Iceland.
The lesson that can be learned from the UIFP case is that, for a network like
UFIP, which stretches over many levels in the value chain, it is important
that the central firm has the defined role and necessary authority to lead
changes in the network environment so it can fulfil the owners' needs.
Otherwise it is likely that this will lead to a power struggle between actors
in the network that can cause the network to become stagnated, as in the
UIFP case. The history of the UIFP network also suggests that clear







VI.2 Icelandic Freezing Plant Corporation
SblumidstoS Hradfrystihusanna, the Icelandic Freezing Plant Corporation
(abbreviated IFPC), was established in February 1942 after the companies in
the freezing industry, that were privately owned, decided to leave the
Fiskimalanefhd (the government owned institution) that took care of then-
sale activities. Behind the establishment of the IFPC were 15 companies,
and more joined in the next weeks so the total number was around 22
companies.
Vl.2.1 History and development
VI.2.1.1 1942 - 1962 Establishment and Entrepreneurship
The ownership form of IFPC in the beginning was a Co-operative among
the producers. This is, in many ways, strange, considering that the
producers' companies were all privately owned and that most of them were
in limited liability form. A rather strict law from 1934 can explain this to
some extent: Fiskimalanefhd was allowed to can grant producers' licences to
take care of their sales if they established an organisation that fulfilled
certain requirements concerning ownership. Another explanation is the
taxation law in Iceland at this time. It was difficult to build up funds inside
the companies without having to pay taxes on them. Hence, the producers
argued that they had already paid taxes on the turnover of the fish in the
processing, and having to pay taxes of their selling would be double
payment of taxes. To avoid this, and to fulfil the previously- mentioned
legal requirements, the aim of the company was to sell members' products
in commission sale and to be a non-profits company in the sense that profits
would be paid back to its owners. To bring light on the objective of IFPC it
is necessary to look at the first law of the company from 1942, some
highlights ofwhich are104:
• The objects of the company is to sell marine products produced in
members' companies, on foreign markets to take care of necessary
purchases for the members' companies, to look for new markets and
104
Hannibalsson, O. & Einarsson, H.
188
to experiment with new products and production methods in the
companies.
• Members can only be those who operate freezing plants and they
have to obey the law of the organisation and its legal agreements.
• Members have to hand over all their products to the organisation to
sell and they are not allowed to sell themselves or have others to sell
the product of their freezing plants. Failure to fulfil this requirement
can lead to a penalty.
• The organisation is allowed to have control over the production of its
members to guarantee the quality of the products.
• To cover the operational costs, the organisation takes 1% of FOB
price of sold products from its members. In addition, the
organisation is allowed to add a levy on the price of accession that it
sells to its members' companies.
• Profits of the organisation will be split between its members in
proportion to the percentage of export value of each member's
companies.
• Each freezing plant has one vote at meetings of the organisation.
From the first law it is obvious that great emphasis is placed on the equality
of members, as indicated by the paragraph that each member had one vote.
Other interesting characteristics of IFPC are the Co-operative ownership and
the fact that the company is supposed to be a non-profit organisation. This
indicates that IFPC was in the beginning just meant to be a commission-
based sales organisation for the producers and not be involved in any other
operation.
IFPC opened its first sale office abroad in the US in 1945. In 1947, it then
changed the form of the sales office into a subsidiary, Coldwater Seafood
Corp., that was a US company fully owned by IFPC. In 1954, Coldwater
established a secondary processing plant in Maryland US to produce coated
fish sticks made from raw material from Iceland. This was the first
secondary processing plant owned by IFPC. With the establishment of the
subsidiary in the US, IFPC set the strategy that it has followed, in the most
part, since. The main aims of this strategy were to get as close to the
customers as possible by establishing subsidiaries in local markets, and to
use its own brand name to build up customers' loyalties to the brand. It is
clear though that changes in the retail sector over the last two decades, with
the increased importance of supermarkets and their own brand names has
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impacted on this strategy of IFPC. Hence, an increased quantity of IFPC
production now goes into supermarket brand names.
Other highlights in the history of IFPC during this period include:
1946 Sales office in Amsterdam opened. This was closed in 1949
1948 Sales office in Prague opened. This was operated until 1953 when it
moved to Hamburg.
1953 Sales office opened in Hamburg and closed again in 1956 when the
operation moved to Prague until it was closed in 1960.
1955 Snax Ross Ltd., a Fish and Chips company in the UK, was bought
and started its operation in 1956. In addition, in 1956 IFPC
established secondary processing plants in the UK under the name
Frozen (Fresh) Fillets Ltd., which started operation in 1958 but was
closed down in 1962.
The governance of IFPC until 1962 is more or less in the hands of the board,
where the chairman and vice-chairman acted more or less as the chief
executive for the company. In addition, the board was involved in
operational decisions by normally having meetings at least once a week. In
1954, IFPC operations were split into two sectors: operation of the company
in Iceland, and the sale and market sector. Each sector then had a manager
who was responsible for its operation and was directly under the board and
its chairman.
Around 1960, the freezing industry faced increased operational difficulties
at home, and, in addition, payments from the main market in the US were
delayed due to the time consuming sales process and increased stocks in the
US. In addition to this delay, it became obvious that Coldwater paid 10%
less for the products than the main competitor from Iceland, the Co-op
Federation. This was due to difficulties in the operation of the secondary
processing plant, causing them to pay the producers in Iceland a lower price.
Hence, producers were in fact paying for the loss of the secondary
processing plant by lower prices105. All this, together with an increased
dissatisfaction with the governance and effectiveness of the operation of
IFPC, led to changes in governance and the management team of IFPC
around the annual meeting in 1962.
105
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Operation of IFPC during this period had increased and changed
dramatically, and it was clear that IFPC was much more than a commission
sale organisation without assets. During this time, IFPC owned warehouses,
office buildings, and a secondary processing plant. Hence, it was necessary
for IFPC to have an independent financial status separated from its owner,
to present to banks and other companies and institutions. As an example of
how IFPC operated during this time, IFPC bought Snax Ross Ltd. UK in
1955 and the U.S. subsidiary of IFPC, Coldwater, had to pay the price
because IFPC itself did not have any assets or profit10 .
All this created pressure for changes in both the structure and governance of
IFPC, as well as in the financial funding of IFPC. The aim of these changes
was to increase the decentralisation and flexibility of the organisational
structure to ensure the operation was more effective. The main changes
• The operation was split into three sectors'; each with its own
manager; sale and markets, production and a financial sector. The
three managers, as well as the chairman and vice chairman of the
existing board, formed the executive board of the company that also
included the operation of subsidiaries abroad. The chairman of the
board worked in IFPC.
• The country (Iceland) was split into seven production areas, each of
which had one full member of the board and one alternate member,
and the board would meet at least once per month instead of once a
week. Each area got one member and then the chairman and vice
chairman of the board would be voted separately, so the board would
have nine members.
• A special equity fund was established to ensure that IFPC would
have a stronger financial status and not be as dependent on its
owners as before.
In the history of IFPC it is claimed that, as an organisation, it had probably
never been as close to collapse as during the period of 1960 - 1963, and if
the changes that were made then had been un-successful the future of IFPC
would have been uncertain108. The changes of IFPC in 1962 were for most
106 Hannibalsson, 6. & Einarsson, H.
107 Hannibalsson, O. & Einarsson, H.
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part unchanged until 1985109, whit the exception that the financial manager
was made a general manager or chiefexecutive in 1969.
VI.2.1.2 1963 -1982 Growth and expansion
After the changes in 1962, IFPC was granted much more independence
from the producers than it had before. This made IFPC much better
qualified to cope faster and better with the changes in the business
environment and expansion its own. Professional managers were now the
ruling actors in managing IFPC instead of the board interfering with daily
matters. There were three general managers of IFPC, all working on the
same level. In order to bring the board and the managers of IFPC closer, a
managers committee was established. Its role was to take care of operations
between the board meetings (that were now held around once per month,
instead of at least once per week). The managers committee comprised the
three managers of IFPC and the chairman and vice chairman of the IFPC
board110. It was not until 1969 that one manger was promoted to become
president of IFPC instead of three managers. Then Eyjolfur Isfeld, who had
been the financial manager of IFPC, was promoted as president. Other
managers held on to their jobs, so the changes only resulted in having one
manager or president responsible over the whole operation1 u.
One of the main aims of IFPC during the first part of this period was to
build up the infrastructure of the company to cope with the increased
independence from its owners. One aspect of this was to build up services
for the members' companies. More emphasis was put on the service of the
technical department that also took care of the implementation of new work
methods and cost analysis. The technical department also took care of the
implementation of a new salary system in the fish industry based on a bonus
system. This meant great emphasis on work analysis, time measurements
and work descriptions. Quality control was also a big part of the IFPC's
operation during this time. There was also an, expansion in other services
109 Hannibalsson, O. & Einarsson, H..
110
Hannibalsson, O. & Einarsson, H.
111
Hannibalsson, O. & Einarsson, H.
192
that IFPC provided for its members, leading to an increase in IFPC's
operations. It is clear that IFPC was now much more than a marketing
company, as it was meant to be, and it can be claimed that it served its
members with almost all of their needs, including supplies for their
production, consultancy for their business, and selling their products.
The strategy of IFPC and its owners during this time was clearly that all
matters that would benefit the members companies would be done inside
IFPC or other companies connected to IFPC. These companies included:
Joklar hfi, which was a sea transportation company; UmbuSamiQstodin hfi,
which produces boxes for fish fillets as well as other boxes that were used
by the members of IFPC; and TryggingarmidstoSin hfi, an insurance
company that took care of insurance for the members of IFPC.
UmbiicSarniSstodin and Joklar were in joint ownership by IFPC and their
members' companies but TryggingarmiSstoSin was in a majority ownership
by the members' companies of IFPC.
Another aspect of IFPC's operation during this period is the role of IFPC as
an acting interest group for its members. This role focused mainly on taking
care of its members' interests against the government in a highly regulated
environment112. Due to difficulties in the operation of the fish industry in
1966-68 and again in 1972-76, this role took a lot of the IFPC's managers,
attention, as well as of managers of the PPCs. IFPC also played a big role
in the pricing of the raw material that was decided by a price committee
with an equal number of representatives from the fish industry and fishing
sector. The government nominated a referee to judge the price so in practice
the government more or less decided the price of raw material.
There were two main markets that IFPC was working on during this period.
The main market was in the US, where IFPC sold its products through its
subsidiary, Coldwater US. The second most important market was in
Eastern Europe, mainly in the former Soviet Union. For a decade, these two
markets took over 90% of the total production of IFPC members (see figure
VI. 1)113. The US market reached its peak around 1979 but after that the
112 See the discussion in chapter II.3.
113 Hannibalsson, O. & Einarsson, H.
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importance of the two main markets in Eastern Europe and the US declined
and other markets such as Western Europe and Japan increased. Due to
booking "6" in the agreement between EFTA and European Union,
abbreviated EU (which became active in 1976) that lowered the import toll
on fish product to EU countries from EFTA countries, the Western
European market started to increase for IFPC. In the 1970s, IFPC sold
around 75% of the total frozen fish exported from Iceland, and this portion
reached its peak in 1976 when it was 77.4%'14.
It is interesting to see how much emphasis was put on these two markets.
Hence, the risk was very badly distributed. Partly this can be traced to high
tariffs on fish products into the EU, as well as the extensions of the
economic zone around Iceland. The extension of the economic zone around
Iceland caused a dispute between Iceland and the EU. Hence, EU delayed
the activation of booking "6" until the dispute had been resolved, and other
import barriers were also put on fish from Iceland115. On the other hand, the
strong position of Coldwater US during this period can explain why less
emphasis was put on new markets. It is clear from the history of IFPC that
Coldwater very much had independence from the other operations of IFPC
and was in many cases the leading force of other developments. As one of
managers of IFPC said,
"it can be said that Coldwater US was a state inside the state"116.
A similar was expressed by other interlocutors. An example of the strong
position of Coldwater US is when IFPC wanted to change the name of its
subsidiaries in the UK to Coldwater UK in 1980. borsteinn Gislason,
manager of Coldwater US, refused this and claimed that Coldwater US
owned the name "Coldwater". As a result, the name was not changed to
Coldwater UK until 1996117.
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Highlights of the operation of IFPC and its subsidiaries during this time
included:
1962 Decision taken to stop operation of secondary plant in UK
1963 Coldwater US stopped commission sale of fish from IFPC members.
Instead, Coldwater bought all the fish they sold for their own
account.
1964 UmbuSamidstodin (packing company) established.
1965 Licence granted to build new secondary processing plant in
Cambridge US.
1969 Coldwater established Royal Guard to operate fish and chips shops
in US. The reasons were twofold. First to sell Icelandic fish and
secondly to learn how to run shops like this to become better sellers.
This operation was stopped in 1973-74 and the reason given was that
it was negative to be in too much competition with their main
buyers.
1969 Operation of Snax Ross reached its peak of operation with around
thirty fish and chips shops. In 1983, the last fish and chip shop was
sold.
1970 Coldwater US made an agreement with producers in Faroe Islands to
sell their product in US. The Faroe Islands producers got the same
terms as members of IFPC.
1972 Coldwater made sales agreement with Findus in Denmark to sell
their products
1977 IFPC bought 39,9% share in Joklar hfi, which had previously been in
ownership of the members' companies of IFPC. Later, in 1980,
IFPC increased its share in Joklar hfi, to over 90%.
1978 New secondary processing plant started its operation in Boston US
Due to the growth of IFPC and increased emphasis on secondary processing
in the US by Coldwater US, a conflict of interest became obvious. This was
reflected in an annual meeting of IFPC in 1970 when borsteinn Gislason,
general manager of Coldwater, claimed that when "block" (a product that is
mainly used for secondary processing) was produced as some kind of by¬
product of other fillet packing it would damage the quality of the
production. He claimed also that elsewhere block was only produced from
whole fillets rather than from just some parts of the fillets that were not used
in other packing.118 It is obvious here that borsteinn was talking for the
118 Annual meeting of IFPC 1970, Hjaltason, J., Einarsson, H. & Hannibalsson, 6.
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interest of Coldwater as a secondary producer but not as a sales
representative aiming at paying the highest price to producers and increasing
the value of their production.
Constellation characterizes the operation of IFPC during this period,
meaning that either IFPC or its owner took care of most of the needs of
members' companies. Due to this constellation and centralisation of both
knowledge and physical flow of supply and products through IFPC and its
subsidiaries, it is clear that IFPC had every opportunity to gain much more
power in this alliance than its members. An interesting example of the
strategy during this time was a decision taken at an annual meeting of IFPC
in 1968, when it was agreed that members' companies of IFPC were not
allowed to buy boxes from companies other than UmbuQamiQstoQinni hf (a
company owned by IFP and its members)119.
Equalization is the main concept in this period and one member had one
vote on annual meetings, so, in theory no member's company could be in
the position to have too much power. It is clear though that managers of the
larger companies inside IFPC were in a leading position, mainly through the
participation in the board of IFPC and its subsidiaries. Membership in the
board meant that the managers were much closer to information and had
easier access to both the staffof IFPC and information from the market.
VI.2.1.3 1980 - 1985 Strategy- and Generation Changes
The turning point for IFPC's operation was around 1980 when the market in
the US declined and increased emphasis was put on markets in Western
Europe by the establishment of marketing subsidiaries in Germany and
plans for building secondary processing plant in the UK. Other markets
grew stronger during this time such as Japan. It is clear that IFPC was
changing its strategy during this time by starting to expand to other markets
much more systematically than it had done before (see figure VI. 1).
Changes in this strategy can partly be traced to the result of the so called
119 Hannibalsson, O. & Einarsson, H.
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"European committee" that worked inside IFPC in 1979, as well as the
increased problems in the US market120.
□ C oldwater USA □ C oldwater UK □ W -European 0 s oviet
□ IF P G-H am b urg M IFS A-Paris □ Asia /IFPC-Tokyo ■ Other
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Figure VI.5 Total sale of SH split after market areas 1943-1997
Implementation of this new strategy started in 1980 when the board of IFPC
agreed to start the preparation for building a secondary processing plant in
Grimsby (UK) and changed the name from Snax Ross to Icelandic Freezing
Plant Ltd. Production started at the plant in 1983. In 1981, IFPC
established a marketing subsidiary in Hamburg (Germany). Other changes
during this time included for example, when IFPC, in the autumn 1984, was
allowed by its members to export and sell products from non-members.
This is mainly due to pressure from owners of processing trawlers that were
in many ways outside the PMCs and therefore did not have easy access to
the markets. This is in many cases an interesting turning point in the history
of IFPC. The fact that IFPC had started to sell for non-members indicate
that IFPC was moving from being just for members towards becoming a
more general sales and marketing company for fish products. Despite this
turning point for IFPC it has to be remembered that Coldwater US had
earlier, in 1970, made an agreement to take on the marketing of fish
products from the Faroe Islands and, in 1972, for Findus in Denmark.
120 Based on interview with former board members of IFPC.
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At the annual meeting of IFPC in 1984, Jon Ingvarsson became the
chairman of the board of IFPC. This was the starting point of a new
generation of managers and board members of IFPC. The first and second
generations had mostly left the industry and the third generation overtook
operation of both PPCs as well as the PMCs121. These changes continued in
1986, when Eyjolfur Isfeld Eyjolfsson resigned as general manager of IFPC
and Fridrik Palson was hired. FriSrik had previously been general manager
of UIFP. In addition to this, new managers of finance and markets were
hired to the IFPC122.
Highlights of the operation of IFPC and its subsidiaries during this period
included:
1980 Snax Ross was renamed the Icelandic Freezing Plant Ltd., and
preparation for building a secondary processing plant started
1981 IFPC established marketing subsidiaries in Hamburg (Germany).
1983 Production started in secondary processing plant in Grimsby (UK)
1984 In autumn 1984 IFPC was allowed to sell product from producers
in Iceland that were non-members in the organisation.
1984 New general managers hired to Coldwater UK after borsteinn
Gislason resigned.
1988-86 Changes of president of IFPC, Eyjolfur Isfeld resigns and FriSrik
Palsson hired.
The period of 1980 to 1985 was characterised by increased emphasis on
globalisation by expanding the market operation to new markets as well as
the decision to build a secondary processing plant in UK. This expansion of
IFPC was both forward and backward in the value chain: Forward to new
markets and backwards to get more producers (that is, non-members) to sell
their products through IFPC.
It is obvious from the change of managers in Coldwater US and IFPC, and
changes of the chairman of the board of IFPC, that there were some
conflicts in the operation of IFPC during this time. After 1980, IFPC started
to expand to new markets and in many ways implemented a new strategy.
Hence, it is a question when relatively young men took over as chairman
121 Hannibalsson. O. & Einarsson. H.
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and vice chairman of the board of IFPC in 1984 whether they have been
pushing for getting younger men in as managers to implement the new
strategy. At least it is clear, although unofficial, that the change ofmanager
of IFPC and Coldwater was not as straightforward as it was meant to be123.
It is likely that both borsteinn and Eyjolfur were regarded to be too much
solo players for the new board and the new generation of managers that
were taking over in the PPCs and in the board of IFPC.
Very little changed concerning the relationship with the members during
this time. Rather, it can be said that the ground for a new strategy was laid
and the first steps taken to stop acting like an interest group. Service to the
members kept on increasing with increased emphasis on technical and work
methods development. In the law of IFPC act 7, the role of IFPC is made
very clear:
"The board is responsible to take care of sale ofmember's products and
should in all matters of the sale make sure that the interest of members is
taken care of IFPC has the duties to pay all its members same price for the
same production, equal of quality, which is exported and paid on period
that members meeting or the board decide on 124 "
In the same act, members are obliged to let IFPC take care of all their sale of
frozen seafood. This act states clearly that IFPC is there to take care of its
members' interests in the sale of their export.
VI.2.1.4 1986 -1997 Globalisation and Structural Changes
As a result of the changes in the board and management team of IFPC,
discussion started in 1986 of how IFPC could change their operation in
accordance with the changes of the business environment during this time.
These changes in the business environment included, for example, increased
freedom in the economy, a foreseeable abolition of the duopoly of IFPC and
SIS/IS (Federation of Icelandic Co-operatives/Icelandic Seafood) on the sale
of fish products to the US, and declining fish stock in the Icelandic sea.
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Fridrik Palsson, president of IFPC, continued this discussion at the annual
meeting in 1987 when he talked about
"that IFPC should be sale organisation but the question was whether IFPC
should be acting as an interest group for its members especially in the light
ofunclear boundaries betweenfishing andproducing"125.
Fridrik was referring to the fact that IFPC dominated one member in
committee that decided the price of raw material for processing. In many
cases the owners of the fishing vessels and the processing plant where the
same. Hence, IFPC were representing processors against the owners of
fishing vessels which were often the same company, causing conflict and
confusion concerning on which side of the table members of IFPC were
sitting. As a response to this discussion about the role of IFPC it was
decided that IFPC would participate in the establishment of Samtok
Atvinnurekanda 1 Sjavarutvegi, (Organisation of employers in the fish
industry), abbreviated SAS, in the autumn 1987. The aim of SAS was to
take over part of the operation of PMCs that included interest matters. By
doing that IFPC more or less quit acting as an interest group for its
members. Hence, the main aim now was to operate as a sales organisation
for its members126.
In November 1987, the Ministry of Trade gave six new exporters licences
for exporting fish products to the US. This meant that the duopoly that
IFPC and IS had on export to the US was abolished for good. IFPC reacted
to this changes by claiming that due to limited competition between sales
companies from Iceland they were the leading sales company on the US
market. Because of this they were leading in price formation on the US
markets and could get higher price than other competitors. Hence, they
could return higher prices to the Icelandic producers127. The abolition of the
duopoly was just one of the milestones towards increasing competition and
freedom in the market.
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It is interesting to see the efforts of Fridrik Palsson, president of IFPC, to
maintain the restrictions on competition in the marketing of fish from
Iceland. At the annual meeting in 1990 he claimed that the old saying
"together we stand but divided we fair was still valid in the export of fish
products from Iceland. He also claimed it was clear that the primary
marketing companies were the only hope for the private enterprises in the
fish industry. The primary processing companies were too small to be able
to implement "go it alone" strategies in marketing of their products. If they
would do that they would need to depend on foreign companies, which both
now and in the future would be in a dominant position against the small
Icelandic producers. Hence, it was only through companies' network or big
companies that producers could maintain their independence against these
foreign buyers128.
At an annual meeting in 1988, major changes in the philosophy behind the
organisation were agreed on. The main change was to abolish the one-
member/one vote system. In the new system, 20% of the votes were
distributed equally, 40% of the total votes were distributed in accordance to
the value of export of each company through IFPC and the last 40% of the
total votes were distributed to each company in accordance to its ownership
in the equity fund of IFPC129. Despite this, each company had a veto on
agreement that was bound in the memorandum of association agreement, so
theoretically, one company could block changes. This happened in 1990
when a change of this veto system was planned. These proposed changes
meant that instead of requiring the agreement of all members for changes in
the law that were bound in the memorandum of association agreement,
agreement of 2/3 of the members was enough. One member did not agree to
these changes and blocked them. Hence, this veto was kept unchanged until
• • • • 1TO
IFPC was changed into a limited liability company in 1997 .
The constellation strategy of IFPC, which was to participate in all matters
that were beneficial for its members inside IFPC, started to change after
128 Fridriks Palsonar speech on the annual meeting IFPC 1990
129
Hjaltason, J., Einarsson, H. & Hannibalsson, O.
130
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1990. The first step in that direction was the reduction and final abolition of
the technical department over the years 1993 and 1994131. Changes of this
strategy became more obvious in 1996 and 1997 when IFPC sold its share in
Plastprent hf., and UmbuSamiQstoSinni hf. At the same time IFPC quit the
sea transportation operation of Joklar, which was terminated and changed
into a holding company to take care of its investment in other companies.
This clearly demonstrates the leading strategy during this time that is "Jo
well what we do best and let other take care of the rest"m. This was a
practical indication that IFPC was focusing on the international marketing
the fish products. This is in accordance with trends in business operation
during this time, to stick to the core business and let others do what is their
core business133.
In the period before 1995, IFPC had limited its vertical integration into
production to foreign companies. In 1995, Icelandic Seafood h.f.
(abbreviated IS), the main competitor of IFPC, bought around 30% share in
one of the biggest producers, VinnslustoSin hf., a member in IFPC. This
meant that the marketing of its products would move from IFPC to IS. A
similar situation arose concerning the biggest producers of IFPC,
UtgerSafelag Akureyrar hf. (abbreviate UA). During this time, UA was in
the majority owned by the town council of Akureyri. IS offered to move its
headquarters to Akureyri if UA moved in its business. This ended in
competition between these two companies about the business of UA. The
result was that IFPC kept UAs, business, but moved 1/3 of their
headquarters to Akureyri.
IFPC had the strategy of not being vertically integrated into its members. In
many ways, this competition reflected one of the main criticisms/weakness
of IFPC and its form during this time: that is, it was too slow to react to such
a situation. It also demonstrates that IFPC's ownership form and
relationship with its members limited in many ways is ability to react
131 Hannibalsson, O. & Einarsson, H.
132
Hannibalsson, O. & Einarsson, H.
133 See for example Hamel, G. & Prahalad, C. K., 1994.
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quickly to changes134. On the other hand, IS is a Limited Liability Company
and was considered to be quicker to respond to changes. These differences
were considered by many to be due to the difference of ownership form and
strategy of the two companies.
In 1990, increased emphasis was put on the discussion about the ownership
form of IFPC and whether it was necessary to change it into a limited
liability form. In that year a future committee was established with the
mission to make suggestions about the future role and ownership form of
IFPC. This future committee concluded that IFPC should not change it
ownership form into a limited liability form135. Despite this, it was clear
that from around 1990 the pressure on IFPC to change its ownership form
would increase. This was due to factors such as:
• General changes of the business environment towards more freedom.
• Changes in the fishery management system meaning less quota
leading to less supply from members in Iceland into the sale network
and therefore increased pressure for fish products from other
countries and companies.
• Changes in the production sector where companies (often family
companies) were increasingly going on the open stock market.
• Producers were merging and getting bigger.
• Due to often-low profitability in the production sector, members'
companies left IFPC to free some of their share in IFPC. Hence,
IFPC had to pay their share out, according to the IFPC agreement in
10 years time. Members claimed that they did not get the market
price for their share in IFPC.
• Competitors like IS were in a limited Lability form. This gave them
better access to increased capital as well as a quicker response times
to changes.
• UIFP went through the ownership changes in 1993/94. Many of
IFPC's members were also members in UIFP.
Members of IFPC agreed to change its ownership form into a closed limited
company as of January 1, 1997. The final push for this change was
probably the competition between IFPC and IS for the producers. To get a
better view of the development of members of IFPC during this period, the




Year Ownership of 10 biggest
members of 1FPC (%)
Ownership of 20 biggest




1986 47.27 70.47 80
1990 56.94 81.45 57
1996 75.91 97.14
—: ■■ — .. •.
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Table VI.4 Development ofmembers and ownership in IFPC136
From this table, it is clear that the number of members declined by more
than half from 1986 to 1996. This happened at the same time that the total
sale of IFPC doubled. This indicates that increased quantity comes from
producers that are not members of IFPC, as can been seen from the fact that
in 1997 IFPC had in its business 123 producers137. In addition, the
ownership of the biggest companies of IFPC increased greatly, indicating
that the bigger companies were getting even bigger. If this development
continued, it seemed clear that IFPC would end up in ownership of a few
big companies.
Highlights of IFPC's operation during this time include:
1987 The virtual duopoly that IFPC and SIS had on export to the US
was abolished
1989 IFPC established marketing subsidiary in France: Icelandic
Freezing Plants Eur. Ltd. in Paris.
1989 IFPC established a sales office in Japan, which in 1997 was
changed into IFP Ltd. Japan, a marketing subsidiary owned by
IFPC.
1993 The board of IFPC agreed to participate in the operation of a
company in India to fish and produce tuna in cooperation with a
domestic company.
1994 IFPC bought Saemark hf., which was a fish exporting company
that specialised in the export of fresh fish from Iceland. IFPC
used this company to sell and buy fish from non-members of
IFPC.
1994 IFPC bought 50% of Superior Salmon Express in Belgium. This
company specializes in the marketing of fresh fish.
1994 IFPC bought all the shares in Icecon hf., whose main business
was the export of knowledge about fishing and fish production.
After IFPC's buy-out the main aim of its operation was to get new
135
Hannibalsson, O. & Einarsson, H.
136 Built on IFPC Annual reports, 1986, 1990 and 1996.
137
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business connections and products for IFPC and its subsidiaries to
sell.
1995 IFPC moved 1/3 of its headquarters operation to Akureyri after
war with its main competitor IS about the marketing products for
UA Akureyri.
1994 IFPC bought a 50% share in Faroe Seafood Ltd., which operated a
secondary processing plant in Grimsby. In 1996 Faroe Seafood
Ltd., and Icelandic Freezing Ltd., UK merged to become
Coldwater Ltd., UK where IFPC owned 75% share against, 25%
share ownership of the previous owner ofFaroe Seafood Ltd.138.
1996 IFPC established a marketing subsidiary in Spain, Icelandic Iberia
S.A.
1996 Changes of IFPC ownership form from Co-operative to Limited
liability.
The relationship between IFPC and its members during this time changed
apparently more than during other periods. First came the abolishment of
the total equality of each company, indicating that the companies with more
export should have more to say than the smaller ones. Another change was
the abolition of the constellation: that is, being a member of IFPC meant
that you were part of a family, which provided you with all your needs.
Members' companies moved their business increasingly to companies that
were outside the family, for example insurers. This reflected the general
trend in the business environment in Iceland during this time to look for the
lowest price through bidding out their business.
Another indication of changes in this relationship came from the chairman
of IFPC in an interview in 1991, where he declared that Coldwater US
bought only 35% of its fish for its secondary processing plant from Iceland.
He carried on by saying
"...it was always clear that the secondary processing plant had to have
independence from the producers in Iceland and be free to buyfish from the
most convenient suppliers each time ",39.
In the same way Agnar Fridriksson the general manager of Coldwater
Seafood UK, said
138 Built on IFPC Annual report 1996.
139
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205
"...that the only duties they had was to make profit and sell the product
from IFPC members on as high price as possible
He declared further that they had no commitment to buy fish from IFPC's
members (Icelandic producers) for the secondary processing plant. In 1996,
around 25% of the fish they used came from Iceland140. It is clear from
these statements that the strategy of IFPC was to operate secondary
processing plants, which were independent from the sale of members'
products and with profit. On the other hand, the operation of the sale of
members' products was supposed to operate on a low margin with profits
returned to members. The boundaries between these operations are often
not very clear due to internal purchases for the secondary processing plants.
Coldwater US purchased all the fish on its own account and then either used
it for its plants or sold it on to other buyers. Producers in Iceland therefore
did not know whether Coldwater US bought the fish for their own use or for
further sale. This indicates a possible conflict of interest, where the profit
aim of Coldwater could easily overcome the overall strategy of IFPC to
return the profit to members. A similar situation was happening with other
marketing subsidiaries: that is, they were increasingly purchasing the fish on
their own account for further sale.
The changes of the relationship between IFPC and its members moved more
from the "one for all and all for one" towards a more independent
relationship. The formal power moved more to the bigger companies due to
changes in the voting system. Despite this, some equalization was kept by
the veto system, although that was possibly more symbolic than real. The
operation of IFPC itselfmoved more to the markets, leaving IFPC more and
more like a mother company with a more supportive operation rather than
the basic sale itself.
In table IV.5 are figures from the operation of IFPC during this period.
These figures are for the operation of the Consolidation (that is, IFPC and
its subsidiaries). As can been seen from the figures the net sale of IFPC had
increased from 1986 to 1996 by 93%. This increase can be traced to the sale
140
Morgunbla6i6 14. November 1996. Interview with Agnar FriSriksson, general manger of
Coldwater UK.
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of products of non-members, which had greatly increased during this period.
In 1996, 13% of the total sale came from foreign producers that sold their
products through IFPC or its subsidiaries141. IFPC had around 43% share of
the total value of frozen fish export from Iceland in 1996.
Year Net sale in 1SK Return on Equity ratio Return on equity
'000 operation in %
revenue
1986 12,802,646 0.63% 26.8% 6.6%
1990 16,454,865 1.84% 19.9% 18.7%
1996 24,744,136 2.9% 23.0% 19.3%
Table VI.5 Key operational and financial figures 1986 - 1996
VI.2.1.5 1997 - 1999 Independence
The ownership change of IFPC was followed with a new definition of the
role of IFPC, was as follows:143
• IFPC is a global sales and marketing company for frozen fish
products.
• IFPC's main task is to provide services for production, sales,
marketing, development and quality control of seafood products.
This service is provided to producers in Iceland and overseas.
• Another objective is to operate subsidiaries outside Iceland, both for
marketing products from suppliers and processing them further by
operating fish processing plants
This role is defined in the mission of IFPC as "IFPC operates subsidiaries
overseas to ensure marketing ofproducts, and to process seafood products.
In order to ensure its market position and growth, IFPC makes production
and sale agreements with Icelandic as well as overseas parties and invests
in production and marketing companies. The company shall yield a normal
return on the capital invested in it at any time.144" For the first time in over
fifty years' history, IFPC's aim was to make profit for its owners and not to
pay it back in lower commission. IFPC had also changed its strategy and
allowed the option of vertical integration by buying shares in producers in
both Iceland and abroad.
141
Hlutafjarlysing IFPC, page 36. (Analysis for stock bidding for IFPC).
142 Annual report 1986, 1990 and 1990. In this table revenue is taken from the coalition of IFPC the
mother company and subsidiaries
143 Information from, http://www.icelandic.is/.
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The chairman of IFPC during this time declared in an interview that with the
changes of IFPC into a Limited Liability Company, it would have to change
its relationship with its former members. This new relationship would build
on business relationships, and the sociological relationship and view would
be abolished145. After the ownership change, companies inside IFPC were
no longer bound to hand over all the frozen products. Instead, individual
companies made a sales contract (service agreement) for part, or all, of their
products, which was terminable from each side with six-months notice. In
this service agreement, IFPC is undertaking to monitor the products in all
parts of the process, from production to delivery of the product to the final
buyers. This entailed, for example, that IFCP consults the producers about
what products are suitable to produce, about the condition of markets, and
that it also takes care of all transportation and documentation for the export.
In addition to this, producers were now under the control of the quality
department of IFPC, and had to fulfil the standards that IFPC now makes on
each product it sells. Producers can also make contracts with IFPC for
supplies of various operational goods, in particular packing. This means
that producers are no longer bound to buy their packing from IFPC and can
buy from elsewhere as long as it fulfils the quality standards of IFPC146. In
addition, IFPC operates an R&D department, which aims to increase the
value creation of the production as well as meet the needs of the buyers and
consumers of the products147.
Producers that make a service agreement with IFPC get services from IFPC
with the aim of providing the producers with the highest price as possible as
well as information about the market. Sasmark h.fi, the trading subsidiary of
IFPC, then takes care of other producers that want to trade on the free
market. Sasmark h.f. either buys the product for further sale or sell it in
commission sale. Sasmark h.f. does not have the same obligation to the
producers about information or other services as does IFPC h.f. By this
IFPC claims that they can keep the operation of IFPC producers oriented so
144 Mission Statement of IFPC taken from the http://www.icelandic.is.
145
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that they can return as high price for the products as possible and provide
producers with more service than would otherwise be possible.
Highlights of IFPC's operation during this time include:
1997 IFPC established a marketing and purchase subsidiary in Russia.
(IFPC Russia) In 1997 IFPC also bought a fish wholesale company
in Russia, which sells considerable quantities in and around
Moscow, and established a holding company, Navenor Holdings
Ltd,, to run it.
1997 IFPC established a marketing and purchase office in China
1997 IFPC established a subsidiary in Norway (IFP Norway A.S.), which
aims at providing products for IFPC's sale and production system
worldwide.
1997 At a shareholders meeting in 1997 it was decided to lift all
restrictions on the sale of shares in IFPC and the company applied
for registration on the Iceland Stock Exchange.
1998 The operation of Coldwater UK was split up into two companies.
On the one hand is Coldwater Seafood UK LTD, which takes care
of the operation of the two secondary processing plants and sale of
its product. On the other hand is the sales company IFPC UK that
takes care of selling products of companies that sell through IFPC.
1998 In the beginning of 1998 the Iceland Stock Exchange approved
trading of IFPC shares on its main stock market.
After the ownership changes of IFPC the nature of the alliances changed
into alliances between IFPC and individual companies rather than joint
venture (alliances) between the producers to market their own product. This
change did not happen overnight; it was rather a development over the past
decade, which was finally confirmed formally and legally by the ownership
change. Now each company had do deal directly with IFPC, and a new
force in the network had emerged: that is, the shareholders. The majority of
the shares is still in the hand of producers, but some producers used the
opportunity to sell their share and use the money in their own company. At
the end of 1998 the ten biggest shareholders owned 75.79% of the total
share and were all former members of IFPC and producers. The twenty
biggest shareholders owned 92.67% of the total share, and six of them were
banks or other investors that were not directly involved in production of
147
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fish. The total number of shareholders on 30th December 1998 was 302148.
Although the majority of shares is in the ownership of producers, it is clear
that there is a new emphasis on the shareholders' value in IFPC's operation.
Therefore, we can talk about three main forces: the IFPC, producers and
shareholders.
One of the obvious changes in IFPC's strategy is the vertical integration into
the production sector. In September 1997 IFPC owned share in only one
producer (a 10% share in UA h.f.) but Joklar, the Handling subsidiary of
SH, owned share in seven producers. In none of the companies are IFPC or
its subsidiaries in dominant positions.
In table VI.6, key figures from the operation of the Coalition of IFPC for the
years 1997 and 1998 are presented.
Year Net sale in Return on Equity Return on Number of
ISK '000 operation ration equity staff
revenue Icel. Abroad
1997 28,484 0.97% 17.3% 8.52% 100 1169
1998 16,454 1.84% 19.9% 6.82% N/A N/A
TO
Table VI.6 Key operational and financial figures 1997 - 1998
VI.2.1.6 1999 - ?
A new turning point for IFPC came during the annual meeting in March
1999 for the year 1998. Then, Robert GuSfinnsson, chairman of bormodur
Ramma h£, and the biggest shareholder in IFPC, was elected as chairman of
the IFPC board in competition with the sitting chairman. Robert claimed
that his candidature as chairman was due to an increased dissatisfaction with
IFPC's operation. Roberts election was guaranteed after he and others
around him had increased their share in IFPC the night before the annual
meeting150. Soon after the annual meeting, FriSrik Palsson, president of
IFPC, resigned as president and a new president was hired. The main
criticism of IFPC was that the centralisation of its operation that was not
adding value for producers or for IFPC. The new board and president have
148
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150
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not presented much about the planned changes, but from interviews with
them in the media and an interview with Robert GuSfinnsson, the main
changes concerning this research seem to be the following.
• Increase the formal authority of president of IFPC by making him
chairman ofboard ofall IFPC's subsidiaries.
• Abolish the big producer's board over each subsidiary.
• Make each subsidiary more independent to make contracts and buy
direct from producers.
• Move activities to producers and subsidiaries from IFPC MC to
decrease centralisation in the process. This was done for example by
abolishing the R&D department of IFPC MC.
• Move IFPC's sale system closer to the consumer.
The aim of these changes is to decrease centralisation to make the network
more effective. It seems obvious as well that contract between IFPC and
producers will no longer exist; rather, producers will make contracts with
each subsidiary151. These changes are meant to bring more freedom in the
network and ensure that producers will have chosen how and through whom
they sell. It is clear as well that the IFPC sales network will be evaluated on
a much more competitive base against its competitors. One aspect of these
changes is that for the first time IFPC defines its role or vision to be an
"international marketing company for fish products" and not a service
company for producers152. As a confirmation of this change, IFPC
abolished Joklar hfi, the holding company, and sold almost all its shares in
other companies. In accordance to this IFPC sold Saemark h.fi, and has cut
its business down to frozen fish as its core business. Despite this IFPC still
focuses on good cooperation with producers, but not as only a service
company for them.
151 Interview with Robert Gubfinnsson 20.05.99.
152 Interview with Robert Gubfinnsson 20.05.99.
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Vl.2.2Analysis of the IFPC Case
VI.2.2.1 Nature and forms of the alliance
The nature of the alliance between IFPC and producers has changed a lot
during the operation time of IFPC. From analyses of the history of IFPC,
four basic shapes of the alliance have appeared.
First is the period from 1942 to 1962 where the form is clearly a joint
venture between producers, and IFPC took care of the marketing activities
of the producers. In many ways this form has many of the characteristics of
a parent-child relationship; the parents (the producers) have the formal
power and authority in the alliance, and the child (IFPC) suffered from lack
of independence and opportunity to mature. The difference from a normal
or traditional joint venture is the number of parents: over twenty companies
instead of two companies forming the joint venture. In many ways this
could indicate that the child would gain more power over time due to high
numbers of parents and the central position of the child. In this case, it is
clear that management of the alliance is in the hands of the chairman and the
board of the IFPC, where all participants in the board are managers ofPPCs.
Hence, the alliance was more or less hand controlled by the board where the
main strategy seemed to be based on shared benefits for the PPCs. The
main philosophy of the alliance during this time was based on equalisation
that is, "one for all and allfor one''' (see figure VI.6).
Figure VI.6 Form of the IFPC alliances 1942 - 1962
Although each individual company has its own relationship with IFPC the
producers were all treated in the same way and looked at as a single group.
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In the end of this period IFPC was close to collapse due to factors such as
too high dependency of its members, lack of independence to take care of its
own matters and lack of leadership and strategy.
The second period was from 1962 to 1996 when IFCP gained more
independence from the producers. Then the alliances still had the main
characteristics of a joint venture between the producers because IFPC
treated them all in the same way and equalization was still one of the main
aims during this time. Other characteristic during this period is
constellation around IFPC and its operation. This was reflected in the fact
that IFPC participated in almost all parts of the process of production and
selling of the products, and related businesses (see figure VI.7).
Figure VI.7 Form of IFPC alliances 1963 - 1996
During this time, IFPC certainly gained much more power and authority
than each individual producer had in controlling the constellation. This
form starts to break down in 1986 when IFPC started to take in producers
that were non-members. Then members had their capital bound in IFPC
while other could use the sale network and service without binding capital
in IFPC. After 1990 the relationship moved more clearly from the
constellation and treating the members as one single group into more
individual relationships. This was due to, for example, increased direct
connection between producers and subsidiaries, and also the fact that
producers were increasingly connected directly to sales contracts. Despite
this, the formal structure of the alliances was the same, although there were
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clear signs that participant companies were increasingly ignoring this
structure.
The third period is from 1997 to 1999 when IFPC was changed into a
Limited Liability Company. Then the alliance formally changed from being
a joint venture between producers to becoming individual alliances between
IFPC and each producer based on mutual contract (see figure VI.8). In
addition to this, it is clear that the formal communication structure (through
the central firm IFPC) is increasingly broken by direct communication from
producers to the marketing subsidiaries of IFPC.
Some would maintain that there was no alliance after this time; the
relationship was built on a pure business relationship. There are signs
indicating that IFPC is trying to maintain the relationship with its producers
on a close alliance base. These indications are, for example, the close
relationship of the R&D department with the producers, and the close
relationship and service that IFPC is offering to producers. It is clear,
though, that many of the producers feared how this would develop after the
ownership changes of IFCP. One manager of a PPC that was a member of
IFPC declared in an interview with MorgunbladiS (The Morning paper):
"Before the change of IFPC, it had been the sale department of the
producers. If the company will be independent limited liability company
then the marketingpart will be cutfrom the producers.153"
153
MorgunblaSi5 1. May 1996. Interview with Finnboga Jonsson manager ofSIN.
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He also claims that this would push the producers to sell their product
themselves, with a much worse result. It is clear that before the ownership
changes there was some uncertainty of what would happen to the
relationship between IFPC and the producers. Clearly, the relationship
moved towards a business relationship, as a manager of IFPC claimed:
"IFPC the Mother Company aimed to have its operation "producers
aimed", with close relationship with producers that have service agreement
with IFPC Due to the profit aim, it is clear that IFPC will need
to make profit of the business with companies with service agreement. In
the same way it is clear that IFPC has other opportunities to make profit in
the constellation and ifwe manage to do that we can keep the margin from
the business with the producers at a minimum "154
This clearly indicates that IFPC's strategy is to maintain a close relationship
with its producers. The other opportunities to make profit are, for example,
through IFPC's subsidiaries such as Saomark, secondary processing plants
and the sale ofproducts from other producers.
The fourth and last period is the planned change in the operation of IFPC in
the Spring of 1999. These changes will move the IFPC Mother Company
out of the direct process between producers and the marketing subsidiaries
(see figure VI.9).
Direct business relationship between UIPF and each producers about their
production, service and price.
Headquarters relltionship. co-ordination, governance and leadership.
Figure VI.9 Form of IFPC alliances 1999 - ?
154 Interview with manager of IFPC, 1-3.
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These changes are in many ways confirmation of the increased tendency of
producers to have direct contact to the markets instead of having the middle
step in the form of contacting IFPC's Mother Company. Producers have
also become bigger and increasingly emphasized on building up market
knowledge inside their own company instead of relying completely on
IFPC. In addition to this producers have also taken on other activities that
traditionally were based in IFPC, as for example R&D. This is in
accordance with the strategy of IFPC that producers themselves take care of
these activities with assistance from IFPC. This will also affect the form of
the relationship because producers will now no longer make a contract with
IFPC as a whole but instead have the option of making long-term contracts
with each of the marketing subsidiaries. This will make the strategic
alliances direct between these actors in the network. At the same time, this
will increase the trading part of IFPC, which means that more and more of
the business will focus on pure buyer and seller relationships.
VI.2.2.1.1Nature ofthe alliance
It took members of IFPC a long time to take the last step in changing the
IFPC into limited liability, which reflects the fact that members had some
doubts about how it would affect the relationship between the PPCs and
IFPC. The quotation as "IFPC was the market division ofproducers"155
raises the question of the nature of the relationship between PPCs and IFPC.
To analyse the nature of the relationship it is helpful to look at the basic
model of the network perspective put forward ofHakansson H and Johanson
J156. That model consisted of three main factors: that is actors, activities and
resources.
In the relationship between IFPC and its members, there are three main
types of actors involved: producers, IFPC and its subsidiaries. The
producers are then split up into individual producers, whose numbers have
varied from around thirty to ninety. In table VI.7, the main factors involved
in the network are summarised. These factors have been more or less the
same over the last two to three decades. It is, however, obvious that there is
155 Interview with a manager of IFPC Mother Company, 1-4.
156
Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J., 1992 .
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not as sharp a difference between each type of actor as there was in the early
stage of the network. Table VI.7 presents the different activities and













































Table VI.7 Actors, Activities and Resources
The importance of each actor in the network has changed over the operation
time. Before 1986 the IFPC was in a key position in the network due to the
large percentage of the total sale, which went through them, as well as both
the physical flow of products and the flow of information being controlled
through the IFPC Mother Company, (abbreviated IFPC, MC). During this
time direct contact between producers and marketing subsidiaries was not
appreciated by IFPC157. Coldwater US was also an important actor during
this time, but as the importance of other markets increased the role of
Coldwater US declined. In a similar way, after 1986 the actual sale was
moved from IFPC, MC to the marketing subsidiaries and the importance of
IFPC, MC declined. In addition, other supportive activities have been
moved from IFPC, MC to the free market, leaving IFPC headquarters in the
middle of the process from production to markets without an obvious
purpose in the day-to-day relationship apart from coordinating the process.
Vl.2.2.1.1.1 Stakeholders
One aspect of analysing actors and relationships in the alliance involves
consideration of the stakeholders. Many of the stakeholders are not directly
linked to the daily activities of the network but could influence the nature of
157 Based on interviews with present and former managers ofPPCs and IFPC.
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the alliance and how it is operated. In the network perspective stakeholders
are usually not mentioned, leading to a lack of depth in the analyses.
Before 1997, producers were almost the only stakeholders in IFPC. They
were also in a leading position in a governing the IFPC, and therefore the
whole network, by having all members in the board of IFPC and its
subsidiaries. After 1997 this changed and shareholders came in as strong
stakeholders. Still, in the beginning of 1999 producers are the biggest
shareholders, but it is clear from discussion in the media that shareholders
and their values are increasingly putting pressure on IFPC and the whole
network. This could be seen before the annual meeting for the year 1998
when Robert GuQfinnsson, a manager of a PPC, which was the biggest
owner in IFPC, was running for chairman of the board against the sitting
chairman. Robert said in the newspaper that:
"
as an example of IFPC status now, little or none request is for the
share in IFPC.... "^8
In a TV interview, he claimed the following
"I have got clear message from the stock market that something needs to be
done about IFPC status "15 .
Clearly, this demonstrates the new pressure or force on IFPC and the
network from shareholders. Although producers are still the biggest
shareholders in IFPC, they increasingly demand profit and return of their
investment instead of just a high price and service. At the same time that
producers demand profits they also demand the highest price, which can
lead to a paradox in the operation of IFPC. Hence, it can be difficult to
fulfil the aims ofall stakeholders in the network.
Vl.2.2.1.1.2 Dependency of actors in the alliance
Dependency on products is the most obvious dependency between actors in
the IFPC alliance. In the beginning of the alliance IFPC was completely
dependent on products from its members. This did not change until around
1970 when Coldwater US made an agreement to sell products from
158
MorgunbladiS 06.06.99. Interview with Robert GuSfinnsson, manager of bormodur-rammi.
159 Interview on Channel 2 (Sto5 2) 07.03.99 with Robert Gudfinnsson, manager of I»orm65ur-rammi.
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companies in the Faroe Islands and Denmark. Before that, Coldwater US
had started to buy fish for its secondary processing plants from producers
other than IFPC members. During this time the (seventies and eighties) the
US market was the most important market for IFPC, putting Coldwater US
in a powerful situation. Due to his, it is clear that the IFPC constellation
was breaking the complete dependency on its members. However, IFPC
itself did not start to sell products from non-members until 1984160. In
1997, 16% of the total turnover of IFPC was due to business with foreign
companies, while around 25-30% of the fish for the secondary processing
plants was from Iceland1 \
On the other hand producers had to depend on IFPC to sell their products.
According to the agreements of IFPC, members were not allowed to sell
themselves or through other companies. This duty to hand over frozen
products was not abolished until IFPC was changed into a limited liability
company in 1997. After the ownership change of IFPC producers could sell
through other companies, except the products that they had made a sales
contract with IFPC to sell162. Theoretically speaking this was the first time
that members' companies of IFPC could evaluate on a competitive basis
options for the sale of frozen products without abolishing membership in
IFPC163.
Producers have had to depend on IFPC for information about the market.
With improved communication and IT, producers are increasingly
contacting the market directly. These contacts are mainly made with the
marketing subsidiaries of IFPC. However, general information about
markets in the form of statistics and trends are much more available now
than two or three decades ago. Hence, producers were more or less
completely dependent on IFPC for information and knowledge of the
markets until 1997. It is obvious, though, that before that time producers
160 Hannibalsson. O. & Einarsson, H.
161 IFPC Annual report 1997.
162 It is though common knowledge that many producers broke this duty by selling them selves or
through other companies.
163 This is relevant for frozen products. Many members' companies were also in some other products
such as salting or drying, or could choose to sell through UIFP or other companies. 1 that case,
they could of course evaluate options between different processing methods on a competitive basis.
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placed much more emphasis on building up marketing knowledge inside
their companies. In addition, from 1986 IFPC did not block, as obviously as
before, direct communication between producers and the marketing
subsidiaries, which makes this dependency less obvious.
Although IFPC had broken the dependency on products from its members'
companies, they had to depend completely on its members for formal
authority until 1997 when the ownership form was changed. This is due to
the ownership form of IFPC and the fact that IFPC was not meant to make
profit. Hence, IFPC had to get formal approval from members to take on
larger financial commitments as well as any major changes on its operation.
Allowing IFPC to build up a fund inside the company, although that fund
was under the ownership of its members, decreased this dependency.
One aspect of the dependency of actors in the network was the existence of
exit barriers on members to leave IFPC. These barriers were in the forms of
time limitation and payback methods and time of member ownership share
in IFPC. The time limits of leaving IFPC were at least one year. Members
had to give one-year's notice that they planned to leave IFPC. Then the
secession would be valid the second New Year from the time it was notified
to IFPC. Then, when members left IFPC, they got their ownership paid
back through certain payback methods, which calculated their ownership in
IFPC according to the booking value of their share in the ownership fund. It
is clear that the capital that members were paid was in no accordance with
the "real value" of IFPC, and furthermore payment was spread over 10
years. This was clearly done to keep the network together, as one manager
of IFPC said:
"It is clear that the methods ofpayment when members left was done in
accordance to one-site method according to IFPC law. "x 4
Hence, this acted as a barrier to leaving, knowing that you would not get
paid back the real value of your share. These exit barriers, in addition to the
fact that members had to sell all their frozen products through IFPC, made
the alliance appear in some way as enforcement to the producers. This was
164 Interview with managers of IFPC. 1-5.
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reflected in an interview with a manager of a PPC in IFPC membership,
when he was asked about the ownership changes of IFPC in 1997:
"Alliances built on enforcement are not likely to survive in modern business
environment"^5.
In a similar way, an example of one of IFPC's subsidiaries claimed the
following:
"For too long time the alliances have been kept together for other reasons
than IFPC is the best choice for the producers. Exit barriers and ownership
form had been used above the competition to be the best.166 ".
It is clear that many producers saw the dependency as an enforcement to the
membership where they could not choose ways of sell their products on a
competitive basis. IFPC and its subsidiaries had gained much more
independence from its members than members had from IFPC. On the other
hand it was not until 1997, when the ownership form of IFPC changed, that
members' companies gained similar independence and the opportunity to
choose sale methods on a competitive basis. This, in many ways, brings
competition much more into the alliances. Hence, it is claimed here that it
is not until after 1997 that there is some balance in the dependency between
actors in the alliances. Key to this are the freedom to choose and
competition. This is both for producers to choose marketing methods and
for IFPC in choosing producers, but one aspect of the dependency is the
commitment that IFPC has had to its members. After the ownership change,
these commitments are much clearer and are included in IFPC's service
agreement with the producer.
VI.2.2.1.2Conflict of interest
It can be difficult to avoid conflict of interest in networks such as IFPC; as
Axelsson claims, the three factors actors, activities and resources are closely
connected and can cause conflict and power struggle in companies'
relationships because '''"actors in different levels, controlling different
resources and being involved in different activities may differ in their
165
MorgunblaSi6 1. May 1996. interview with BrynjolfBjarnason, manager ofGrandi.
166 Interview with an employer of IFPC subsidiary, 1-15.
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intentions and perceptions....''''167. In addition to actors in the network are
stakeholders, whose objectives are often not in harmony with the day-to-day
activities and aims of the actors in the network. According to Axelsson,
conflicts are mainly associated with the actors in the network and their
control over activities and resources. Conflicts between activities can, for
example, be between the sales method (that is, commission sales) versus
purchase of the product, as well as primary processing versus secondary
processing. Conflicts between sale methods are one of the oldest conflicts
inside IFPC. This can be traced back to when Coldwater US started to buy
all products from Iceland for further sale. Producers in Iceland have often
suspected them of buying the product at a low price, then stocking the
products and selling them when the price went up again168.
Due to increased buying by the marketing subsidiaries and the change of
strategy of IFPC (that is to be profitable), it is clear that there is a danger of
increased conflict between the producers, that want as high price as
possible, and the IFPC that wants profit on its operation. This is obvious
concerning the buying by secondary processing plants of their supply. In
those cases, the transparency of the sale is not clear, where the overall aim
of IFPC was to return as high a price to producers as possible. This is even
more obvious after the ownership change, when IFPC is clearly now meant
to make a profit as well as return as high a price to producers as possible.
Hence, this introduces the potential for conflicts in the strategy, which can
be difficult to harmonies in order to fulfil the aims of all actors and
stakeholders.
The conflict between buying or selling the products in commission sale is
not the only conflict between the operations of secondary processing versus
selling product from primary processing companies in Iceland. When
managers of IFPC and its subsidiaries were asked about conflicts between
operating secondary processing and selling products for primary processing
they, in most cases, admitted that there was a clear conflict of interest
between these factors, as can been seen from following quotations:
167 Axelsson, B., page 199.
168 Based on interviews with former present and former managers of PPCs.
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"It is clear that operation of secondary processing can lead to other aims
than returning highestprice and value adding back home "169
"Operation of secondary processing plant demands that the emphasis on
value adding is in the secondary plant and not necessarily back home with
the producers. This also causes that information is often not necessarily
returned home. So there is clearly conflict between these two operation"110.
"...IFPC evaluated that it was causing trouble to have the same company
selling products from producers in Iceland andproduct from the secondary
processing plant using the same channel. The development has been in that
way that inside IFPC are producers that are capable of breading fish in
Iceland. They have increasingly started to ask themselves whether it is
likely that I can sell my product through company that itself is in breading
fish Coldwater UK must think about their own matters and that is
not necessarily in the best interest ofproducers " 7 .
"The secondary processingplant has a bit special status but it is clear that
it would be problematic for us if we (in Iceland) would have to stock
products in Iceland while the secondary plants would be buying fish from
Norway. Then we would be breaking this agreement with producers. It has
to be admitted that conflicts rise in these matters but they have been solved
in good manners and that are conflicts that are quite normal and we need to
think about the production and they need to think about themselves and then
we find some agreement. The main issue is that we have a process to find
some solution"112.
In a similar way, producers claimed that there were clear conflicts between
these two parts. What is most obvious are comments about the lack of
returning information from the markets. This information is vital for
building up knowledge for further production and value adding in the
production in Iceland. An example of this can be taken from a manager in a
production company that was planning on going into secondary processing:
"We needed tools to draw the information from the IFPC subsidiaries about
markets and technique. It is clear that the staff there was blocking
information to us and they were not very happy about what we were
planning to do It is my conclusion that secondary processing and
sellingproducts from producers in Iceland does notfit together"113.
169 Interview with a manager of IFPC subsidiary 1-1.
170 Interview with a manager of IFPC subsidiaries, 1-15.
171 Interview with a manager of IFPC subsidiary, 1-17.
172 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-4.
173 Interview with former producer manager in PPC, 1-31.
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In a similar way an employer of an IFPC subsidiary claimed:
"IFPC needs to make profit on their capital bound in the secondary
processing plants abroad so it is clear they put emphasis on doing that on
the account of the further development in Iceland. Hence the operation of
secondary processing plant can been seen as barriers on further
development andprocessing in Iceland "m.
This touches on one of the central issues in a network like IFPC, that is, the
value creation in the network. This mixture, that is, the operation of a
marketing network with the aim of returning the highest price to producers
on the one hand, and the operation of secondary processing itself on the
other hand, leaves IFPC with a paradox about value creation in this value
chain. Where is the emphasis on value creation and value adding in Iceland:
the producers or the secondary plants? The establishment of the secondary
processing plants were well justified at the time they were established due to
factors such as import barriers in the countries that would have made
secondary processing and value creation in Iceland difficult. Other factors
also affected this development as capability of producers in Iceland and the
unstable economics in Iceland over a long period175. This should not have
been a barrier to fiirther development in this field in Iceland in the last 5-10
years. Adding to this picture the decreased fish stock for the last 10-15
years means that producers often had difficulties in increasing their value
creation by just increasing fishing as they often did before. Hence, the
question arises whether the conflict of interests has influenced further
development in this field in Iceland. Almost all interlocutors that stood
outside IFPC claimed that the answer to this was "yes", it had been blocking
this development in Iceland; as one former product manager claimed:
"It was always taboo to talk about breadingfish in Iceland. It was claimed
by IFPC to be too expensive to transfer the bread to Iceland, the product
would be damaged in transportation, the distance from the markets was too
long, the equipment too expensive and the production too complicated etc,
etc.... ",76
174 Interview with an employer of IFPC subsidiary, 1-15.
175 See for example the discussion about the economic status in Iceland in chapter III.
176 Interview with former producer manager in PPC, 1-13.
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However, this has been looked at in the light of the import barriers that
existed on processed fish until 1986 in the EC and transportation that was
mainly built on filling whole ship before the containers became dominant.
This meant that the distance from the market was a big issue, but today,
with increased frequency and smaller portions, in container, this is not the
case. At the same time, it is also clear that producers in Iceland were in
many cases not able to enter into further development of secondary
processing, as illustrated by the following quote:
"It is only recently that producers in Iceland have been capable ofgoing
into further processing, both due to knowledge in simple factors like
language and then size and access to capital... ".177
On the other hand, when a manager of IFPC was asked about this he pointed
out that:
"I do not think that it has been the case that our operation of secondary
processing plants on two markets, US and UK has blocked this development
in Iceland. There are big marketing areas for breadedfish andfood where
such food is a bigpart ofthe retail food there, as in France, Germany and a
lot of the Scandinavian countries and the Benelux countries. Why have we
not started there? Leave that we have not started in US and UK if that have
been such a blocking factor that we were operating secondary processing
plant there. "178.
The same manager claimed further:
"At least when we have studied this [that is whether producers could go into
breading] we could not recommend that they invested in this What
has happened now is that one strong producer has from a certain
presupposition that he gets from the markets, from the sale office in
Germany in this case started to bread fish. This is a strong market for
breaded Ocean Perch fillet, and this opens for other options but this has not
opened the opportunityfor high quantity... The equipment is there and now
we can develop the connection with our customers. It is a bit difficultfor us
as a dealer to take the initiative in this having no fund to put in this 9.
In this quotation the manager is referring to UtgerSafelag Akureyringa,
which is one of the biggest producers inside IFPC, as it had started to
produce breaded fillets mainly of Ocean Perch for markets in Germany.
177 Interview with former board member ofPPCs, 1-16.
178 Interview with managers of IFPC, 1-2.
179 Interview with managers of IFPC. 1-2.
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The main issue is information, and that through the history of IFPC it has
never been considered as an option to go into breading in Iceland. The
above quotation from a manager of IFPC reflects very well one of the main
issues in this network, that is, those who had the access to the markets
prepared the information for the producers and in many cases evaluated
them as well. This is also reflected in a quotation from a manager in one of
the PPCs:
"It is not good to have some men in Reykjavik that neither work on the
markets or in the production to "pre-cook" the information for producers
and the market. There is a danger that you start to doubt how they value the
information and what lies behind them.180 "
Due to the conflict of interest between the producers and the secondary
processing by the central firm, it is clear that they are in many ways in
competition with each other about value creation, which affects the
information flow and emphasis on the markets181. IFPC has in some ways
admitted this when it split up the UK operation into Coldwater UK, that
takes care of the secondary processing, and IFPC UK, that takes care of the
resale ofproducts from producers. As one manager of IFPC claimed:
"We have always made the requirement that the secondary processing
plants are at arms length.... On the other hand it is clear that we had
problems in UK because ofgreat conflict of interest between the part that
were operating the secondary processing and the parts who were in the
resale. We split this for three months, that is July - August (1998)
These two are separate companies in the same ownership that is 75% in
ownership of IFPC and 25% in ownership of our Danish partners. These
companies have then co-operative guidelines between them, giving
Coldwater UKfirst preference on all what we produce here in the same way
Coldwater has to give us first preference on products that they want to
buy"182.
The same conflict is active between Coldwater US and producers in Iceland
although that conflict has not been as much on the table as the conflict in the
UK. An explanation of this can be the historically strong position of
180 Interview with a manager ofPPCs, 1-8.
181 It is also interesting to point out that a the manager ofUA during this time had previously been
working in the marketing section for Icelandic Seafood a competitor to IFPC.
182 Interview with a manger of IFPC, 1-3.
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"It is not sensible to maintain with hand-power some processing here home
when it creates more profit by doing it abroad. On the other hand we can
not forget that here at home great opportunities have opened for further
185
processing after the producers have become bigger and stronger. "
This increasingly put pressure on the network to create the type of
relationship where producers have the opportunity to get access to
information and knowledge in the network that can support further value
creation in their own companies. This in an accordance with the new
emphasis in the literature about networks and cooperation, where the value
creation is the central issue186. This puts the emphasis, in analysing network
like IFPC, on the "value creation''' in the network and the possibility for
participants to increase their value creation. Hence, the central issue
becomes one of how the participants' companies work together to co-
produce value, rather than of how any one company can locate itself in the
right position in the network, or of the bargaining power of each actor in the
network187. In many cases the IFPC network has built on being in the right
position in the value chain, in the spirit of Porters model188. According to
the interlocutors the conflict of interest has meant that producers are not
gaining sufficient access to information and knowledge that is essential for
further development and value creation. This can lead to a lack of trust in
the participants in the network.
VI.2.2.2 Role of the central firm in the alliance
In interviews, managers of IFPC and its subsidiaries usually defined the role
of IFPC as a service company for producers. This can be summarized by a
quotation from one manager of IFPC who claimed that the role of IFPC is
to:
185 Interview with FriSrik Palsson, former president of IFPC and presently Chairman of board ofUIFP
in Morgunbladid 13/4 '99.
186 See for example, Axelsson, B.; Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J., 1988; Larson, S.; Jarillo, C. J.;
Easton, G.; Ouchu, W. G.; Osborn, N. R. & Hagedoorn, J.; Clegg, R. S.
187 Normann. R. & Ramirez, R.
188 See for example Porter, E. M.
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Coldwater US, independence from IFPC and the long-term duopoly of IFPC
and IS/SIS of selling to US.
The case taken here about conflict in the network about breading in Iceland
versus breading in secondary processing plants abroad is not the central
issue in the network. As one manager of IFPC subsidiaries said when he
was asked about whether he believed that operation of secondary-processing
plants had delayed this development:
"This case about breading in Iceland versus breading in secondary
processing plants abroad is not the central issue but the value creation in
general. It seems to be obvious that when one of the producers inside IFPC
started to bread fish, it opened up these conflicts and it is after that that
IFPC recognized these conflicts and split up the reselling and secondary
JO 3
processing in UK."
When this manager was asked about whether he believed that operation of
secondary processing plants had delayed further development in value
creation in Iceland he said.
"Yes I think that this has delayed this development but I am not saying that
the secondary processing plant was bad and I am not saying that all
producers should be breading fish. The markets for breaded fish are
declining in quantity as well as price rather than on the way up The
secondary plants are not only producing breadedfish but also cutting down
into smaller portion unbreadedfish andpacking. Producers could easily do
this in Iceland. The difference between IFPC and Icelandic Seafood is that
Icelandic Seafood is not operating secondary processing plants in
UK Producers inside Icelandic Seafood are producing retail
products in Iceland, which they claim are returning them high value... Ifwe
look at the value creation (for producers) inside IFPC it is highest on
products that are going through the marketing subsidiaries as in Germany,
France and even Japan." [Where IFPC is not operating secondary
processing plants]'54
This again put the emphasis on value creation in the network and the
environment that the participants' companies are offered. In studying the
value creation in this network it is dangerous to be blind and just look at the
value creation in Iceland, as Fridrik Palsson claimed in an interview soon
after he quit as president of IFPC.
183 Interview with a manager of IFPC subsidiary, 1-17.
184 Interview with a manager of IFPC subsidiary, 1-17.
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"...guarantee that the producers get the best deal and opportunities on the
market in long runm. "
This raises the question of what is the best deal and opportunity? Asking
the managers of IFPC and producers, the first response was usually just
"competitive price". Then as the interview went on they started to add that
is was not just the price, it also includes guarantee of payment, stocking
time, minimum of after sale claim etc. Clearly the price is the single most
important factor, but after analysing these interviews, managers of IFPC and
producers seem to be unanimous that the best deal includes;
"
...competitive price in long term, guarantee of payment, short stocking
time ofproducts, short time until the product are paid, quality andminimum
after sale claims19
In addition to this, interlocutors talked about the role of IFPC being to offer
the "best opportunity" on the markets for producers. This included that
IFPC had to offer producers new opportunities for their products, as well as
opportunities to increase the value of their productions. In order to make
use of the "best opportunity" and "best deal" on the market the quality and
response time of information that IFPC is returning to producers is vital191.
This makes great demands on the effectiveness of communication and IT
system used in the relationship. The best opportunity is also closely
connected to the previously described value creation in the network and the
conflict between IFPC and producers there. It is therefore clear that these
conflicts between actors that influence the information flow and the value
creation in the network can affect the ability of IFPC to fulfil its role
according to the above description (that is, to offer producers "the best deal
and opportunity in long term".). This role should in many ways rather be
counted as an aim or objective of IFPC.
On the other hand is the role of IFPC as a central firm in this network that
has changed considerable through its operation time. The role of IFPC is
reflected in the form of the alliances and was discussed earlier in this
189 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-4.
190
Based on interviews with managers and staffof IFPC and producers.
191 Based on interviews with managers of IFPC.
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chapter. In the first period (that is in 1942 - 1962), the main role of IFPC
was twofold: to sell the producers products and to take care of interest
matters of its members. As has been previously discussed IFPC suffered
from being the "child" in a joint venture that was dominated by its "parents"
during this time. Hence, IFPC did not have a clear role in governing the
network during this period. The role of IFPC was to coordinate activities
such as to implement collective quality and packing systems. The next
period is from 1963 - 1986, when IFPC is clearly the ruling actor in the
network by controlling sales and taking care of interest matters of its
members. After 1986, the new chairman of board and president
implemented a new strategy. This is reflected in moving sales to the
markets into the marketing subsidiaries, leaving IFPC with no actual sales
(that is, no core activities), as was bemoaned by a former manager of IFPC:
(t >>192"Now they have even taken from me the permission to sell"
In many ways, 1986 is the turning point in the role of IFPC. The
development of moving sales completely to the marketing subsidiaries took
some time and was not complete until after 1990 when IFPC had established
marketing offices in France and Japan. This leaves IFPC more or less with
just support activities for the network, having moved the core activities to
the markets. Other changes during this time were, for example, that IFPC
stopped acting as a pressure group for its members, and also that they cut
down their connection to companies in related businesses such as in the
packing and transportation sectors.
At the same time as the role of the IFPC in the process from producers to
the markets has increasingly moved into supportive activities and
coordination, producers have increasingly merged, becoming stronger and
better qualified to take on demanding activities. In similar ways the
marketing subsidiaries have gained more experience and knowledge of the
markets than IFPC itself. The status of IFPC after this is reflected in a
quotation by a manager ofPPCs:
192 Interview with a former manager of IFPC, 1-4.
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"The sale organisation and especially IFPC are going through middle age
crises similar to what humans go through. This reflects in being grown up
and the youngster matured leaving the question of how much freedom
should we give them. This entails that for IFPC it is difficult to free the
hand ofproducers and its subsidiaries. "193
This captures very well the situation that the central firm is in, that is, with
no core activities in value creation. Rather, the central firm has supportive
activities that many producers view as a cost in the process rather than
creating.
It is interesting in the history of IFPC that producers have in many cases
applied pressure to make changes in the role of IFPC as the central firm.
This was reflected in 1980 when producers put pressure on IFPC to put
more emphasis on new markets. This was then taken further by moving
sales to the marketing subsidiaries, which was done more or less according
to the strategy, which was laid down by the new president of IFPC in 1986.
As has been said before, this left IFPC with only supportive activities, and
the difficult position of having the subsidiaries with independent boards of
producers and the chairman of IFPC as the chairman of the board of some of
them194. Hence, the presidents of IFPC, and IFPC itself, have in many ways
limited authority in governing the network. This is one of the central issues
in the criticism of IFPC that led to changes of the chairman of the board and
the president of IFPC in spring 1999. There again producers applied
pressure to make changes in the role of IFPC, especially the Mother
company.
The changes in 1999 include for example, that the president of IFPC will be
the chairman of the board of each subsidiary, and that the board of each
subsidiary will become an executive board instead of a producers' board.
This will increase the governance role of the Mother company and the
authority over the subsidiaries, but it is difficult to see how it will increase
their independence. What is likely to happen though is that the Mother
company will no longer interfere with every sale and therefore be an
193 Interview with a manager of PPCs, 1-8.
194 Chairman of IFPC board was also chairman of IFPC subsidiaries that operated secondary
processing plants.
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intermediary between the subsidiaries and producers. In many ways this
will not change the role of the Mother Company of IFPC in the network,
which is to govern and coordinate the network. This will instead change the
methods used to fulfil the role and will be looked at later in this analysis. It
is claimed here that the role of IFPC as central firm has mainly been to
coordinate activities and govern the network. On the other hand the main
aim of IFPC has been to "offer producers the best deal and opportunity on
the markets in long run". In the following discussion about the governance
of the alliances, deeper analysis will be performed on the methods of
governing the alliances and influencing factors on that.
VI.2.2.3 Governance of the alliances
VI.2.2.3.1Mechanism
Yves L. Doz pointed out that the "operating interfaces between the two
partners cannot be left to chance and to ad hoc adjustment"195. Instead,
clear internal organisational relationships, as exist in strategic alliances,
demand some kind of administrative mechanism196 to be able to share
information and knowledge as well as coordinating activities,197 with the
overall aim to make the strategic alliances efficient and competitive. Hence,
in networks with high numbers of participants the administrative mechanism
has to be effective and able to cope with different aims and strategies of
participants' companies. One of the mangers of IFPC framed this as:
"It is a fundamental issue that we (the Mother Company) keep eyes on the
operation otherwise we cannot evaluate whether we should operate all our
subsidiaries abroad. Likewise, it is essential for this company like others to
have some kind of central overhead. Complete decentralisation was out of
198
fashion a long time ago; it was a long time since it was abolished .
,9S




Johnston, R. & Lawrence, R. P.
198 Interview with manager of IFPC, 1-3.
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More or less until 1986 all communication and physical flow of products
were controlled through the Mother Company, and direct connection
between producers and marketing subsidiaries was not appreciated199.
One of the main characteristics of the administrative mechanism of IFPC
and its subsidiaries is the independence of each subsidiary through a board
dominated by producers. This raises the question of why this has developed
this way? From interviews with managers of producers' companies it seems
clear that this in many ways was done to build up some form of marketing
knowledge by producers, as well as to guarantee that they had
understanding of what was happening on the markets200. If managers from
the Mother Company had dominated the board of each subsidiary and
therefore governed them, the producers would probably have viewed that as
too much power and authority for the Mother Company in this process.
That could have lead to a lack of trust between these two sectors instead of
mutual understanding of what was happening each time. This can also be
viewed as a method to coordinate and build up an informal shared vision.
This can be seen from a quote from an interview with a former manager of
PPCs:
"It is clear that being a member of the board of IFPC and its subsidiaries
was for many managers ofproduction companies essential to be in touch
with what was happening on the markets. In that way we got direct contact
with the people working on the markets, not just the people in Reykjavik.201"
This independence of the subsidiaries often meant that the Mother Company
lacked formal authority both over its subsidiaries and producers to control
the process. Hence, this makes it difficult to locate the mechanism on the
two dimensional scale of markets and hierarchy202. It is rather through the
scale put forward by Ouchi (1980), which approached this problem by
adding a new dimension that builds on cooperation203 (see picture V.4 in the
199 Based on interviews with managers and employees of IFPC and PPCs.
200 Based on various interviews.
201 Interview with former managers ofPPCs, 1-12.
202
Axelsson, B.; Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J., 1988; Larson, S.; Jarillo, C. J.; Easton, G.; Osborn,
N. R. & Hagedoorn, J.
203 Jarillo, C. J.
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Literature Review chapter). Ouchu approaches this by splitting the
hierarchy into two parts, the "bureaucracy" which would reflect the
traditional hierarchy and the "clan" which describes long-term relationships,
carried out through non-specific contracts within the formal environment of
an organisation204. Until 1986, the main characteristics of the administrative
mechanism of the IFPC network were centralisation of information and
knowledge through the Mother Company. Despite the lack of formal
authority and power in the process, the Mother Company was in a central
position to govern and coordinate in the process. Hence, it is clear that the
Mother Company, through its central position, had much more power and
authority than the theoretical picture indicates. Due to all this the
administrative mechanism of IFPC can be located in the clan group on this
scale, where they use the methods of a vertically integrated firm through
coordination instead of formal authority, as vertically integrated firm would
have done. In many ways these methods are understandable considering
rather small number of markets that IFPC were operating on and that the
Mother Company itself took care of a big part of the sale, that is, its core
activities.
After 1986 theses methods and mechanism started to change, mainly due to
the moving of core activities to the markets, leaving the Mother Company
with supportive (and governance) activities. In many ways an internal
market emerged by the increased numbers of marketing subsidiaries that
were competing with each other for products from producers; this can been
seen from quotations from two managers of IFPC subsidiaries:
"...we are in constant competition with other markets areas... "205.
"The competition between subsidiaries blocks, in many cases, cooperation
between them "206.
Due to that, the emphasis in the administrative mechanism moves from just
coordinating activities between it and producers to coordinating activities of
204 Jarillo, C. J.
205 Interview with a manager of IFPC subsidiary, 1-1.
206 Interview with a manager of IFPC subsidiary, 1-15.
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the subsidiaries to the producers. The Mother Company did this through the
authority of having to agree on each sale. In an interview with a manager of
IFPC he stated that:
"The issue is this [the need to get agreement from the marketing division for
each sale] is not just to be a barrier in the system as a whole telling you
whether you can or can not, rather it is the marketing manager ofIFPC that
is responsible for the sale contract to be fulfilled or not. Therefore the sales
person can be relaxed and say to his customers that it is okay with the
order and then it is the marketing manager ofIFPC that evaluates the
contract and says yes it is okay then he is responsible for fulfilling the
}>207
contract and guaranteeing thatproducers will produce the product" .
Another manager in the Mother Company framed this part of the control in
the following way:
"We here [in Reykjavik] are thinking about the producer- his needs, his
wishes, and his opportunity on the markets. We build on this when we go to
the sale person to keep them concentrated to the main issue. The sale
person on the other hand should think about the customers, the
208
opportunities and danger on the markets and the daily sale operation " .
From this quotation, it seems obvious that inside the Mother Company
managers view this control over sales as a method to avoid internal
competition as well as to coordinate activities between the marketing
subsidiaries and producers. This can been seen in a quotation from a
manager ofan IFPC subsidiary:
"There is no one in Reykjavik deciding on how or what we do here.
Contracts go home to start certain processes. No contract goes home
without us being sure that it will not be stopped. On the other hand when it
goes home then they push the buttons to start processes such as
documentation and transporting. In addition, even before we sign the
contracts they connectproducers to the contract"209.
It is clear from interviews with managers in the producing sector that they
on the other hand criticised this mechanism as being too centralised and
blocking direct communication between the producers and markets210. They
experienced that in many ways they were pushed to use the central body to
207 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-2.
208 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-4.
209 Interview with a manager of IFPC subsidiary, 1-17.
2,0
Based on interviews with managers ofPPCs.
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get information, as the following quotation of one manager of PPCs
demonstrates:
"IFPC has built up too big a body in Reykjavik, that is, the marketing
division and R&D division, that in many ways are an unproductive
operation between the markets and producers. It is essential to have direct
communication between producers and the markets. It is not good to have
some people working in Reykjavik who are neither working in the markets
or production- pre-cooking the information for producers from the markets.
There is a danger that producers will doubt their judgement ofvalue behind
their decisions "2U.
This reflects the fact that the Mother Company coordinates all activities
through centralisation of the information flow from the markets to producers
and vice versa.
In a similar way another manger ofPPCs stated:
"By agreeing on all sales, IFPC MC is taking on responsibility for
producers and subsidiaries that often is difficult to fulfil. It is vital for us
producers to be responsible for our marketing operation due to increased
competition andpressure from our shareholdersfor good results. Therefore
both producers and the subsidiaries need to be responsible for their own
operation. "2I2
On the other hand, managers of IFPC point out that they have examples
where salesman had got a producer to agree on the sale of a product that the
market division stopped, and pointed out that they (the producers) could get
a higher price for the same product on other markets213. This causes
dissatisfaction for the sales person, but points out clearly the internal
competition within the network. In the same way, this raises questions of
the importance of coordinating information when more and more of the
sales are through direct purchase of the subsidiaries for resale, making the
transparency of the sale unclear. If the Mother Company did not have this
coordinating role between the subsidiaries and sales, it would increase the
danger that the subsidiaries would try to purchase the products cheaper and
sell them for higher price. As one former manager ofPPC stated:
211 Interview with a manager of PPCs, 1-8.
212 Interview with a manager ofPPCs, 1-20.
213 Based on interviews with managers of IFPC, 1-2 and 1-3.
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"It was well known that we suspected that the price of the products
increased at sea in the transportation. If the subsidiaries purchase the
products completely they will definitely try this more andmore "2N.
In many ways, the administrative mechanism of IFPC has not changed
much from 1986. It is still based around the Mother company although the
emphasis has changed in accordance to changes of the operation. The main
characteristics, of the mechanism, though, are more or less the same, based
on the centralisation of information. The changes of the ownership form of
IFPC have not changed this much, rather it changed the relationship with the
producers in that sense that producers were not as dependent on IFPC as
before. The changes of dependency in many ways can affect the mechanism
by making producers more opportunistic in the relationship, which puts
pressure on the mechanism to meet producers' needs faster. Other factors
that affect this mechanism and have created pressure on IFPC included the
fact that producers are becoming bigger and financially fitter, and that
general knowledge inside their companies has greatly increased. This can
be seen from a quotation from one of IFPC's mangers.
"What we still find is the criticism that we are looking at these days is that
with increased education in the production companies and younger people
theyfind that they should utilize these people to have more knowledge about
the markets and therefore the marketing division will be in their way. It is
neither good nor exciting enough to talk to people in Reykjavik instead of
talking directly to the sales man out on the markets. This happens although
it is known that the marketing division has a much better overview. This is
called talking to the "sale man " or talking to "the markets ". Our strategy
is that if they want to talk to the markets they can do that. We do not build
some barriers and are more than willing to reduce the staff in the routine
job here at home "2I5.
It is obvious from the previous discussion and quotations that the main
criticism of the network concerns the question whether there is
centralisation or not. This is also reflected in questions such as how much
of the activities should the participants' company take care of, how much
should the central firm do and how should the central companies fulfil then-
roles in the network. One of IFPC's managers stated that:
214 Interview with former managers of PPCs, 1-12.
215 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-3.
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"It weakens our position ifwe do not have an overview ofall the processes.
Then we would be abolishing a knowledge network that has been
established for producers and is at least beneficial for the companies that
are smaller than the five biggest that is around 20 companies. These
companies are considerably smaller and technically worse equipped,
although managerially good companies. Their production is not that much
so they are very dependent on IFPC. Do the bigger companies want to
abolish the smaller firm and let them form a coalition that will be their
competitor? Due to the fact that they (the five biggest) are getting that big it
is a question what will their ego be, not just in companies needs but also
their personal ego. They want increasingly to be in contact with the
customers and take part in developmentproject with them there are
producers today that say we have no need for Reykjavik. The subsidiaries
are capable enough and we can work with them individually and we can
then just choose or deny"216.
The same manager also stated that due to the internal competition there is a
danger that this competition would bring the producers a lower price due to
a lack ofoverview of all markets, or as he stated:
"People are human and each sales person is fighting for his area and his
customers".217
It is clear that there is controversy about this mechanism. In 1999, this
controversy is reflected in a planned change, which includes cutting down
staff in the marketing division of the Mother Company and increasing the
direct connection between each subsidiary and producer218. Another
interesting aspect of this change is an increased power from the Mother
Company over each subsidiary, because the president will be the chairman
of the board and each board will only have three members. Hence, the
boards dominated by producers are over. This will give the Mother
Company an opportunity to coordinate activities through methods other than
being "a tube" in the process. This raises questions such as whether the
methods of coordinating will change from coordinating through
centralisation to coordinating through strategy.
From 1986 until 1999, when the proposed changes become active, the
mechanism of the IFPC network is closer to a hierarchy than a free market
216 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-2.
217 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-2.
218 Based on interviews with staffof IFPC and Frjals Verslun.
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due to the centralisation of governance and coordination. On the other hand,
it is difficult to talk about hierarchy when IFPC lacks the formal authority in
the process to control both the information flow as well as the subsidiary
sale. There is a paradox in the strong position and the control of the Mother
Company of each sale of the marketing subsidiaries and the independence
that the marketing subsidiaries have from the Mother Company. In many
senses the interface or touching points of actors in this network are twofold,
first between the Mother Company and producers and then secondly from
the Mother Company to its subsidiaries. A third interface has emerged
increasingly from 1986 between the subsidiaries and producers. This
interface is on an ad hoc basis and outside the normal structure of how
things should have been done.
Types of interaction in IFPC network
Formal relationship, information, documentation, payment, quality,
R&D
Informal relationship built on personal contacts and direct
'
communication.
Figure VI.10 Types of interaction in IFPC network
This mixture of mechanisms has in many ways characterised the governance
during this time. In reality there are at least two active mechanisms. First is
the formal mechanism with the Mother Company in the centre,
characterised by centralisation of information and knowledge. Secondly,
there is the informal mechanism, that is, direct connection between
subsidiaries and producers. This mechanism is characterised by informal
connection and personal contacts between managers and staff in
participants' companies. One manager pointed out that the form of
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mechanism used was connected to the type of product they were selling, or
as he stated:
"When we are selling brand products and it does not matter who is the
producer, it is produced under the Icelandic brand. Then there is no special
needfor us to have direct contact to producers when it does not matter who
is the producer. Then it is simple for us to talk to one instead of five
producers about the same thing"219.
On the other hand when the subsidiaries are working with producers on
special products or for special customers they claimed that direct contacts
were vital for them220. According to this mixture of mechanisms it is
important to keep the mechanism effective. This is also confirmed in a
statement from a manager of a production company when he states:
"For the standard products I am happy to get rid of it from my freezer's
doors but for the more value added products and special packing 1 almost
want to know how the consumers chew the products. Therefore I need to
have an overview of the whole process and direct communication to the
... . ,,221
participants.
ft is clear from interviews with managers and staff of participants'
companies that there are many issues affecting the role of the central firm in
the governance of the network. In the following chapter of this analysis,
issues that emerge from the analysis of interviews and history will be
discussed to give a better picture of the development of governance in the
network. The main issues that emerged from the analysis are power,
communication and IT, coordination, independence and social maturity.
VI.2.2.3.2Power
One of the first questions to be asked about a network such as IFPC
concerns the power balance and authority between actors in the network.
One of the competitors of IFPC's network claimed that when they
introduced them to their potential customers they put great emphasis on
being a vertically integrated firm222. By this they claimed that they have
219 Interview with managers of IFPC subsidiaries, 1-17.
220 Based on interviews with managers and staffof IFPC subsidiaries.
221 Interview with producers manager, 1-19.
222 Interview with a manager of competing company to IFPC, 1-22.
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control over the whole process, which IFPC and IS, their main competitors,
have not.
When managers of IFPC and its subsidiaries were asked about whether they
lacked formal authority in this process the answers were not unanimous,
although they tended to be rather careful about this topic:
"It is a weakness in our system that we were only advisors about what to
produce what the price was and what the return price was. It is right to
point out that around 1980 we had a productivity department that
calculated the productivity of each production method for producers that
themselves often used poorly coordinated andprimitive technique. Ifound
that many producers used the calculation of the productivity department as
the only calculation behind their product decisions.223 "
This system was more or less active until after 1986 when a new president
took over in IFPC, and it was finally abolished around 1990 when the
productivity department was abolished and producers were themselves made
responsible for their own calculations concerning the production decisions.
It is clear during this time that, through the centralisation of information and
knowledge, the Mother Company wielded great power even though it was
informal. This can been seen from a quotation from a manager of the
Mother Company:
"It was this strong centralisation that characterised the company and was
even its strength. Producers of "block"224 did never know how much of the
products went to US or Europe; they were paid according to payoffperiods
and on equalization price. As a salesman I regret this period (the period
before 1986) because you could sell on a high price and then on a lower
price to customers that you had believed in for a long term andyou did not
have to talk to producers about this. However, in this time the producers
started to demand to produce what was best at each time and to know more
about the production and the markets than was published in the monthly
newsletter. This was recognised by the newpresident and changed.225 "
This lack of formal authority affected the long-term strategy in the process.
This is because it is difficult to build up markets or products when producers
were opportunistic and jumped to better opportunities when they arose, as a
223 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-2.
224 Block is standard products mainly used for secondary processing.
225 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-2.
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manager of IFPC stated when he was asked about the producers'
commitment:
"When we talked to the producer today he was very positive but after two
weeks his preconditions changed. He saw that it was possible to produce
some other products, for example to the US because the dollar became
stronger, then the producers told us to find somebody else. Therefore, this
weakness always exists. "226
On the other hand interlocutors pointed out that by connecting producers to
the contract they have built up formal authority because the producers need
to fulfil the contract. This was confirmed by one of the managers of IFPC
when he was asked whether the Mother Company had authority of what
producers would produce:
"Not directly. We cannot promise things without producers' agreement to
produce. However, after we have made contracts out in the markets then
increasingly we connect the contracts to producers because they sign it and
take on all commitments of the contracts. This means that our authority
starts there. If the producer does not fulfil the contract the customers can
make claims against the producers. In this way the producer has a
227
commitment to keep the contract." "
This has brought IFPC an opportunity to gain more authority through
contracts. According to interviews with managers of IFPC they claim that
producers increasingly ask to receive information and to confirm sales
contracts themselves to be better informed about the markets228. This is also
to have more stable contracts to build on and is in accordance with the
increased emphasis on special products by producers. It is clear, though,
that most of producers' production is unbound to contracts; producers claim
that they have less than 10% of their products bound in contracts229. Hence,
producers have all the opportunities they want to swap between markets
according to market conditions.
It is clear from interviews with both producers and IFPC staff that there
exist both formal and informal mechanisms of authority. The formal one is
226 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-2.
227 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-4.
228 Based on interviews with managers of IFPC.
229 Based on interviews with producers.
242
based on the rules and constitutions of IFPC that give the Mother Company
limited authority in this process. On the other hand there is the informal
mechanism that is built on traditional control over information and
knowledge and the connection to customers. This is well reflected in a
quotation from one manager of the Mother Company, where he states the
following:
"Then it is the informal power, which is of course not much. The manager
ofPPCs can do what he wants to do Naturally it happens for
some reasons that we cannot offer producers a price that is the best or
acceptable. Then the producer says' okay Iwill produce this' and often this
product or party is connected to some other contract. Hence, as in any
cooperation the question arises how can we make a combination that will
attract so the producers to produce this production for this contract. Then
there is some authority involved in that we can offer some opportunities ifI
put it clear ifyou produce this we can get another good deal for you. This
is not formal authority-this is first andforemost authority that is in the day-
230
to-day operation that people do not talk much about.
According to this, the Mother Company has informal authority through the
connection to the markets and its role as coordinator of the sales. This can
also been seen from a statement from a manager of IFPC when he explained
that IFPC as a whole often needed to built up markets by selling on low
margins for some time and to gain it back later with a higher price.
"It is our responsibility [to built up markets] of IFPC as a whole, it is done
in the markets because they know the customers. There is our power to
maintain markets although producers do not understand it for the moment.
We have many examples of this.231"
Due to a lack of authority, it is clear that the Mother Company has to
exercise much more cooperation to be able to coordinate the activities of
sales and information flow.
One of the characteristics of the IFPC network was the equality ofmembers,
that is, one member one vote. This changed in 1988, moving more formal
power to the bigger companies, although with the veto system. After the
ownership changed this changed again, or as one manager of IFPC claimed:
230 Interview with a manager in IFPC Mother Company, 1-4.
231 Interview with a manager in IFPC Mother Company, 1-4.
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"People do not need to be philosophical about power; in limited liability
companies there exists no equality. The only equality is how many shares
do you own. Your power is in accordance with that. Ifsomeone has enough
interest and money then he buys a majority share in this company and of
course can do what he wants with it. Producers must have made up their
mind about this when they changed the ownership form. Now this company
is an open public liability company, which means that who offers the highest
price gets the share that is for sale.232 "
Four months after this interview, this happened in the annual meeting of
IFPC for the year 1998 when the biggest owner bought an additional 4%
share, which was enough for him to be elected as chairman of the board.
This was followed up by the expulsion of the president of IFPC. This will
lead to changes of IFPC's operation that will bring the Mother Company
more formal authority over its subsidiaries and increase the direct
connection between producers and the subsidiaries. On the other hand, this
will not increase the authority of the Mother Company towards the
producers. The increased emphasis on connecting the sale contracts that
IFPC is making with its producers brings IFPC as a whole more formal
authority, especially if the contracts are bound with certain producers and
customers. This indicates that the central firm is gaining more formal
authority in the process than they had before. There is a question of how
this will affect the network when one or a few actors can dominate the
operation of the network.
One aspect of the power balance between actors in this network lies in the
right to ITQs, that is the individual transferable quotas. Interlocutors in the
IFPC focused on the ownership of quotas and claimed that the real power
lay in quota ownership and in the fact that the quota is bound to the fishing
vessels. That gives the owner of the fishing vessels a very crucial role when
attempting to gain access to the raw material. An example of this can be
taken from the previously described race (see chapter VI.2) between the
sales organizations, IFPC and IS to keep producers (mainly UA) in their
business233. On the other hand, producers focused on the power that lies in
232 Interview with a manager in IFPC Mother Company, 1-5.
23j Based on interviews with managers and staffof IFPC.
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the marketing connection and the control of the information flow back to
them234.
To conclude this discussion about the power in the network it is appropriate
to quote a manager of IFPC when he talked about the power balance in the
network:
"I am not sure that it is desirable to gain more authority in the process.
What IFPC shouldput emphasis on is the information flow to its producers.
Everybody here indoor admit that most of us are equally logical in thinking.
It should not matter whether you have all the information here as a
marketing manager or in some other role inside IFPC or production
managers in some freezing plant to take decisions. On the other hand what
has to bind people at the same time as contract is due to the increased
competition in the business today, when we have to connect the contract to
producers. It is a fact that we need to make the producers responsible for
mistakes if they do not produce the products. Hence, on products that are
235 }>
not bulkproducts like block we need to have producers in the contract.
The manager is pointing out that the producers are mature enough to take
their own decisions based on information from the markets. There is
therefore no longer the need for the Mother Company to think for the
producers and interpret the message from the markets for the producers.
This had been done by the Mother Company through the centralisation,
which they are now abolishing. This raises questions about other forms of
power than lie in the authority and in the coordination role of the central
firm. This could be power in the form of being a strategic leader for the
network and the role of strategy or vision in the governance of the network.
VI.2.2.3.3Strategy
The literature in strategic alliances and networking increasingly points out
the need for strategic leadership in the network and alliances236. In the
history of the IFPC network, it is in many ways difficult to point out one
leader. At first glance, the Mother Company is the most obvious candidate
for this role. One interlocutor phrased the position of IFPC in this way:
234 Based on interviews with managers and staffof production companies.
235 Interview with a manager of IFPC Mother Company, 1-2.
236 See for example Lorenzoni. G. & Baden-Fuller, C.
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"I often compare IFPC to a horse coach in the cowboy's movies where six
horses are pulling the carriage and all the horses shared the same reins. In
the case ofIFPC we do not have the reins but we have lots ofhorses [that is
the subsidiaries] but they all pull in different direction [their own direction]
because the reins are missing.237"
The interlocutor is pointing out that the strategy and leadership are missing
from the corporate IFPC. Hence, if IFPC as a corporation is missing the
strategy and leadership, the same can be said about the network as a whole.
This is not surprising due to the previously described lack of authority and
power of the Mother Company. In a similar way, a manager of IFPC stated:
"It is difficult to see how we could be leading and have some political
influence because we are just a service unit in the ownership of the
238 a
companies that we should have political influence on.
In this statement, the manager of IFPC seems to doubt that the Mother
Company has the opportunity to become a strategic leader in the network.
According to the interlocutor this is due to the governance mechanism and
lack of formal authority of the Mother Company in the network. In many
ways this is right, and the structural form of IFPC and the mechanism of
authority did not indicate that IFPC had the role of leading the strategy of
the network as a whole. This changed partly with the ownership changes of
IFPC in 1997, in that the role of IFPC in relation to its producers became
clearer and built more upon business principals. The planned changed in
1999 will then make the authority of the Mother Company over its
subsidiaries clearer and bring the Mother Company formal authority.
Hence, if these changes are successful then the Mother Company has gained
the formal authority to become the strategic leaders in the network.
Looking back at the history of IFPC and the network as a whole, it can be
seen that long-term thinking has been lacking. In the same way leadership
has been lacking in the network and therefore no actors have had the role of
leading the strategy and vision in the network. This can be seen, for
example, from the change in 1980 when producers pushed for more
emphasis on new markets, in 1997 concerning the ownership changes, in
237 Interview with a employee of IFPC Mother Company, 1-21.
238 Interview with manager of IFPC, 1-3.
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1998 when Coldwater UK was split up into two companies, and changes in
1999 when a number of producers "overtook" the company to implement a
new strategy. In all these examples IFPC was reactive, not leading the way
for the network.
Almost all interlocutors claimed that there was neither clear strategy nor
vision in the network. Interlocutors from IFPC claim that this can be traced
to producers who are characterised by short-term opportunists239. This has
to be looked at in the perspective of the economic condition that surrounded
the industry, which was not favourable until 1993 due to the lack of
economic freedom and high inflation240. Another consideration is the quota
system; the declining quotas made long-term thinking in many ways
difficult. It is not until the last five years (from 1994-5) that the majority of
producers have gained the financial capability and stability to be able to
make some serious long term planning and strategic decisions241. It is then
a question of whether the clear splitting of production and marketing have
not influenced this and made long-term thinking and vision difficult. A
manager of IFPC claimed that this could be the case, or, as he stated:
"Ofcourse, this can be the danger but I think it is exactly the same thinking
as a big andpowerful competitor to us has. I have not heard anything else
but he behaves exactly as we do although he is completely vertically
integratedfrom the basics. This is also due to the flexibility in catching and
so on. "242
According to the managers of IFPC, it is clear that the opportunism of
producers has been a barrier towards the implementation of long-term
thinking. An example was taken from the new emphasis IFPC France was
using in marketing products:
"We gained there strategic thinking and brought it back home to producers
but it has to be admitted that we needed to transfer this strategy from one
producer to another almost each month depending on when the producer
239 Based on interviews with managers of IFPC.
240 See the chapter about the Icelandic economy.
241 See the chapter about the Icelandic economy. This can also been traced to opening of stock
markets and increased freedom ofmoney transfer between countries that has opened new ways for
companies to increase their capital.
242 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-3.
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found new more exciting opportunities through some other marketing
subsidiaries.243 "
Here the manager points out the fact that the producer is not responsible for
the marketing operation and the internal market that gives them the
opportunity to jump on new exciting opportunities, causing barriers towards
strategic thinking. The manager carried on by commenting on the nature of
the business:
"What I have been trying to say is that this business is such that we control
very little of it. There are some areas that we can control but the business is
incredibly opportunistic and some people see it as some kind of "Wild
Producers " in double meaning ofthat. "
Here the manager is referring to catching from wild stocks, and also that the
producers are wild in their business. It is also clear that the limited authority
is, in his view, affecting the ability of the Mother Company to be a strategic
leader of the network.
According to the interlocutors there are many issues affecting the long-term
strategy or vision of the network. These issues can be split into two main
themes, one relating to the nature of the business and the other to the nature
of the network. The nature of the business produces the uncertainty mainly
due to fishing from wild stock that affects producers and causes them
difficulties in planning. For the bigger producers that are vertically
integrated into the fishing sector, uncertainty in this is rather low. They
know their quotas, and, although they cannot guarantee, it they fish the right
spices at the right time. This means that control and planning of the fishing
is getting more accurate and easier. The other part of this is the nature or
structure of the network. This is mainly the lack of authority of the central
firm that clearly has not had the role in the network to form or lead the
strategy of the network. Before the ownership changes the strategy was to
serve every member on a more or less equal basis, or as one interlocutor
said:
"The strategy ofIFPC has been to be friends ofeveryone244 ".
243 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-3.
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This strategy is reflected in the aim and role of IFPC, to be a service
company for its members. After the ownership changes this has changed
slowly. This has lead to a lack of strategy in the network because no one in
the network considered at it their role to lead it strategically. This can also
be traced to the fact that producers controlled IFPC through the board and
the board of its subsidiaries.
After the ownership changes IFPC has a business contract with producers,
making the relationship a business relationship instead of the mixture of
business and social relationships as it was before. Together with the
planned change, this brings the Mother Company more opportunity to lead
the network with a long-term vision and implement it through its
subsidiaries and in their contract with producers. Lorenzoni and Baden-
Fuller focus on the importance of creating an atmosphere where the
participants' companies can be creative and the network flexible245. The
planned change to IFPC in 1999 brings it an opportunity to take more pro¬
active action for the network and lead the strategy to be able to create an
atmosphere of flexibility and creativity, instead of trying to control the
network through centralisation.
The lack of strategy, and of actors in the network who are responsible for
leading the network, has in many ways influenced the IFPC network. The
impacts have been obvious: IFPC has been conservative and re-active to
respond to changes. In many cases this can be traced to the structure of the
network where the formal authority belongs to producers and the
governance mechanism is based on centralisation. Whether clear strategy
and leadership from the central firm could reduce the need for centralisation
and increase the flexibility in the network is difficult to judge from the IFPC
cases, but the need for it is obvious.
VI.2.2.3.4Knowledge, Communication and IT
According to interlocutors, effective communication is essential for
networks such as IFPC. From the analyses it is clear that the network has
244 Interview with a former member of IFPC board, 1-16.
245
Lorenzoni, G. & Baden-Fuller, C.
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changed much more into a business relationship instead of the social
relationships that previously existed. These changes have simultaneously
brought changes to the communication in the network. Before 1986 most of
the communication went through the central firm, or as one interlocutor
stated:
"Ifwe come back to the old managers, many of them were in the board and
were updated on the monthly board meetings about the status of the
markets. Others were quite happy to telephone here and get information of
what they should produce and the time until the products were shipped.
Then they found it sufficient to talk to 2-3 people here in Reykjavik that had
an overview over what was happening. " 4
With changing generations in the production sector and in IFPC this has
changed. In a similar way, another manager of IFPC stated:
"What has happened is that before producers had little market knowledge
but now the world is much smaller and we have our information system
open. This is what members wanted when they existed and this is what the
owners that is, the producers want now. By doing this the producers can
build up their knowledge of what is happening on the markets. This is
happening now, not much but more than we have known before. They watch
more and more what we are doing. It is therefore open communication:
when we talk aboutprice they know whatprice we are referring to. "247
It is interesting to see how managers of the central firm talk about direct
communication but at the same time were operating communication systems
that were built around centralisation of information through the central firm.
On each site of the central firm both producers and managers in the
subsidiaries claimed that the central firm was struggling to keep up the
centralisation of information flow and communication248. It is a question
whether this can in some ways be traced to the lack of a well-defined role
for the central firm in the process. On the other hand, Lorange P. and Roos
J. point out the need for someone to coordinate activities to avoid
information asymmetry249. They point out the use of strategic planning to
do that, which is missing from the IFPC network. Hence, it is concluded
246 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-2.
247 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-4
248 Based on interviews with managers and staff of IFPC and its subsidiaries and producers.
249
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here that the lack (of a) defined role of the central firm as well as
inadequate authority and lack ofstrategy leads to more centralisation of the
governance mechanism in matters as communication and information flow
than would otherwise be necessary.
Although the relationship has moved on to more of a business relationship,
interlocutors were unanimous that personal communications were essential
to build up trust and the will to work together. This is reflected in the
following statement:
"I am not saying that the importance of trust andpersonal connection have
declined. It is more the methods used andpreconditionsfor decisions which
are becoming much more economicalfor their own companies. At the same
time there are many more demands from the owners of their companies.
They make much higher demands to know more about the markets, the
sales, and about the customers than the earlier generation ofmanagers"250.
All interlocutors talked about direct communication and the need to talk to
the person who has the information or the authority to make decisions, as
can be seen from this statement from a manager of IFPC:
"I define that people want to talk to the person who has the authority to
make a decision. Moreover, I have to admit that the man who has the
authority to make decisions about production is the product manager and
the man who is best informed about what to sell is the sales man. Therefore,
we have this development into direct communication. On the other hand,
with 20 — 30 producers and large numbers of sales people it is not very
sensible to let them talk together all the day. It is not very economical.25 "
Here the manager points out the need for direct communication, but at the
same time points out the danger that this communication can in some cases
not be very economical for the network. In a similar way, a manager of one
of the marketing subsidiaries claims:
"If we have standard products, no matter who produces them and the
products are under the Icelandic Brand name, then there is no special need
for us to contact producers on individual bases. It is much simplerfor us to
contact one instead offive that are producing exactly the same products "25 .
250 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-2.
251 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 14.
252 Interview with a manager of IFPC subsidiary, 1-17.
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In a similar way, a producer pointed out its different needs regarding its
different products:
"For the standard products I am happy to get rid of it from my freezer
doors, butfor the more value added products and special products I almost
want to know how the consumers chew the products. Therefore I need to
have an overview of the whole process and direct communication to the
participants "253.
From these quotations it can be concluded that a mixture of direct and
central communication would fulfil the aims of both producers and IFPC. It
is more likely, however, that producers would like to have direct
communication with the person that has authority to take decisions about the
price and sale. Therefore it could be economical for the IFPC network to
have centralisation in the purchase of standard products no matter whether
they are sold in, for example, the UK or the US, and then to have direct
strategic alliances and communication between producers and marketing
subsidiaries concerning more value added special packing.
VI.2.2.3.5Socialmaturity and trust
One of the most interesting factors that emerged from this analysis was
when interlocutors talked about what could be called fashion and social
maturity. From the interviews it was clear that most of the interlocutors,
both inside IFPC and producers especially the younger ones, showed great
individualism and focussed very strongly on the performance of their
companies almost without regard to whether that would affect some other or
even their own business in the long run. This was apparent in what could
be called "fashion" and framed as "this is the way we do business today".
On the marketing side this appeared as the general belief that in order to
make profit you have to buy the product for further sales instead of selling it
through commission sale. This means that the transparency of the
transaction is gone, which could easily damage the trust between
participants. On the other hand the freedom and increased competition
make this not as serious as it would otherwise be.
253 Interview with manager ofPPCs, 1-19.
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Managers of IFPC pointed out the danger that will follow the trend where
participants stop to think about the interest of the whole and instead think
about their own narrow interests, as can been seen from the following
statement:
"There is a danger ofproducers forming a coalition and it is clear that all
the producers have not the maturity to think about the interest of the whole
instead oftheir own narrow interest.254"
This raises a question about the nature of a network like this. Is it, for
example, likely, that producers will participate in a network if it will not fit
to their own aims and strategy? According to producers this is not likely,
and it seems to be clear that they are willing to work with the marketing
subsidiaries in marketing their product in the long run, but clearly it has to
be to their own benefit and has to fulfil their own strategy. Hence, this will
increase the need for a flexible network to meet the different needs of
participants' companies.
The individualism that the author observed is in accordance with the
development in the network. The network is moving towards an open
market from the hierarchy where participants' companies have the freedom
to choose and where the benefits of participating in the network are
evaluated on the basis of competition. It is not unlikely that, due to the
newfound freedom, many participants' companies will try to experience the
markets on their own to get a feeling for what is happening there. Despite
this individualism, social maturity has played a big role in the operation of
this network, as can been seen from quotations:
"Although IFPC did not control the production, managers of IFPC
understood very well its role and many big producers were loyal when for
example, IFPC needed one container then it was possible to talk to few
producers and ask them to produce their wanted quantity and this was
usually easy 255 "
"Naturally it happens for some reasons that we cannot offer producers a
price that is the best or acceptable. Then the producer says' okay I will
254 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-3.
255 Interview with a manager of IFPC, 1-2.
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produce this' and often this product or party is connected to some other
contract256
This indicates that producers had the social maturity to make an adjustment
to their production to solve problems that occurred in the network. This
adjustment between producers and IFPC is based on trust and personal
contacts between managers of IFPC and its subsidiaries and managers of
producers' companies.
When the interlocutors were asked about whether the increased
individualism and economically based decisions had changed the
importance of trust and personal connection in the network, the answer was
"no". Still they claimed trust that was built on personal connection and
experience was also very important in the relationship in the network.
VI.2.3 Conclusion
In concluding this analysis of the IFPC network, one of the first matters that
occur is the question of why the network has been so conservative and
reactive to changes in the environment. One of the most obvious causes for
this is the form of IFPC in the way that it was until the 1999: that is, largely
a production-driven network. This is based on the fact that IFPC for most of
its operation time has defined its main role to be a "service unit for
producers". It is not until 1999 that there are changes in the way that IFPC
defines its role, which is now as an "international marketing company for
fish''''251. This conservatism can also be traced to a lack of freedom inside
the network and to the fact that the network did not have to face real
competition from other sales companies. Enforcing producers to sell then-
product through IFPC has on the other hand, meant that IFPC has been
forced to sell all their products. Hence, the network has mainly been driven
from the producers' needs rather than the needs of the markets.
The paradox in this is that nobody but producers themselves could change
this, and nobody but producers themselves put this enforcement on. This
leads to looking at the fact that until 1999 nobody regarded it as their role to
256 Interview with manager in IFPC Mother Company, 1-4.
257 Interview with Robert Gubfinnsson, chairman of the board of IFPC.
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lead changes in the network. Until then, no owner had a leading share in
IFPC, and even before IFPC became limited liability company equality
between producers made this difficult. This has lead to a clear lack of
leadership in the network, and indicates the need for someone to have a
defined role in leading the network. This supports the increased emphasis in
the literature about networks and the need for a leading company in the
network, as, for example, Lorenzoni G. and Baden-Fuller C., point out with
the "strategic centre", Jarillo C. J. with the "hub" firm258, Easton G. with the
"focal" firm259 and Grandori A. with the leadership of a central firm in a
constellation for the organisation260.
Academics have increasingly pointed out the importance of informal
governance and communication mechanisms in the operation of network.
This has been framed as the need for mutual adjustment261, personal
coordination and communication262, personal networks263 and processes of
mutual adaptation and learning264. The results from the IFPC case support
this, as emerged from the analysis that both formal and informal
mechanisms exist in the network. The informal is based on personal
communication and trust that leads to mutual adjustment of participant
companies in the network. By this the IFPC case supports the view that
governance in the network is based on both formal and informal
mechanism265.
It is interesting to recognise that in the IFPC case the formal mechanism of
centralisation worked against the increased tendency to use the informal
mechanism. Partly this can be explained by the need of the IFPC MC to
withhold power through centralisation and the general belief inside IFPC
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information. In this way, the IFPC case support Pfetfer when he points out
that power in a network is often gained from centralised control or
coordination over other participants in the network266. Throughout its
history IFPC MC has done both these, especially after 1986 when the MC is
left with only supportive activities and a lack of defined role in the network.
Lundgren points out that mutual adjustment and learning are the driving
forces for changes of the structure of networks, and that a perfectly
coordinated and balanced network is a static network2 1. In contrast, the
IFPC network is neither perfectly coordinated nor balanced, but a static
network. One explanation of this can be the lack of balance of power and
the dependency between actors in the IFPC network mainly in the form of
the lack of formal authority of the IFPC Mother Company over its
subsidiaries and its lack of a defined role in the network. This has meant
that IFPC Mother Company has been a barrier against changes in the
network, in harmony with the informal mechanism that has existed in the
network. In this way, there has been a change on the network and mutual
adjustment, but that has been exercised outside the formal mechanism.
Lorange and Roos point out that companies, and particularly the central or
focal companies in strategic alliances, tend to have some "black box" where
they protect unique proprietary skills and know-how from other companies
in case of a break-up of the alliances268. In the IFPC case this black box can
been seen as the brand names and marketing connection that clearly is in the
ownership of IFPC. In a similar way Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller claim "to
maintain the balance of power in the network, all central firms retain
certain activities. The control of the brand names and development of the
systems that integrate the network are two activities that give the
organisation a pivotal role and allow it to exercise power over the
system"269. Due to its lack of formal authority, IFPC has not been in a
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gained more formal authority and role to govern its subsidiaries, they have
the entire precondition to develop the system or create the environment that
is necessary in this network.
One aspect of this power balance is the power that lies in the hands of the
quota holders in the Icelandic fish industry. The previously described race
about the business relationship with one of the biggest producers in the fish
industry, UA, proves that the access to the fish stocks has become a major
issue in the network. This access to the fish stocks in the form of quotas
could be regarded as the "black box" of the owners of the fishing vessels.
The high vertical integration in the Icelandic fish industry maintains certain
power between the fisheries sector and the processing sector and helps the
producers to retain their power against the exporting companies.
It is clear that until 1999 a power struggle has existed between more or less
all actors in the IFPC network. One aspect of this power struggle, and the
role of IFPC MC in this process, is the transfer of knowledge inside the
network. IFPC MC maintained its status by blocking information and direct
contacts between producers and the sales subsidiaries. This was done
through the role of IFPC MC as the coordinator and as the point through
which information from the market was served to producers. This supports
Pfeffer when he claimed that power in networks often arises from
centralised control or coordination over other participants in the network270.
On the other hand, this has affected the flow of information and learning in
the network. Nearly all of the knowledge that IFPC MC returned to the
producers was second-hand from the markets in the form of production
instructions and newsletters. The centralisation of information has therefore
blocked for transfer of the embedded knowledge, which can arise through
direct communication between actors in the network. Badaracco described
the embedded knowledge as a "specialised relationship among individuals
and groups and in the particular norms, attitudes, information flows, and
ways of making decisions that shape their dealings with each other"21 x.
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think for them and "pre-cook" information as IFPC MC has done through its
history. Producers want to be able to build up their own knowledge about
the markets, which they have increasingly done through direct connection
with the markets and thereby starting to build up embedded knowledge and
feel for the market instead of building solely on information from IFPC MC.
One interesting aspect of the knowledge transfer is how little flow of staff
there is between the production sector and the markets. This is especially
true about the flow from the markets to the production companies. This is
slowly changing in that few employees from IFPC and its subsidiaries are
now working for the producers. This indicates that market knowledge has
not been moved from markets to producers. This also suggests a difference
in culture between the production and marketing sectors, built on the clear
division of activities between these two sectors and the interference of the
central firm.
From the previous discussion it becomes obvious that one of the single most
important factors in creating and operating a successful network is to create
an environment for participants' companies to work in. From the IFPC
case, it is clear that it is not the formal mechanism of rules and hand-
controlled coordination that is the essence of the governance in the network;
it is rather the informal network built on trust and direct connection between
actors. Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller support this when they emphasise that
the role of the strategic centre is not just to coordinate and rule the network,
but rather to create an atmosphere where the participating companies can be
creative and where the network can be flexible272. What is not always clear,
though, is what is included in the atmosphere and flexible network and what
is then included in the role of the central form in creating such an
environment. From the IFPC case, three main factors concerning this
environment emerged: first is the value creation in the network, second is
flexibility and freedom, and third is direct communication and connection.
The first factor is the value creation in the network and the possibility of
participants' companies to increase their value creation. In the IFPC case,
the environment has not been favourable for the producers in this matter,
272
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due to a conflict of interest between IFPC and its secondary processing and
producers. From the IFPC case it is also clear that products can be split into
two main groups, that is, standard products that could be sold on the trade
market and special products (that is, value added products) where producers
need to be involved in all steps in the value chain. The conflict between
secondary processing by IFPC and producers is obvious and has in many
ways delayed further value creation by producers. IFPC has recognised this
problem and approached it by separating resale and secondary processing in
the UK.
Advocates of free competition claim that this conflict of interest is no
problem, and that the freedom to choose and competition will solve this.
Hence, if IFPC does not offer the best deal or price then the producers will
go somewhere else. This will create pressure on IFPC to offer the best deal.
It is claimed here that this would increase the opportunism of producers and
change the relationship into an ad-hoc business relationship that is unlikely
to increase value creation in the network in the long run. It is more likely
that IFPC will focus on how to create the environment where participants'
companies can work together to create and increase the value creation in the
network as a whole, so all participants' companies will benefit. A
precondition of this is the need to deal with the conflict of interest in the
network that is affecting this, and to ensure that the network will become
market driven instead of production-driven, as it has been. This can be done
by increasing the emphasis on the marketing subsidiaries and their
connection to producers in marketing their products. From observing the
operation in the network, it became clear that interlocutors very seldom
talked about marketing of the products, but just about selling products.
When this became clear interlocutors were asked about this, and most of
them claimed this was due to the lack of stability of the producers caused by
their opportunism. Hence, the emphasis was not on marketing fish products
but rather just selling the products.
The second factor is the flexibility and freedom in the network. It is perhaps
a paradox after talking about the need for stability and value creation to talk
about the freedom to leave the network. Interlocutors claimed that it was
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important for the network and IFPC to be facing competition where
participating companies would evaluate their participation in the network on
the basis of competition instead of being enforced to participate. In
addition, the freedom will keep IFPC on a constant search for the best way
to operate its business, which will drive forces for changes; the endless
search for that is the best environment to operate in. In a network like IFPC,
with a high number of participants many with different strategic aims and
resources, it is important that the network is flexible to be able to fulfil the
different strategies of the participants' companies. Hence, lack of resources
by smaller participants' companies can mean that they require more service.
This has been the case for IFPC but IFPC MC has more or less treated all
producers in the same way regardless to their needs. Therefore, in a
network with a mixture of small and bigger companies, it is essential to
have a flexible mechanism to meet the different needs of individual
participants. This differs from strategic alliances or networks with fewer
participants that often have a narrower scope and are often bound to certain
projects. Such alliances or networks demand a much simpler mechanism of
operation than networks with a high number of participants.
The last part in this discussion about the environment concerns direct
connection and communication between participants in the network. From
the IFPC case, it became clear that both producers and the sales people put
great emphasis on the importance of direct communication between actors
in the network. The direct communication was the essence of creating trust
between actors in the network that leads to will to make mutual adjustment
between the companies. On the other hand intermediates in the form of a
central firm without some value adding activities as IFPC MC can lead to
lack of trust in the values that he behind the information that is given to
producers. The lack of direct communication, and the emphasis on serving
and "pre-cooking" information and thinking for the producers, has acted as a
barrier towards learning and knowledge creation by producers.
To conclude this discussion about the environment it is claimed here that
IFPC and its owners have not put enough emphasis on creating a suitable
environment for the actors in the network to work inside. IFPC has put too
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much emphasis on offering producers the best deal in terms of price and on
serving the producers instead of creating a system where participants'
companies can mature and think and act for themselves on their own terms.
Research on networks and strategic alliances has pointed out that such inter¬
company relationships have moved from formal product-driven alliances
towards more informal ones273. This development seems to be suggesting
that alliances are becoming more informal, knowledge-based, objective and
market-driven than they were in the past. The development of IFPC is
clearly in this direction, that is, to a more informal network. It is difficult to
say whether it is becoming more marketing driven instead of production
driven network but it is clear that the informal mechanism in the IFPC
network has pushed much more towards becoming a marketing-driven
network. While as the informal mechanism has been more focused on
building up knowledge by direct communication with the markets,
meanwhile the formal mechanism is much more information based rather
than knowledge-based.
The conclusion from the IFPC case is that it is essential for marketing
networks that cover multiple steps in the value chain to have strategic
leadership where the main aim is to create an environment that is flexible,
within which all the participants' companies can operate and fulfil their own
strategy and goals. This network has to be marketing-driven, focusing on
the opportunity of the participants' companies to increase their value
creation, and on all the steps in the value chain working together to create
value instead of destroying value by blocking knowledge from moving
freely between actors in the network. A pre-condition to this is the freedom
to choose: that is, that the network has to compete with its competitors and
other options for the participants' companies. Hence, inside the network the
competitiveness is built on cooperation between the actors with the
emphasis on creating competitive supply/value chain, but what keeps the
network together is the continuous evaluation with other competition. In
this way, the network will be in an endless search for better ways to operate
its business and avoid the stagnation that has characterised the network of
273
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IFPC. To be able to do this it is necessary that there is some owner of the
network or some central firm that has a well-defined role to lead the
network. It is clear, although the governance is based on an informal
mechanism, that without the overall leadership and some formal mechanism
it is likely that the governance will be based on putting out fires that arise
from a lack ofoverall aim and strategy.
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VII Conclusion
This chapter is split into four parts, the first being the mutual conclusion and
the comparison drawn from the two studied cases. The aim of this section is
to draw on the differences between the cases as well as the factors that are
mutual for both cases. The second part discusses the implications that this
research will have for the Icelandic fish industry and the third part
highlights the theoretical implications of this research. Finally, suggestions
for further research are discussed in the fourth part.
VJI.l Mutual Conclusion and Comparison.
In this chapter a conclusion is drawn from the two cases ofUIFP and IFPC
as well as looking at how these cases have contributed to finding an answer
to the research question on which this thesis is based. A comparison will
also be made between the two cases in order to put forward a general
implication from the study.
The research question that was put forward is "What is the role of the
"central firm " in strategic alliances involving large numbers of small and
medium size enterprises?
a) What is the role of the central firm in the governance
(administrative mechanism/coordination/management) of the
alliances?
b) What methods have been used to coordinate activities and actors
in the alliances as a whole?
c) How has the structure ofthe alliances changed over the operation
time and what has influenced these changes? "
Other topics or themes also emerged in the analysis of the cases but these
questions will be used as guidance in drawing the mutual conclusion of the
two cases.
VII.1.1 Form and Structure of the Alliances
In order to start this discussion it is helpful to look at the last part of the
research question that is the structure of the alliances. Both alliances have
moved from being joint ventures between producers to being independent
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Limited Liability Companies and in the case of UIFP in minority ownership
of producers. It is interesting to see that during most of the operational time
of these two joint ventures the "child" had a dominant status in the
relationship with its "parents", that is the producers. This inversion of the
status in the joint venture can be traced to factors such as increased
independence of the child, the position of the child as a central firm in the
value chain, large numbers of parents, the small size of the parents'
companies and equality between the parents.
Independence was granted to the child in both cases when they, in their
early days, were suffering from a lack of freedom from their parents. This
increased freedom made it possible for the child to build up own capital as
well as gaining increased freedom in financial matters. Also the child
achieved increased freedom and independence in governing its own matters
without parental interference on day-to-day basis. Due to this increased
freedom and independence and the position of the child as a central firm in
the value chain dominant stances against its members, that is producers
were quickly built up. The child achieved the dominant status by nature of
this central position. Hence, the central firm took control of one of the most
important features of the network, that is the flow of information and
therefore the flow of knowledge and learning in the network. The analysis
of the two cases undertaken in chapter VI showed that the central firm
blocked this flow of information both consciously and unconsciously, which
gave the central firm dominant position over its producers. Another factor
that affects this and made the status of the child stronger is the high number
of parents in the network. In addition to the high number of parents, the
rather small size and equalisation made it almost impossible for individual
parents or blocks of them to dominate the child. This was the essence of
both networks, that is, no members could dominate the alliances for their
own benefit. The downfall of this system is that the child is almost without
ownership. This cause a lack of strategic leadership in the network whereas
the child, in a dominating position in the network but not holding a defined
role of leadership in the network, has grown and developed on more or less
an ad hoc bases depending on the environment and its own interest each
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time. The result of this lack of ownership and leadership in the network will
be discussed in more detail later in this concluding chapter.
It is clear from the analysis undertaken in chapter VI that both the business
environment in the fishing industry and the economic environment have had
great impact on the development of the networks. Before the ownership
change, both networks were built on enforcement. This can be traced to the
monopoly of UIFP and the duopoly of IFPC and IS on selling fish products
the to US. These export barriers formed exit barriers inside the fishing
industry where producers were almost in a position of not being able to
leave the marketing organisation due to export barriers. Hence, the
marketing companies never had to face any really serious competition for
the producers' business from other marketing companies. The analysis of
the two cases showed that competition is entering more and more into the
relationship as well as into the fishing industry as a whole. The analysis
revealed that many of the new generations of managers both in the
marketing companies and production companies, tended to view the
environment as completely competitive, believing that competition would
solve all their problems. One aspect of this increased competition in
marketing the fish products is the increased concentration in the fishing and
processing sectors that has occurred in the past few years. This
concentration can mainly be traced to increased access to capital through
improved admittance of the companies to the stock markets and the ITQ
system that allows the companies to buy out or merge with other companies
in the fishing sector. Despite this view, it is clear that the marketing
companies built their competitive stance in the markets not least on
cooperation and a good relationship with the producers.
Another view of the environment surrounding the two networks is that
pressure from the stakeholders has highly influenced the development of the
two networks. Before 1990, these stakeholders were mainly the producers
and the government through its involvement in controlling the economic
environments in Iceland as described in chapter III.5. After the ownership
changes of the two networks, the shareholders took over as the most
influential stakeholders. The impact of shareholders became obvious in the
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IFPC case of the annual meeting for the year 1998 when one producer
"bought" himself the seat of Chairman of the Board. Producers still own a
majority share in IFPC in 1999 but in the UIFP case the producers own just
around 20% of the total share in the company making it obvious that others
beside producers are becoming the most influential stakeholders. Another
example of external influence on the structure of the industry is the fisheries
management system that is controlled by the parliament. By allowing the
quotas to be moved between fishing vessels, the structure of the industry has
changed through increased concentration in the fishing and processing
sectors. The government can clearly control the development in the fishing
industry through the fisheries management system, which can have a great
impact on the structure of the industry and the network. Flence, the impact
on the networks of external stakeholders, such as the government and the
shareholders suggests that it is necessary to add environmental factors, such
as stakeholders' impact to the analysis of networks. It is claimed here that
bringing the stakeholders impact into the analysis would bring more depth
into the network perspective as Hakansson and Johanson1 have put forward.
At the same time as the environment is getting more and more mixed by
being both competitive and cooperative it is clear that the increased
competition in the networks has accelerated changes in their structure and
nature. Before the ownership change, both networks were conservative and
slow to react to changes in the environment. Competition and freedom have
acted as driving forces for change to the network and, in the case of IFPC,
made it more flexible towards the needs of individual producers. Also
concentration amongst the producers has increased their demand for service
from the marketing companies. In the same way, this concentration has
made the producers better capable of taking on more complicated and
demanding tasks than before. This flexibility does not have as high a
priority in UIFP due to the homogeneous products that they are buying from
their producers. It is, however clear that after the ownership changes the
relationship between the marketing companies and the producers is much
1
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more clearly defined and producers should know much better what to
expect.
In the joint venture, the interface between each producer and the marketing
company was more or less the same, meaning that all producers had access
to the same service on an equal basis. After the ownership change, the
nature of the alliances changed from being a joint venture between
producers into individual alliances between the marketing companies and
each individual producer. Therefore, the nature of the alliances became
more complicated due to the different aims of each producer which the
network has to meet. Due to this, as well as the influence of the
environment on the network, it is concluded that to view the relationship
after the ownership changes, the network perspective is necessary. The
network perspective views the relationship between companies in the
alliances in a more holistic way than just studying individual alliances
between actors in the network . Each producer contributes to the network
by, for example, broadening the scope of the products, which are for sale, as
well as maintaining the economy of scale of the network. Vice versa, each
producer benefits from the contribution of other producers to the network by
keeping it effective and economical. This supports the view that network
should be studied as a whole instead of individual business relationships
between producers and the marketing companies. Hence, the use of
network perspective offers good guidelines to the study of the two networks.
It is clear from these two cases that the lack of freedom and competition in
the network has made it conservative and stagnant. The lack of ownership
has also supported this development towards stagnation whereas the
network has lacked the clear strategy and authority that clear ownership is
more likely to provide. It can therefore be concluded that in networks as
UIFP and IFPC, the freedom to leave the network and the constant
evaluation of all options that follow competition are vital for networks, as
this is the driving force for changes. In the same way, clear ownership and
authority is essential to move the changes forward. Fundgren points out that
mutual learning adjustment and learning are the driving forces for changes
2 See for example Axelsson, B.; Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J., 1992.
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in a network3 but the conclusion here is that the precondition for that to
happen, is that the network is operating in competition, with the freedom to
leave and clear ownership or leadership.
VII.1.2 Governance of the Alliances
The mechanisms of governance for both UIFP and IPFC have been based on
centralisation of coordinating activities and the information flow. In the
IFPC case, it is clear that two mechanisms exist, a) the formal mechanism4
based on centralisation and rules and b) the informal mechanism5 that builds
on direct communication and personal contact between actors in the
network. This is not as clear in the UIFP case where the formal mechanism
built on centralisation has more or less been maintained. There was no clear
indication that either producers or UIFP subsidiaries have tried to avoid this
formal mechanism and centralisation. Despite this formal mechanism of
UIFP, personal contacts and mutual adjustment of the individual companies
in the network were used to maintain the mechanism and to solve problems
that arose in the network on an ad-hoc basis. However this mutual
adjustment was exercised much more in the IFPC network due to more
complicated products and marketing conditions.
It emerged from the research findings in chapter VI that both these
companies used centralisation in order to gain and maintain power in the
value chain. This reflects Pfeffer's view that power can arise from
centralisation of control and activities6. This is obvious in the case of IFPC
due to a lack of authority over its subsidiaries and producers. In the UIFP it
is rather the nature of the business, homogeneous products, few buyers and
a high number of small producers that justify this centralisation. It has to be
considered when generalising from this that it is not until after 1985-90 that
the business environment in Iceland and the economy, the size of the
3
Lundgren, A.
4 Formal mechanism is defined here the administrative mechanism based on rules, centralisation,
communication through the hierarchy of the companies but not direct and description on how
things should be done.
5 Informal mechanism is based on direct communication, decentralisation, mutual adjustment, and




producers and producers' capability, made it possible for them to take on
more responsibility and therefore push for changes to this centralisation.
Until 1985-90 participant companies in both networks seemed to have
accepted this centralisation as an economical way of achieving the
coordination.
Due to the centralisation of the mechanism in both cases, the mechanism is
characterised by the methods of a vertically integrated firm. Johnston and
Lawrence describe this characteristic well when they say that large
vertically integrated companies tend to share as little knowledge as possible
as well as, in many cases, viewing their external relationship in accordance
with the dominant competitive perspective, concentrating on maintaining
bargaining power over their divisions and subsidiaries7. In addition to this,
the bureaucratic structure results in the managers' lack of knowledge about
activities along the value adding chain8. Although Johnston and Lawrence
describe large vertically integrated firms, the description is transferable to
the mechanism of the two cases. The tendency to share as little knowledge
as possible is especially true for IFPC before 1986 and UIFP for more or
less all its period of operation. The dominant stance of the central firm is
also in accordance to this description. The small amount of knowledge
sharing was in both cases, due to blocking of communication between these
sectors. Bjarnason supports these results in his research on export
behaviour in the Icelandic fish industry which revealed that inadequate
communication between producers and the marketing organisation has
impelled producers to go into direct export themselves. Bjarnason claims,
"Further involvement of the PIE-19 firms in exporting was provoked by
factors such as increased marketing orientation and enthusiasm among
managers in these firms, too much product specialisation of the Principal
EMCs' , inadequate level of communication between the P1E-1 Firms and
1
Johnston, R. & Lawrence, R. P.
8
Johnston, R. & Lawrence, R. P.
9 PIE-1 stands for Partially Integrated Exporters-1. They are key members and principal owners of
marketing organisations as UIFP and IFCP and sell all their frozen and salted products through
those companies.
10
Principal EMCs stands for Principal export management companies, which includes both UIFP and
IFCP.
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the Principal EMCs, and a failure by the Principal EMCs to respond to
some structural changes within the fishing industry.1 " Bjarnason is here
referring to how slow the big marketing companies such as IFPC, UIFP and
IS, have been to respond to changes.
Concerning the governance of the network the question as to whether to
support centralisation or not became one of the main issues. With increased
size and capability of the producers they have made more demands on being
responsible for their marketing operation and are less grateful for the
interference of the central firm into day-to-day activities. This became
much clearer in the IFPC case where the producers as well as the marketing
subsidiaries showed signs of desiring to avoid the centralisation that was
exercised in the network. In this matter there is difference between these
two cases. First of all, after 1990 IFPC, the central firm had no core
activities in the value chain after the sale was transferred to the marketing
subsidiaries1 . UIFP has always had some core activities in the central firm
and put less emphasis on transferring them to the markets. The
homogeneous products of UIFP also help in maintaining the centralisation.
After IFPC transferred its sales to the markets, other participants have
increasingly started to view them as a cost in the process much rather then
having value adding impact. The development of IFPC, that is to transfer
the activities to participants' companies, reflects Lorenzoni and Baden-
Fuller's view when they claim that successful central firms tend to stick to
very few core skills and assets and hand out as much as possible of the
resources, making the alliances ac much as value adding for the
participating companies as possible13. On the other hand, the case ofUIFP
is much more in the direction of the vertically integrated firm where the
main emphasis is on their own value creation instead of the participants'
companies.
One of the issues concerning the governance mechanism is that in the IFPC
case, the central firm suffered from a lack of defined role in the process after
"
Bjarnason, A., page 325.
12 See discussion in chapter VI. 1.2.1.2 and VI.2.2.1.2.
13
Lorenzoni, G. & Baden-Fuller, C.
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they moved the core activities to the marketing subsidiaries, while the UIFP
had a defined role in taking care of core activities, as for example sales.
This indicated the need for the central firm to have some defined role in the
process. According to the research, two ways to approach this emerged.
The first is to have some core activities, as in the case of UIFP, through
selling to some markets and taking care of all purchases of products in
Iceland. Hence, the central firm is seen as having some role in the process
as well as making the perceptibility of the transaction and value creation
difficult. The other approach is to leave the process, as IFPC is planning to
do (in 1999). The precondition for the central firm to leave the process is
that they obtain the necessary authority to place them selves in a
strategically leading position in the process where they have a defined role
of leading the network and creating the environment for participants'
companies. Thus the central firm becomes what is called in the literature as
a "strategic centre"14. Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller claim that the essence of
successful strategic alliance is the need for the network to have strategic
leadership in form of a "central firm"15. They take an example from the
Italian textile industry (Benetton) of a vertical network in the value adding
chain. The two cases taken here are both of a vertical network in the value
adding chain, so the similarity is clear. The two cases support the need for a
strategic centre in a network that is responsible for creating environment for
participants' companies and to implement changes that are needed to
maintain the network. This is supported by the fact that both of these
networks have lacked clear leadership and ownership making the network
conservative and slow to respond to changes in the environment. This
supports Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller when they say that without strategic
leadership the network becomes unable to meet the challenges of today's
markets16.
The need for strategic leadership in the networks raises questions on
methods of governing networks. Three main forms of governance can be
14
Lorenzoni, G. & Baden-Fuller, C.
15
Lorenzoni, G. & Baden-Fuller, C.
16
Lorenzoni, G. & Baden-Fuller, C.
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analysed for the literature and the two cases taken in this research. In the
network perspective the emphasis is put on almost "grassroots" movements
where the driving force for change can be traced to direct communication
and mutual adjustment amongst the participants' companies17. On the other
hand the theory behind the strategic centre puts emphasis on the need for
someone in the network to be responsible for leading the network, which
has been, defined here as informal mechanism18. The third method of a
vertically integrated firm emerged from the analysis of the two cases where
the governance is highly characterised by centralisation defined here as the
formal mechanism. It is claimed here that the centralisation in the network
and the clear separation of activities that occurs between the production and
marketing sectors have damaged the possibility of value creation for the
producers. Centralisation has acted as a barricade to the transfer of
knowledge between these two sectors by blocking direct communication
and information flow. This has also created and maintained two different
cultures in the two sectors built on clear cut activities between these two
sectors and the interference of the central firm.
The research showed that there is a need for the mixture of formal and
informal mechanisms of governing marketing networks as in these two
cases. Due to the high number of participants' companies, and often their
small size the formal mechanism and centralisation is in many ways more
economical than the informal mechanism built on direct communication
between all actors in the network. This is especially valid when the
products are standardised and under the brand name of the marketing
companies. Then it is much more economical to centralise the buying or
selling of those products instead of having sales people in the markets
contacting all the producers and even competing with each other for the
products. On the other hand, in value added products and more specialised
products direct communication and overview of all steps in the value chain
is necessary. In a similar way it emerged from the research that the informal
mechanism with direct communication and overview over the value chain is
17 See for example Axelsson, B.; Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J.; Alter, C & Hage, J.
18 See for example Lorenzoni, G. & Baden-Fuller, C; Jarillo, C. J.; Grandori, A.
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much more likely to be value creating than the formal mechanism that often
blocks the route for direct communication and contacts. It is therefore
concluded that this marketing network with a high number ofparticipants'
companies needs to support a mixture ofmechanisms to govern the network;
the formal to make it economical and the informal to create value for the
participants' companies.
VII.1.3 Role of the Central Firm
Before the ownership changes, both UIFP and IFPC defined their role
against their producers to be "Service Company" or "Service Unit" for
them. Hence, during most of the period of operation the two companies
focused on serving the producers' need by selling their products. This
resulted in the network being driven by the products of its members. An
example of this as explicit in the interviews where almost all of the
interlocutors never talked about marketing of products, only about selling
products. Interlocutors claimed that this was due to the nature of the
network selling their products as well as the lack of authority of the central
firm as a previously quoted statement from a manager inside IFPC in
chapter VI.2 indicates.
"It is difficult to see how we could be a leading force and also have some
political influence because we are just a service unit in the ownership of the
companies that we should have political influence on.19 "
This is especially true in the case of IFPC. After the ownership change both
companies have redefined their roles and the definition of UIFP is to be an
"international marketing and production company in chilled fish
production"20 and for IFPC it is "a global sales and marketing company for
frozen fish products. "2I In the case of UIFP it is clear that soon after the
ownership changes UIFP changed its strategy and the role of the central
firm. Now it was not meant to be a service unit but a freestanding
marketing company and later on a production company as well. This has
become explicit in the way that UIFP has become a vertically integrated
19 Interview with manager of IFPC, 1-3.
20 Taken from UIFP strategy on the www.sif.is.
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company and in a sense this is in competition with its producers in Iceland.
IFPC started later in this development and it is not until 1999 that IFPC is
moving from being more or less a service unit towards a more freestanding
business unit responsible for creating and leading its network.
What can be learned from the history of these two cases is that there is
definitely a need for some leading company in the network. Before the
ownership change ofUIFP and IFPC, the central firm had all the potential to
do that, but lacked the authority to lead the network. In addition, it has not
been recognised or defined by the participants' companies that the central
firm should have the role of leading the network. From the literature
analysis it emerged that the role of the central firm in the network should be
twofold, first, to strategically lead the network and second, to create the
environment in which the participants' company should work. What
emerged from the two cases is that the two networks have lacked this
leadership and failed to create the environment. Therefore it can be
concluded that in order for networks or strategic alliances with a large
numbers ofparticipants' companies, to become successful they need to be
led and governed by a strategic centre, which has the necessary authority to
implement changes to make the alliances competitive on the markets and
effective for the participants' companies. As was pointed out in the
literature analyses it is often unclear what factors should be included in this
environment which the central firm is meant to be responsible for creating.
A lesson can be drawn from the two cases. The main factor, which should
be prevalent in the environment, is the flexibility to meet individual
demands of participants' companies and value creation in the network, that
is, how encouraging the environment is for the participants' companies to
increase their value creation.
It emerged that the two cases did not have the same needs regarding the
networks' environment. Producers in UIFP had much less need for flexible
environment than IFPC. This is due to the homogeneous products ofUIFP.
It was interesting that in interviews with producers standing outside UIFP
much was talked about the lack of flexibility and the possibility of achieving
21 Taken from IFPC website http://www.icelandic.is/.
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their own strategy. This was given as an explanation as to why they did not
stay in the business of UIFP. On the other hand, in IFPC there was
definitely a need for a flexible network, whereas producers required direct
communication with their customers. But they also had standardised
products that they were happy to get rid of as soon as possible and without
any specific knowledge of who bought them. Hence, it can be concluded
that the processing stage of the products determines the needs for direct
communication and the degree of flexibility required by the network or in
other words, "standardised products and/or low value added products
demands little flexibility22 meanwhile special products and/or high value
added products call for much more flexible environment with direct
communication and overview ofall the value chain".
Another aspect of the environment is the value creation, which from the
research analysis emerged as the single most important factor in the
network. The same can be said about the demands on value creation as was
said referring to flexibility; that is, the process stage affects the demands.
Low value added (less processed) and/or standardised products demand not
much of value creation and vice versa. Two forms of value creation
emerged in the analysis undertaken in chapter VI. In the UIFP network the
emphasis on the value creation is entirely on value creation inside UIFP
itself instead of what of the producers. The producers get value creation
more effectively through the system of UIFP and in the form of higher
prices, less stocking time and quicker payment. UIFP is not focusing on
value adding in the form of further or secondary processing, by its producers
but rather on secondary production inside their own constellation. On the
other hand, IFPC needs to think of the value creation of its producers in the
form of further processing. For the majority of producers inside IFPC, the
possibility of increasing their value creation is essential. Affecting this is
the conflict of interest in the network where IFPC itself, through its
subsidiaries, is in secondary processing, causing certain competition and
conflict with its producers. It emerged from the analysis in chapter VI that
22 A flexible environment for participants' companies means the ability of the network to meet the
different needs of the participant companies.
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this conflict has delayed the development of further processing in the
processing sector in Iceland. This is due to a lack of information from the
markets to the producers, which has blocked transfer of knowledge between
these two sectors. This has affected the ability of the network to learn and
adapt to market conditions. Learning and knowledge that the marketing
subsidiaries acquire have not been returned to producers. The explanation
for the blocking of information from the markets to the producers is
twofold. The first was the previously described centralisation of
information flow by the central firm traced to a lack of authority and a
defined role in the value chain. This was discussed earlier in this concluding
chapter. The second explanation is the conflict of interest that occurs when
the marketing subsidiaries, which are responsible for returning the
information from the markets, are in secondary processing as well.
Participants in the research were more or less unanimous. It has to be
recognised that managers are human and if they are in a situation of
conflicting interests will think of their own interest before they think of
others' needs, especially when the profitability of their companies may be
damaged. Hence, managers of subsidiaries that are both operating a
marketing office and a secondary processing plant are in position where
interests conflict with the producers. As a result, they will think first of the
subsidiaries' needs. The research findings suggest that it is unlikely that
these managers will return information to producers in a way it will
encourage them to go into further processing in competition with the
subsidiary.
It is concluded in this research that one of the "major roles of the central
firm is to an create environment that is value creating for the participants'
companies. The precondition for value creation is to avoid a conflict of
interests between actors in the value chain and to establish the
uninterrupted transfer of information and knowledge between actors and
levels in the value chain". This means direct communication that will
support and stimulate producers to become value creative where they will
have an overview of the whole value chain. Direct communication supports
both better marketing knowledge by producers and better knowledge and
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understanding by the marketing sector of the needs and aims of the
producers. The paradox here is that this is relevant to special products, but
in standardised products certain centralisation can return better value
creation for the participants' companies through a more economical and
effective system than direct communication between all actors in the
network. By this the network will have to move from being product driven
to become a knowledge and information driven network where the emphasis
is not just on migrated knowledge but rather embedded knowledge that
builds up learning inside the participants' companies. This supports the
increased emphasis in the literature about learning and the importance of
knowledge transfer in the network23. The research shows that the
precondition for this is an environment which is flexible and has eliminated
conflict of interest between participants' companies.
To sum up the conclusion, it is clear that the governance of networks and
strategic alliances does not fall under the visible hand of the hierarchy or
vertically integrated firm or the invisible hand of the free markets. In the
same way it is difficult to locate the two networks in between the two
extremes of hierarchy and markets. Much rather a third dimension is
needed in this picture of hierarchy and markets, where the rationalisation of
the network is based on cooperation, i.e. a win-win strategy that supports the
use of Quchi's model24 described earlier in chapter V.2 and figure V.4.
Despite this, the research shows that freedom25 and certain competition is
essential for the network to push for evaluation on the performance of the
network thus creating a driving force for changes to the network's structure
and operation. In the same way, clear ownership and/or leadership is
necessary to implement these changes. In a network where ownership is not
clear or equality is an important factor it is essential that some companies or
actors have the defined role to govern and lead the network and are
supported with sufficient authority. The most suitable candidate to govern
and lead the network is the central firm. Whether it is directly participating
23 See for example Badaracco, J. L. Jr.
24 Jarillo, C. J.
25 Freedom is defined here as the freedom for producers to evaluate and choose the way ofmarketing
their products.
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in the value chain or plays only a governance and leadership role in the
process does not matter. Hence it is essential that a network with a high
number of participants' companies is governed and led by actors that have
the defined role and authority to do so. According to these findings this role
of the leading company should include the role of governance of the
network as well as that of a strategic leader creating and maintaining the
network environment.
VI1.2 Theoretical Implications
This research contributes to the literature in three main fields. Firstly, the
research contributes to literature in the networking of small firms, especially
networks with a high number of participants' companies. Secondly, this
research identifies important factors of governing network such as the need
for ownership and the fat that some companies have the defined role of
governing and leading the network. Thirdly, the research findings
contribute to the network perspective and a better understanding of it,
especially the importance of environmental factors relating to the
development of the networks.
The research findings have an implication on the limited literature about
networking for small firms with a high number of participants' companies.
The conclusion of this research strongly indicates the need for a network to
be led and governed by a responsible company. The findings suggest that
due to the high number of participants' companies, the network can be in a
situation where it lacks ownership. This emerged where equalisation
between participants' companies was the aim and where no company had
the responsibility to lead and govern the network. This indicated a
difference from most of the literature relating to network and strategic
alliances26 where the emphasis is rather on the danger created where
companies in the network are trying to dominate its governance and
strategy, thus damaging the network. The findings support Doz where he
claims that the "operating interface between the two partners cannot be left
26 See for example Harrigan, R. K.. 1985 and 1988.
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to change and to ad hoc adjustment.27" This research reveals that this is the
same for networks with a high number of participants' companies, i.e. the
governance cannot be left to some ad hoc changes and adjustment. Hence,
the network needs both formal and informal mechanisms to make the
governance effective and competitive.
This brings the discussion towards the governance of the network. The
literature about the governance of a network or the nature ofthat governance
has in many ways been unclear. The literature about strategic alliances and
networks is often characterised by a discussion of the relationship between
two or a few companies, as a previous quotation from Doz shows28. In
addition, the network perspective places a strong emphasis on such informal
mechanisms as mutual adjustment and personal contacts in coordinating
• • • 90 • •
activities . Furthermore, the research findings indicate that a formal
mechanism is necessary in governing the network as well as having a
company in the network that is responsible for leading and governing the
network. This supports literature that points out the need for strategic
leadership that has been defined as "centre"30, "hub firm"31 or "focal
firm"32. At the same time, the research findings support the need for the
informal mechanism to govern the network and to build up trust that
supports the managers of participants' companies to meet each other's needs
by mutual adjustment.
The findings of this research indicate that it is freedom and competition
which are the driving forces for changes in the network. This emerged in
cases where there was no company in the group researched that was
responsible for changing the network or had the necessary authority to do
so. Therefore it is clear that a network with a high number of participants'
companies need to be governed and led by a central or focal firm that has







30 Lorenzoni, G. & Baden-Fuller, C.
31 Jarillo, C. J.
32
Easton, G.; Built on Mattsson, 1986
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without this the network will stagnate and become too slow in responding to
changes in the environment.
The role of the central firm can, however, never be the same as with the
headquarters of vertically integrated companies where the authority is much
clearer. According to the findings, the role of the central firm should rather
be to create the environment and lead the strategy of the network. This
supports Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller where they claim that the rule of the
central firm is to create an atmosphere rather than just coordinate and rule
the network33. The research findings also support Lorenzoni and Baden-
Fuller where they claim that the two most important factors of this
environment are flexibility of the participants' companies to meet their own
strategic goal and the possibility for value creation34. In the value creation,
a conflict of interest between the central firm and other participants pinpoint
the danger of internal conflict in the network that can block information
flow and therefore the learning process of the participants' companies.
Therefore the research contributes to the literature by pointing out how an
internal conflict in the network can undermine the possibility of
participants' companies becoming value creative, by leading to too much
centralisation and blocking of direct communication. An example of this is
taken in chapters VI. 1.2. and VI.2.2 where in the UIFP the lack of
information from the markets has caused the failure of the grading system to
reflect the markets thus causing lower value adding in Iceland. A similar
example is taken from IFPC where the conflict between the secondary
processing of IFPC and primary processing by producers have resulted in
information from the markets not being returned to the producers.
The research findings shed new fight on the need for clear governance in the
network where a mixture of formal and informal mechanisms is used. The
formal mechanism is to bring in the necessary effectiveness and the
informal to create flexibility and value for participants' companies. It also
revealed the danger of placing too much emphasis on the formal mechanism
and centralisation which could block the flow of information and knowledge
33 Lorenzoni. G. & Baden-Fuller, C.
34
Lorenzoni, G. & Baden-Fuller, C.
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thus damaging learning and value creation in the network. This supports the
literature on networks where the emphasis is much more on the informal
mechanism or governance based on mutual adjustment and learning35.
Although the research findings indicate the need for an informal
mechanism, it is also clear that where there are a high number of
participants' companies, the formal mechanism needs to be much clearer
than in a relationship with only two companies. It is difficult to find a
balance between the economic need of the formal mechanism and the need
for creativity and flexibility of the informal mechanism. One of the most
important elements that influence the balance between the formal
mechanism of centralisation and informal mechanism of decentralisation is
the processing stage of the products. Hence, for standardised and less value
creative products, centralisation is a more effective and economical way of
coordinating activities. Therefore, in a centralised formal mechanism the
value creation for participants' companies is mainly through the
effectiveness and low cost of selling the products. On the other hand as the
processing stage and value creation increase, the demands for
decentralisation get higher. The research findings indicate that "the
informal mechanism with decentralisation and direct communication was
much more likely to create value for the participants' companies'".
Finally, the research implications are concerned with the network
perspective that is increasingly quoted in the academic literature relating to
cooperation between companies. The development of the two cases
supports Devanna and Thichy where they claim that strategic alliances are
getting more informal and more specific in scope36. It emerged that as the
marketing companies became more independent, the relationship with the
producers loosened up. In the case of UIFP this became evident where
UIFP do not have a contract with their producers. The relationship is based
rather on trust between the companies. This development, on the other
hand, indicates the need to view the relationship as a network with
individual strategic alliances between the marketing companies and each
35 See for example Lundgren, A.
36 Devanna. A. M. & Thichy, N.
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producer. These strategic alliances could then differ depending on the need
and scope of the business that is included in the relationship. This research
supports the need for the network perspective and with a history over fifty
years these two networks show that obviously an organisational-form of
network can be as competitive as much of a go-it-alone strategy, especially
for small companies.
In the two cases studied, the business environment had a great impact on the
form, structure and operation of the network. Included in this business
environment are governmental decisions and the economic environment in
which the network is operating. With increased freedom in the Icelandic
economy this has changed. Now it is rather the shareholders that put on the
pressure for different approaches to the operation where profitability is the
single most important factor. These external or environmental factors could
be phrased as stakeholders' pressure. The impact of this kind ofpressure on
the network suggests that it has to be taken into consideration in analysing
networks. This suggests a need for broadening the basic network
perspective that Hakansson and Johanson put forward and consists ofactors,
activities and resource37. The analysis suggests that stakeholders' impact
should be recognised and including in the analysis as presented in figure
VII. 1.
Network of
Figure VII.l Network perspective
37
Hakansson, H. & Johanson, J., 1992.
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Another option is to regard the stakeholders as actors in the network. It is
clear that the impact of the stakeholders can differ between networks. In the
Icelandic economy, the impact of the export of fish products is considerable
and the two cases chosen here play an important role in that export. It is not
strange therefore that the government and other stakeholders have tried to
influence the way they have developed. An example of external influence
in the networks can be seen from this research where the fisheries
management system, that is the quota system, has a clear influence on the
actors and resources in the network. Hence, government can have a major
role as a stakeholder and put external pressure on the network. The findings
support the need to consider the environment in which the companies are
working and its impact on the companies and the network instead of
viewing the company as a completely freestanding unit not being influenced
by its environment38.
VI1.3 Implicationsfor the Icelandic Fish Industry
The Icelandic fish industry has in the recent years gone through massive
changes where the production companies are getting bigger and more
capable of taking on the increased competition. Changes have also been
experienced in the export sector where the companies are entering the stock
market and merging. These changes can be traced back to alternations in
the Icelandic business environment, where companies are increasingly
entering the public stock markets and freedom is increasing in the Icelandic
economy. Changes in fisheries management, especially the ITQ system,
have also made it easier for companies to buy out other companies and
transfer their quotas to their own fishing vessels. These changes, that is
increased freedom in the Icelandic economy, the improved access of
companies to the stock markets and changes on the ITQ system have pushed
for increased concentration in the fisheries and production sectors for the
past decade. Despite these changes, the production companies in the
Icelandic fish industry are in almost all cases so small that it is unlikely that
they will be capable of marketing their products completely through a "go-
38
Axelsson, B. & Nohria, N.
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it-alone" strategy. In order to do so they need to specialise more, narrow the
production spectrum and market what they are selling. At the same time, it
is clear that on the markets the buyers, mainly the supermarkets, are getting
bigger and strengthening their bargaining position. This concentration of
the supermarkets has in many cases changed their approach to suppliers.
The supermarkets now want fewer of them, wishing to build up long-term
relationships. Hence, it will be increasingly difficult for small companies to
sell direct to the supermarkets. This makes it more difficult for small
companies to compete on the markets where the buyers are looking for
fewer suppliers who can serve their needs better and lower the transaction
cost.
This development on the markets, with increased power and importance of
supermarket chains, will in the future add to the pressure on companies
within the Icelandic fish industry to work together and become part of a
competitive supply/value chain instead of focusing on a go-it-alone strategy.
Hence, the reality in the Icelandic fish industry is that companies will need
to be able to cooperate with each other to be as competitive in the future as
they have been in the past. The latest development in the export sector
where the two principal marketing companies, UIFP and IS, are merging,
supports the need for producers as well as exporting companies to be able to
cooperate with each other through a win-win strategy. The danger is that
increased freedom and bigger companies will encourage managers to gain a
better competitive advantage through their bargaining power against each
other rather than through cooperation. Such a development will in all cases
damage the Icelandic fish industry in the long run. Rather, it is essential
that these two sectors should work together in a win-win way to create an
environment that benefits both. The implications of this research will help
managers in both sectors to understand better the nature and demands of
working in a close relationship with other companies.
It is therefore claimed that as the production companies grow and become
stronger, their need for value creation will increase. Their need for taking
care of their own matters such as marketing their products will increase as
well. This makes great demands on the marketing companies for shaping an
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environment where the producers can be creative and pursue their own
strategy instead of having the central firm and the marketing subsidiaries
thinking and acting for them as they have done in the past. To be able to
create this kind of environment it is essential that the marketing company
and the producers are not in direct conflict concerning value creation. This
does not means that the marketing company should not be in secondary
processing. Rather, that the companies that are responsible for returning
information and knowledge from the markets should create value for the
producers and should not be in competition with the producers over value
creation as the research findings in chapter VI. 1 and VI.2 indicate. One of
the essential factors that emerged from these research findings is that direct
communication and contact between customers and producers is essential in
value creation. On the other hand for a more standardised product,
centralisation of activities is well justified due to the effectiveness of that
system. Hence, a mixture of governance mechanisms that is formal,
characterised by centralisation, and informal, characterised by direct
communication, is essential to create the necessary flexibility and
effectiveness for the participants' companies in the network.
Due to increased freedom for the producers in choosing their way of selling
their products, barriers against leaving the marketing companies and
segmentation between the companies are loosening up. Due to long time
enforcement of producers to sell their products through the marketing
companies it is not unlikely that they will increasingly start to export on
their own to gain knowledge in the filed of marketing by direct connection
which has been a very limited option until now. In this atmosphere of
increased freedom, it is essential for the marketing companies to reconsider
what they can offer the producers and how they can create value for them
that will persuade them to stay in their business. Hence, it is important that
the marketing companies return the knowledge to producers and make the
network marketing- and knowledge- driven instead of being an almost
completely production driven network. This puts pressure on the marketing
companies to reconsider their position in the value chain as well as forcing
them to reconsider value creation in the value chain and their part in it. This
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means that the marketing companies will have to consider whether they will
concentrate on their own value creation, leaving the producers as suppliers
or whether they should involve the producers in the value creation by
cooperating with them rather then competing with them over the value
creation.
In accordance with increased freedom in the Icelandic economy and the
establishment of stock markets, it is clear that the pressure on companies in
the fish industry has greatly increased. The stock markets have encouraged
necessary and long overdue changes to the Icelandic fish industry, geared to
making it more profitable and business-focused instead of a rather social-
focused industry where the aim was often to keep up employment rather
than make profit. This pressure from the stock markets has resulted in
companies in the fish industry needing more than ever to be profitable and
expand their operation to meet the expectations of the shareholders and the
stock markets. Despite the positive influence of the stock market, it is clear
that it is rather primitive, where expectation and demands are often made by
people with knowledge or understanding of the nature of the business that
they are analysing. This has influenced the expectations of how business
should be conducted where the view of the specialist of the stock markets is
often the only view that is reported in the media. The reality is that in too
many cases the knowledge of the analysers of the stock markets is bound to
key figures in the business and judgment is based on how they should look
to please the markets. This brings with it a danger of too much
generalisation, almost a "fashion", of how business should be conducted
rather than an understanding of the nature of the business. The are
remarkable sign of this in the fish industry, where the marketing companies
are supposed to buy all their products for resale as the stock markets claim
this is the way "business should be conducted". UIFP has in many ways set
the stage for this with its good performance in past years where they have
bought all their products for further sale or further production, making the
producers function as their suppliers. It has to be considered that this
performance ofUFIP occurs in years when the prices of their products have
been on the way up, causing stocking products to be profitable. This
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environment, where the prices go up is not guaranteed to last as well as the
homogeneous UIFP products which makes this way of doing business well
justified. On the other hand, this business strategy is not likely to increase
the value creation by the production sector in Iceland. Rather it supports
value creation and further processing abroad. This is due to the cutting of
the connection between the markets and production as well as to the fact
that the marketing company is concentrating on its own value creation much
rather than the producers. The research findings point out the need for a
direct connection between the production and the markets to support the
value creation. The networks need to be more marketing-driven rather than
production-driven where information; openness and knowledge are the
critical issues. The merger between UIFP and IS makes new demands on
UIFP where, as the producers inside IS they are much more akin to the
producers inside the IFPC network. Therefore it is not unlikely that they
will put pressure on their value creation and not accept being treated as pure
suppliers.
As the networks in this research have developed, there has been clear
blocking of this connection causing less value creation in Iceland than
would have been possible with a more marketing- and knowledge- driven
network. It is important that companies in the Icelandic fish industry, both
production and marketing companies, work together to create value in such
a way that it will benefit both sectors. It is well justified that the marketing
companies operates secondary processing abroad. But it is unacceptable
that secondary processing is causing conflict with the producers, thus
undermining further value creation for producers in Iceland as the research
findings suggest.
As has been said earlier the production companies in the Icelandic fish
industry are relatively small and they will need to rely on their ability to
work with other companies and build their competitive strength on
cooperation; i.e. on relationships with other companies. In the same way the
marketing companies in the Icelandic fish industry will base their
competitive stance on the markets on their relationships with their producers
and how they can create value with them. Therefore cooperation will be one
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of the biggest elements in the fish industry and the competitiveness of the
industry will be based on the ability of these two sectors to work together.
VI1.4 Further Research
Due to limited research in this field, this research is rather broad covering
almost all aspects and history of the relationships between producers and the
marketing companies in the Icelandic fish industry. This results in research,
which does not go very deeply into detail in matters of relationships but
rather casts light on their main factors. It points out therefore, the need for
further research into more specific aspects of the network between small
companies. Suggestions for further study that can be drawn from this
research are therefore many, but five proposals are made.
Firstly, further research into the role of strategy and strategy formation in
the network spanning a few levels in the value chain is needed. This
research suggests the need for strategic leadership, which supports the
literature about a strategic centre in the network. What has been studied less
is the formation of strategy in such a network and even whether it is
possible to build up some shared strategy in networks with a high number of
participants' companies. Research could focus on preconditions for the
formation of such a strategy and the impact that strategy leadership would
have on the operation of the network.
The second suggestion is to study closer the value creation in marketing
networks between small and medium size companies. Focus in this research
would need to be on how each participant contributes to the network and the
different aspects of value creation for each actor in the network. This would
contribute to better understanding on the value creation in such networks,
where the value creation is not as clear as in the dominant perspective and
the go-it-alone strategy.
Thirdly, further research is needed into the governance aspect of a network
like this. Although it is claimed that this research has contributed towards
better understanding of the governance, it is limited to only two cases and
much more is needed to be able to generalise on the governance of such
networks. In this connection, it would be interesting to study closer what
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influences the need for formal and informal governance mechanisms in
networks and how different mechanisms have been used in networks.
The fourth field that is suggested here is to study the ownership of the
network. It would be interesting to see more research into networks with a
high number of participants' companies, where, as this research points out,
the lack of leader and ownership has made the networks conservative and
slow to change which contributes a danger to the competitiveness of the
network as an organisational form compared to other forms.
The fifth and final suggestion is to study the effect of environmental factors
on the development of the network. This would open up various options of
research such as taking the stakeholders' impact on the networks and
studying how they have influenced the operation, individual companies in
the network and also the network in whole.
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